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Police Reform Through a Power Lens
A B ST RA CT. Scholars and reformers have in recent years begun to imagine new and different
configurations for how the state can design policing institutions. These conversations have in-
creased in volume and urgency in response to the 2020 national uprising against police violence,
when radical demands born within social movements have gained steam-demands to defund
the police, to institute "people's budgets;' and to give communities control over the state provi-
sion of security. In recent years, within this time of foment and possibility, social movements
have been proposing, creating, and sometimes establishing new governance arrangements that
shift power over policing to those who have been most harmed by mass criminalization and mass
incarceration. These recent pushes by social movements for power shifting surface a fundamental
set of questions about the very purpose of police reform, adding a new way for scholars and re-
formers to think about the contours and objectives of the state's provision of safety and securi-
ty - what this Article terms the power lens.
This Article examines the movement focus on power shifting in the governance of the police
at both the local and national levels. It fleshes out a three-part theoretical account of why the
power lens is an important and necessary addition to how scholars and reformers view the regu-
lation of policing. First, shifting power to policed populations is reparative, in the sense that it
shifts power downward toward populations who have been denied political power directly as a
result of the history of policing policies and practices in their neighborhoods. Second, power
shifting is a means of promoting antisubordination, based on the idea that it is wrong for the
state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior social status of historically oppressed groups.
Third, a power lens on police reform promotes a particular view of contestatory democracy, one
in which democratic policing has as one of its objectives the facilitation of countervailing power
for those subject to the domination of the state. Taken together, the power lens brings a critical
eye to the ways in which the construction of the notion of "expertise" often denies agency to the
people who most often interact with police in the streets and on the roads. More broadly, the
power lens opens up discussions of reform to first-order questions about how the state should go
about providing safety and security in our time, with or without the police as we know it.
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POLICE REFORM THROUGH A POWER LENS
INTRODUCTION
The demands that emerged amid the 2020 uprisings against police violence
and white supremacy brought into the national consciousness radical ideas for
change in how the state should provide safety and security. There are demands
to defund the police, to have the people decide how budgets are allocated, and
to give communities control over how to define public safety. To look back just
one year is to see how these visions are the product of long-term organizing by
directly impacted people -especially Black, Latinx, and Indigenous people-
pushing to create new visions of how to keep each other safe. In June 2019, for
instance, Black Lives Matter Chicago and other local groups held a press con-
ference to condemn the killing by Chicago Police Department (CPD) officers of
five people of color in the previous thirty days. The activists issued a call to ac-
tion, summarized in this tweet: "Defund, Disarm, Disrupt CPD and business
as usual. #FightBack #CPACNow."I The last hashtag references a bill that had
been recently reintroduced in the Chicago City Council to form the Civilian
Police Accountability Council (CPAC), which would consist of civilians chosen
through elections in each neighborhood district.2 As the activists supporting
the bill have written: "Without taking power away from the police and the
state systems that operate in complicity, nothing will change. We need com-
munity in control. It is our democratic right."3 When protests erupted on the
streets of Chicago in May and June of 2020, people were ready with their trans-
formational demands. "CPAC NOW" became a ubiquitous sign and chant,
1. See BLM Chicago (@BLMChi), TWITTER (June 12, 2019, 2:25 PM EDT), https://twitter
.com/BLMChi/status/113887 5o87 57 7387 009 [https://perma.cc/AZ6G-S52N]; see also Press
Release, MacArthur Justice Center, Coalition of Community and Civil Rights Groups Call
on the City, Attorney General, State's Attorney to Address Escalating Police Violence (June
13, 2019), https://www.macarthurjustice.org/coalition-of-community-and-civil-rights-
groups-call-on-the-city-attorney-general-states-attorney-to-address-escalating-police-
violence [https://perma.cc/SsRQ-YCK8] (describing the coalition that "urged the Mayor
and City Council to implement the Civilian Police Accountability Council (CPAC) as the
only way to create meaningful community-based accountability and ensure those most im-
pacted by police violence have the necessary role to transform the Chicago Police Depart-
ment").
2. See Matt Masterson, Chicago Alderman Renews Push for Elected Police Oversight Council,
WTTW NEWS (May 14, 2019, 1:49 PM), https://news.wttw.com/2019/o5/14/chicago-
alderman-renews-push-elected-police-oversight-council [https://perma.cc/AG78-2XN4];
The People's Guide to an Elected Civilian Police Accountability Council, STOP POLICE CRIMES
(Mar. 2015), https://jcua.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/1o/CPACB-WPeoplesGuide
_March2o15.pdf [https://perma.cc/A87S-G28G] (summarizing the proposed ordinance).
3. See BLMChicago (@BLMChi), TWITTER (June 19, 2019, 12:11 PM EDT), https://
twitter.com/BLMChi/status/141377967484002304 [https://perma.cc/G6JV-JU4M].
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often placed or chanted in tandem with a demand to defund the Chicago Police
Department.4
In late 2019, a national coalition of grassroots groups led by people who are
formerly incarcerated, the "People's Coalition for Safety and Freedom," took the
25th Anniversary of the 1994 Crime Bill as an opportunity to present a vision of
national legislation that could replace that much-maligned bill. 5 The new legis-
lation would require the federal government to reduce its spending on the
criminal legal system and invest instead in health, education, housing, and in-
frastructure.6 The People's Coalition insists that new national policies be gen-
erated by "join[ing] forces with the people most harmed by policing, criminali-
zation and incarceration."7 The result is a call for a "People's Process," in which
federal legislators would be required to conduct townhalls, workshops, and
peoples' assemblies on the impact of mass criminalization; hold in-district con-
gressional hearings on the impact of the 1994 Crime Bill; and, ultimately, draft
legislation based on the priorities of directly impacted people.' These ideas
reemerged in the summer of 2020, embodied in the BREATHE Act and the
People's Coalition's continued work to engage in their own "People's Process"
to craft federal budgeting priorities.9
4. See Curtis Black, Community Oversight or Control? Coalitions Meet on Competing Police Ac-
countability Standards, CHI. REP. (July 1, 2020), https://www.chicagoreporter.com
/community-oversight-or-control-coalitions-meet-on-competing-police-accountability-
proposals [https://perma.cc/EQ3T-5F99] (describing "thousands of Chicagoans in the
streets in recent weeks demanding community control of police in the form of an elected Ci-
vilian Police Accountability Council").
5. See Deanna Hoskins, Andrea C. James & Kumar Rao, Opinion, The '94 Crime Bill 25 Years
Later: It's Time for a Reckoning, COLORLINES (Sept. 30, 2019, 11:40 AM ET), https://www
.colorlines.com/articles/94-crime-bill-25-years-later-its-time-reckoning-op-ed [https://
perma.cc/MSW9-XH9Z] (announcing the formation of this coalition). On the 1994 Crime
Bill, see Lauren-Brooke Eisen, The Complex History of the Controversial 1994 Crime Bill,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work
/analysis-opinion/complex-history-controversial-1994-crime-bill [https://perma.cc/7BPR-
224G].
6. See Hoskins, James & Rao, supra note 5.
7. Id.
8. See Reckoning with Mass Criminalization and Mass Incarceration: A Proposal to Advance a New
Vision of Public Safety and Dismantle the 1994 Crime Bill Through a Participatory People's Pro-
cess, CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY 5 (Sept. 2019) [hereinafter Reckoning with Mass Crimi-
nalization], https://secureservercdn.net/198.71.233.15o/yjt.eea.myftpupload.com/wp-
content/uploads/2o2o/o7/94-Violent-Crime-Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DEK-KS82].
9. See The BREATHE Act, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES (July 2020), https://breatheact
.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/The-BREATHE-Act-PDFFINAL3-1.pdf [https://
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These two long-term collective efforts -locally, in Chicago, for community
control of the police; and nationally, via the People's Coalition, to repeal and
replace the '94 Crime Bill -represent two different scales of a growing empha-
sis within social movements: reckoning with police violence by imagining new
forms of governance and policymaking in which power is shifted to those who
have been most harmed by mass criminalization and mass incarceration. These
calls for power shifting surface a series of questions about police reform and
the governance of criminal legal institutions more broadly. One set of questions
gets at the specifics of institutional design within governance arrangements.
This is a subject that Sabeel Rahman and I take up in a parallel work, analyzing
the elements of institutional design in local governance that can (or cannot) fa-
cilitate contestation, build power, and push back against the antidemocratic
structures of laws themselves.10 But the movement visions of legislative and in-
stitutional change also bring forth a more fundamental set of questions about
the very purpose of "police reform," whether it is local, national, or somewhere
in between. By concentrating on power arrangements and a particular form of
contestatory democracy, these movements open up police "reforms" to new in-
stitutional arrangements with the potential to facilitate the defunding and even
abolition of policing as we know it.
Underlying the contemporary movement demands for governance changes
that include community control of the police and a national "People's Process"
is a critique of two leading ways of thinking about the objective of reforming
the governance of law enforcement. The first traditional way of thinking about
police reform is instrumental: reformers focus on policies that they hope will
lead to particular outcomes traditionally associated with policing success - as
examples, a reduction in reports of violent crime or a reduction in police use of
unconstitutional excessive force."1 A second leading way of conceptualizing po-
lice reform focuses on building trust between the police and communities so as
Coalition for Safety and Freedom (@PplsCoalition), TWITTER (July 15, 2020, 4:24 PM
EDT), https://twitter.com/PplsCoalition/status/1283497591o12o4o7o6 [https://perma.cc
/YEM6-KS4M].
1o. See K. Sabeel Rahman & Jocelyn Simonson, The Institutional Design of Community Control,
108 CALIF. L. REv. 679 (2020). What we do not do, however, is provide a broader theoretical
account of why shifting power should be a goal of police reform specifically.
11. See, e.g., NAT'L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG'G & MED., PROACTIVE POLICING: EFFECTS ON CRIME
COMMUNITIES 119-32 (David Weisburd & Malay K. Majmundar eds., 2018) (describing how
to measure reductions in crime and disorder associated with policing); cf Nat'l Inst. of Just.,
Overview of Police Use of Force, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (Mar. 5, 2020), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics
/articles/overview-police-use-force [https://perma.cc/34C9-WAJD] (discussing the diffi-
culties that arise from measuring police use of excessive force).
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to enhance the legitimacy of the police. 12 Often, the instrumentalist and the le-
gitimacy approaches are combined in a manner that aims to strike a balance be-
tween the two goals, or to weave them together into one coherent method.13 In
contrast to the instrumentalist approach or the legitimacy approach, the
movement focus on governance and policymaking in police reform adds a
different idea about what it means to regulate the police effectively. The reform
proposals from movement groups urface the specific role that policing plays in
denying people in highly policed neighborhoods their democratic standing and
collective political impact. They advocate reform efforts to counteract the anti-
democratic nature of policing. They focus on power.
Since the uprisings in Ferguson and Baltimore intersected with the for-
mation of the Movement for Black Lives (M4BL), the last six years have seen
far-reaching changes in how the public and legal scholars alike think about po-
licing 14-changes that have only intensified in the wake of the 2020 upris-
ings.15 These changes would not have been possible without the push from
12. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, The Path Forward: Improving the Dynamics of Community-Police
Relationships to Achieve Effective Law Enforcement Policies, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1355, 1361-68
(2017); Final Report, PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 9-18 (May 2015),
https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforcefinalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/ML3G-
GG9J].
13. See, e.g., Kami Chavis Simmons, Increasing Police Accountability: Restoring Trust and Legitima-
cy Through the Appointment of Independent Prosecutors, 49 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 137, 158
(2015) (describing the goal of reform as finding a combination of ways to "effectively restore
trust and reduce police violence"); Leadership, NAT'L INITIATIVE FOR BUILDING COMMUNITY
TRUST & JUST., https://trustandjustice.org/about/leadership [https://perma.cc/J8VS-
MV8S] (describing the organization's mission to promote "the best of law enforcement and
community-driven approaches to improve public safety, minimize arrests and incarceration,
enhance police legitimacy, and rebuild relationships between law enforcement and distressed
communities"); PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 12, at iii
(combining instrumental ideas about outcomes with reforms focused on increasing trust be-
tween police and communities); cf Kate Levine, Discipline and Policing, 68 DUKE L.J. 839,
852 (2019) ("[T]ransparency is a core reform suggestion in almost every recent scholarly
proposal regarding policing problems.").
14. See Samuel Walker, "Not Dead Yet": The National Police Crisis, A New Conversation About Po-
licing, and the Prospects for Accountability-Related Police Reform, 2018 U. ILL. L. REv. 1777, 1782-
83 (describing the "National Police Crisis" after the 2014 events in Ferguson and the creation
of a "New Conversation" about police reform).
15. For just a small sample of legal scholars engaging with new ideas around police reform in
the summer of 2020, see, for example, Monica Bell, Black Security and the Conundrum of Po-
licing, JUST SECURITY (July 15, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71418/black-security-
and-the-conundrum-of-policing [https://perma.cc/FWY6-NMHX]; Barry Friedman,
Brandon L. Garrett, Rachel Harmon, Christy E. Lopez, Tracey L. Meares, Maria Ponoma-
renko, Christopher Slobogin & Tom R. Tyler, Changing the Law to Change Policing: First
Steps, JUST. COLLABORATORY (June 2020), https://aw.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area
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movement actors to recognize the racialized and subordinating history of polic-
ing in the United States. 16 A number of legal scholars has argued recently that
transformative change is necessary if we are to realize legitimate, fair, and equal
means through which the state can provide security. For example, Paul Butler,
Bennett Capers, and Tracey Meares have all called for us to think of police re-
form as a "Third Reconstruction,"" implying a total shift in the way that the
state provides security in the context of the history of racist and racialized po-
licing. Amna Akbar, Monica Bell, and Barry Friedman have, in different ways,
all called for a complete transformation in how we think about the path for-
ward: For Bell, it is a focus on undoing the subordinating effects of racial seg-
regation;18 For Friedman, it requires disaggregating the roles that we ask police
officers to play in order to reduce harm;19 And for Akbar, it requires the reduc-
/center/justice/document/changetochangefinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/3V6H-PGST];
Amna Akbar, Monica Bell, Dorothy Roberts & Jocelyn Simonson, Beyond Reform: Reenvi-
sioning the Role of Police, YOUTUBE (June 24, 2020), https://www.youtube.com
/watch ?v=qGXVSg5EjdI [https://perma.cc/AP98-F3FY]; and Monica Bell, Allegra McLeod,
Jamelia Morgan, Anthony O'Rourke & Rick Su, Defunding the Police: A Conversation, U.
BUFF. SCH. LAw (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.law.buffao.edu/news/defunding-the-police
.html [https://perma.cc/7YB3-35MC].
16. Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 416 (2018)
("The rebellions in Ferguson and Baltimore ... and the accompanying swell of Black-led
organizing, forced hard-charging conversations about law, the police, and the state -routine
conversations in communities of color that are relatively absent in legal scholarship -onto
the national stage, changing the debate over race in the United States." (footnote omitted)).
17. Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Re-
form, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1475 (2016) ("I want to support a frame alignment around the term
'Third Reconstruction .7..."); L Bennett Capers, Afrofuturism, Critical Race Theory, and Po-
licing in the Year 2044, 94 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 59-60 (2019) ("How do we make a reality what
CRT scholars and fellow travelers have long called for, a Third Reconstruction that would
'merge "we" and "they" while eliminating the role that whiteness and blackness play in de-
termining who belongs and who does not'?" (footnote omitted) (quoting Lisa A. Crooms-
Robinson, Is the Third Time the Charm? Reconstructing Personhood and Reimagining "We the
People," 43 HUM. RTs. 28, 31 (2018)); Tracey Meares, A Third Reconstruction?, BALKINIZATION
(Aug. 14, 2015), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2o15/o8/a-third-reconstruction.html [https://
perma.cc/UAC5-877W] ("Once we have [a] system in which the formal and hidden curricu-
la are the same for everyone we will have achieved the goal of the Third Reconstruction.");
see also Capers, supra, at 59 n.323, 6o nn.324-30 (collecting sources of Critical Race Theory
(CRT) scholars who have linked CRT to the idea of a Third Reconstruction).
18. See Monica C. Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. REv. 65o, 677-84 (2020).
ig. See Barry Friedman, Disaggregating the Policing Function, 169 U. PA. L. REv. (forthcoming
2021) (manuscript at 26-52), https://ssm.com/abstract=3564469 [https://perma.cc/Q8EF-
WZ 3S].
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tion and elimination of the police footprint altogether.2o And a number of
scholars have called for the "democratization" of policing, a rethinking in how
we administer policing as much as in what our policies and priorities for polic-
ing should be."
Even if these scholars disagree on what that "reconstruction," "transfor-
mation," or "democracy" would look like, as well as whether the institution of
policing can ever be compatible with racial justice or public safety,22 there is a
tentative agreement from many corners that large-scale transformation is nec-
essary and possible. This tentative consensus creates an opening to imagine
new and different configurations for how the state can organize policing spe-
cifically and the provision of safety and security more generally. Thanks to the
radical visions of social movements, a vast range of possibilities stretches out
before us, from cementing our current policing practices with improved spe-
cialization and increased resources, to abolishing our institutions of policing
altogether. It is within this range of possibilities that some movement actors
have begun to propose and create new forms of governance arrangements that
shift power over policing to those who have historically been the targets of po-
licing. Although many of these efforts remain relatively unrecognized in the
public sphere, some have gained national attention in 2020, including calls to
defund the police, efforts to institute people's budgets that implicate law en-
forcement and community wellbeing, calls for community control over polic-
ing, and demonstrations of long-term mutual aid as an alternative to policing.
20. See Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1782, 1832-
39 (2020).
21. See, e.g., Richard A. Bierschbach, Fragmentation and Democracy in the Constitutional Law of
Punishment, 111 Nw. U. L. REv. 1437, 1452-53 (2017); Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy
Making by Procurement, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1595, 1655-62 (2016); Barry Friedman & Maria
Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1827, 1889-1907 (2015); Joshua Klein-
feld, Three Principles of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 Nw. U. L. REV. 1455, 1464-65, 1483-86
(2017) ; Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for "Community Engagement"
Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 793, 798 (2016); Maria Ponoma-
renko, Rethinking Police Rulemaking, 114 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 20-45 (2019); Christopher Slobo-
gin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REv. 91, 134-51 (2016); see also Symposium, De-
mocratizing Criminal Law, 11 Nw. U. L. REv. 1367 (2017) (a collection of essays on the theme
of democratizing criminal law); Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L.
REv. 761, 809-16 (2012) (urging legal scholars to study the regulation of policing by analyz-
ing the comparative advantages of various regulating institutions beyond courts and consti-
tutional rights).
22. Compare, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, CHOIEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 229-47 (2017) (pushing to-
ward the abolition of policing), with Tracey L. Meares, Synthesizing Narratives of Policing and
Making a Case for Policing as a Public Good, 63 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 553, 558-62 (2019) (describ-
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In many of these proposals, one central goal of the "reform" is to shift power
away from the police and toward policed communities.
In this Article, I identify the movement focus on power shifting in the gov-
ernance of the police and provide an account of why we should incorporate the
power lens into the array of objectives of "police reform." This analysis consists
of three theoretical arguments. First, shifting power to policed populations
might be reparative,2 3 in the sense that it shifts power downward toward popu-
lations who have been denied political power directly as a result of the history
of policing policies and practices in their neighborhoods.2 4 Second, power
shifting might be a means of promoting antisubordination, based on the princi-
ple that "it is wrong for the state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior
social status of historically oppressed groups."25 Third, a power lens on police
reform promotes a particular view of contestatory democracy, one in which dem-
ocratic governance has as an objective the facilitation of countervailing power
for those subject to the domination of the state. This view is anchored to a
larger belief that direct forms of agonistic contestation are crucial for democrat-
ic justice,26 in part because it is our criminal legal system itself that, by defini-
tion, yields forms of domination and violence.27
23. Cf Alfred L. Brophy, Reconsidering Reparations, 81 IND. L.J. 811, 835-36 (2006) (explaining
reparations and what they are designed to accomplish); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bot-
tom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 394 (1987)
("Reparations ... is a concept directed at remedying wrongs committed against the power-
less.").
24. See generally AMY E. LERMAN & VESLAM. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRAT-
IC CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL 64-69 (2014) (describing the erosion of
citizens' power to hold police officers and departments accountable); Monica C. Bell, Police
Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2067 (2017) ("[A]t both
an interactional and structural level, current regimes can operate to effectively banish whole
communities from the body politic.").
25. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional
Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1470, 1472-73 (2004); see also Owen M. Fiss, Groups
and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108, 157 (1976) (arguing that the
Equal Protection Clause should prohibit laws that "impair[] the status of a specially disad-
vantaged group").
26. See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Through Contestation and Re-
sistance, 111 Nw. U. L. REv. 1609, 1612, 1623-24 (2017).
27. Cf EGON BITTNER, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE POLICE IN MODERN SOCIETY: A REVIEW OF
BACKGROUND FACTORS, CURRENT PRACTICES, AND POSSIBLE ROLE MODELS 38-39 (1970) (de-
scribing policing as primarily about the imposition of force); Harmon, supra note 21, at 762
("Police officers are granted immense authority by the state to impose harm."); Alice Ris-
troph, The Thin Blue Line from Crime to Punishment, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 305,
306-07 (2018) (describing the role of force inherent to the nature of policing).
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Taken together, these ways of thinking about power shifting in policing - as
reparations, as a method of antisubordination, or as facilitating contestation
necessary for democracy-create a lens on policing that adds a critical layer to
the dominant ways of thinking about the objectives of "police reform." The
power lens asks analytical questions separate and apart from traditional focuses
on outcomes like crime rates, incidents of police violence, or a community's
trust in the police. Instead, it asks reformers to consider who has been and is in
danger of being harmed by policing, and to connect that inquiry to questions
about who has control over policing policies, priorities, and practices. It asks
scholars and reformers to imagine what it would mean to set aside temporarily
a desire to rely on traditional "experts"28 or even "evidence-based"2 9 practices -
for it may be that lay people are not well-equipped to form policies and distrib-
ute resources in a way that leads to improvements in traditional police-reform
metrics, like crime rates or trust in the police. Divorced from this focus on out-
comes, the power lens brings a critical eye to the ways in which the construc-
tion of expertise itself denies agency to the people who most frequently interact
with police on the streets and on the roads: most often, poor Black and brown
people. One way to unearth this analysis is to examine the governance and pol-
icymaking proposals being put forth by social movement actors -people tradi-
tionally thought of as "nonexperts" - themselves.
Methodologically, this Article uses social movement visions of legal change
as a starting point for asking broader questions about how we think about and
study policing and the criminal legal system.30 In this sense, it is both descrip-
tive and normative: it provides a descriptive account of a way in which some
social movement actors are approaching reform, and then follows with a nor-
mative account of why scholars should take this approach seriously and weave
it into existing scholarly accounts of the regulation of policing. When this view
28. See, e.g., RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS IN-
CARCERATION 165-85 (2019); Ponomarenko, supra note 21, at 41-44; cf John Rappaport,
Some Doubts About "Democratizing" Criminal Justice, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 759 nn.276-78,
76o nn.279-82 (2020) (collecting studies showing that laypeople can be punitive, in contrast
to the view that democratizing criminal adjudication will lead to leniency).
29. See, e.g., ANTHONY A. BRAGA & DAVID L. WEISBURD, POLICING PROBLEM PLACES: CRIME HOT
SPOTS AND EFFECTIVE PREVENTION 99-151 (2010) (describing the importance of focusing on
"evidence-based" police practices); Brandon L. Garrett, Evidence-Informed Criminal Justice,
86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490, 1493 (2018) ("Evidence-informed practices refer to a family of
approaches that have brought greater use of data and science into the criminal justice sys-
tem.").
30. For more on this methodology, see Amna Akbar, Sameer Ashar & Jocelyn Simonson, Move-
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"from the bottom" is brought into scholarly discourse over the contours of po-
lice reform and police accountability, the resulting analysis expands the range
of possibilities for how we approach goals such as justice and public safety.3 1
The power lens is rarely going to be, on its own, a complete way of ap-
proaching reform of the criminal legal system. Instead, it can be a complemen-
tary lens, one that must be separated out in order to be analyzed properly. In a
sense, it is at the meso-level of police reform: concentrating on governance and
policymaking arrangements rather than outcomes or policies themselves.
Indeed, there is no guarantee that a power-shifting arrangement in policing
would on its own lead to any particular outcomes. Communities, however de-
fined, are not monolithic, 32 a reality that has become especially salient as com-
munities of color have disagreed internally over the summer of 2020 about calls
to defund the police.33 The result of power shifting in police reform could easi-
ly go in a very different direction than that envisioned by activists in Black
Lives Matter Chicago or the People's Coalition, the two movement groups that
are at the center of the examples of the power lens that I examine in this Arti-
31. See Matsuda, supra note 23, at 324 ("Looking to the bottom-adopting the perspective of
those who have seen and felt the falsity of the liberal promise - can assist critical scholars in
the task of fathoming the phenomenology of law and defining the elements of justice."); cf
Richard Delgado, Law Enforcement in Subordinated Communities: Innovation and Response,
1o6 MICH. L. REV. 1193, 1204 (2008) (book review) (discussing how looking to the respons-
es of subordinated communities to policing can help unearth new ways of thinking about
policing).
32. Cf Monica C. Bell, The Community in Community Justice: Subordination, Consumption, Re-
sistance, and Transformation, 16 Du BoIs REv. 197, 210 (2019) ("[M]embers of marginalized
communities who seem similarly situated can simultaneously have multiple types of rela-
tionships with the crime control apparatus."); Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the
Danger of "Community," 2003 UTAH L. REv. 343, 348 (describing how the term "the commu-
nity" in its different forms "can mask fundamental ambiguities of group definition ... or se-
rious political conflicts within what otherwise seems a determinate group"). This is especial-
ly true when describing "community" solely by artificial geographical boundaries. See
Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107
HARV. L. REv. 1841, 1844 (1994) (describing the "oppressive and disempowering" nature of
boundary-drawing in the context of racial segregation sanctioned by local governments);
Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 403-59 (2001) (arguing
that defining "communities" within local boundaries gives priority to certain privileged deci-
sionmakers over others, and can actually be exclusionary).
33. See Peter Hermann & Clarence Williams, On a D.C. Street Beset by Gun Violence, Calls to Fix
Policing, Not Defund It, WASH. POST (July 10, 2020, 7:29 PM EDT), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/on-a-dc-street-beset-by-gun-violence-calls-to-fix-
policing-not-defund-it/2o2o/o7/1o/35of46de-c143-ilea-b4f6-cb39cd894ofbstory.html
[https://perma.cc/QAK-4YN8]; Jeffrey C. Mays, Who Opposes Defunding the N.Y.P.D.?
These Black Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2o2o
/o8/1o/nyregion/defund-police-nyc-council.html [https://perma.cc/8BLA-A2PQ].
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cle. Community control of the police, for instance, might very well lead a par-
ticular police district to more police patrols, more arrests, more stops-and-
frisks, and an increase in other tactics that are seen as "tough on crime.""
Moreover, changes in top-level policies in police departments have no guaran-
teed effect on the behavior of police officers; changes in police department poli-
cies or even resources might not lead to widespread change on the ground.35
Such a result would surely frustrate activists who aimed to reduce or defund
policing in their neighborhoods. But considering the normative value of this
outcome would be a separate question from whether there had been a power
shift in the course of the governance arrangement hat led to this kind of polic-
ing. This Article attempts to engage in that separation between various lenses
and levels of reform, giving the power lens the serious attention that social
movements demand of us.
At the same time, it is through the process of demanding power that
movement groups are able to put more radical demands -such as abolition-
on the table of what is possible.36 It is no coincidence that the calls for power
shifting that this Article describes come from abolitionist grassroots organiza-
tions, many of which organize under the banner of the Movement for Black
Lives,3 7 and all of which have been engaging in collective projects to redefine
public safety on their own terms, imagining and creating ways in which "we
34. See Rappaport, supra note 28, at 759-60 (collecting studies of lay opinions of punishment
questioning the lenience of lay people); cf JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OwN:
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 10-11 (2017) (documenting how residents of
Washington, D.C., promoted "tough on crime" policies when faced with a lack of other op-
tions); Kate Levine, Police Prosecutions and Punitive Instincts, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2021) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author) (describing how Black Lives Matter and
other movement groups do not speak with one voice with regard to "punitive instincts").
35. Cf JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 227-29 (1978) (describing the limited
effects of local-community involvement and even local politics on the everyday behavior of
policing); Barbara Armacost, The Organizational Reasons Police Departments Don't Change,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 19, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/o8/the-organizational-reasons-
police-departments-dont-change [https://perma.cc/4X4U-6E7B] (arguing for the necessity
of top-down police reform).
36. For extended analyses of the movement push to abolish the police, see, for example, Akbar,
supra note 20; V. Noah Gimbel & Craig Muhammad, Are Police Obsolete? Breaking Cycles of
Violence Through Abolition Democracy, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1453, 1527-42 (2019); Allegra M.
McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1617-37 (2019), which de-
scribes abolitionist efforts in Chicago that center on policing; and Dorothy E. Roberts,
Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-29 (2019), which describes the
abolitionist analysis of the origins of policing within slave patrols and other deliberate state
means of oppressing Black Americans.
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keep us safe" in a world without police.38 The analysis by these groups of the
ways in which policing in the United States has mediated the oppression of
people and communities on the basis of race, gender, and disability focuses on
how policing is deeply intertwined with structural impediments to self-
governance. 9 Indeed, although there are plenty of disagreements between in-
dividual abolitionist groups about which method of power shifting is the best
road to abolition,4 there is seemingly a consensus that power shifting is im-
portant and necessary to the larger abolitionist project, and it should be a part
of "non-reformist" or "transformative" reforms.4 1 This is because abolitionist
38. See, e.g., About People's Budget LA, PEOPLE'S BUDGET LA, https://peoplesbudgetla.com/about
[https://perma.cc/D9NA-9TXP] (describing how a coalition of organizations in Los Ange-
les has been fighting for five years to present an alternative vision of public safety in which
the city spends money on public services rather than policing); see ZACH NORRIS, WE KEEP
US SAFE: BUILDING SECURE, JUST, AND INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES 63-99 (2020) (describing
community efforts for mutual aid and protection in Oaldand).
39. See, e.g., Enough Is Enough! A 15o Year Performance Review of the Minneapolis Police Depart-
ment, MPD15o (2017), https://www.mpdl5o.com/wp-content/themes/mpdl5o/assets
/mpd15o-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNT9-MP7L]; Solutions, AGENDA BUILD BLACK FU-
TURES, https://www.agendatobuildblackfutures.com/solutions [https://perma.cc/5W2D-
PQSG] (connecting demand to "[r]educe police budgets and reallocate residual funds to the
people's vision of public safety" to the demands to honor workers' rights, value women's
work, and promote trans health); Vision for Black Lives, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES,
https://m4bl.org/policy-platforms [https://perma.cc/VQR4-29TN] (connecting demands
for community control of both policing and schools to the push to equalize political power);
see also Rahman & Simonson, supra note io, at 693-99 (describing how contemporary
movement visions of change concentrate on counteracting long-term structural inequalities
created by or facilitated by the state).
40. Compare, e.g., Beth Richie, Dylan Rodriguez, Mariame Kaba, Melissa Burch, Rachel Herzing
& Shana Agid, Problems with Community Control of Police and Proposals for Alternatives, COM-
MUNITY RESOURCE HUB (Sept. 2020), https://drive.google.com/file/d/12q4eWZQzwIj-
EFrLUU2XbnLipKnXIuxG/view [https://perma.cc/8KT6-A4ZC] (presenting a critical
analysis of community control of the police from an abolitionist lens), with Max Rameau &
Netfa Freeman, Community Control vs. Defunding the Police: A Critical Analysis, BLACK AGEN-
DA REP. (June 10, 2020), https://www.blackagendareport.com/community-control-vs-
defunding-police-critical-analysis [https://perma.cc/5YJA-G7H4] (arguing that defunding
the police will not shift power and lead to abolition in the way that instituting community
control of the police would).
41. See 8 to Abolition: Abolitionist Policy Changes to Demand from Your City Officials, 8 TO ABOLI-
TION COALITION, https://statici.squarespace.com/static/5edbf32lb6026bO7 3fef9 7d4 /t
/5eeo817c955eaa484ollb8fe/1591771519433/8toAbolition_V2.pdf [https://perma.cc/UN7B-
CPDX] ('As abolitionists, we recognize that reforms that do not reduce the power of the po-
lice ... simply create new opportunities to surveil, police, and incarcerate Black, brown, in-
digenous, poor, disabled, trans, gender oppressed, queer, migrant people, and those who
work in street economies."); cf Amna A. Akbar, Demands for a Democratic Political Economy,
134 HARV. L. REV. F. 90, 98-106 (2020) (describing building power as one of three central
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demands require contending with first-order questions about how the state
should provide safety and security: Should it be through policing and prosecu-
tion and prisons or through state support of communities and responding to
harm in other ways? By claiming power over the governance arrangements that
lead to the distribution of state resources and agencies devoted to "safety," abo-
litionist social movements are able to put these first-order questions on the ta-
ble and then contest the answers to them in ways that traditional, consensus-
based modes of reform have foreclosed.
The Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I present an account of leading
ways of thinking about the purposes of police reform, each of which contrasts
with the movement focus on power -what I term the power lens. Part II pre-
sents a descriptive account of the contemporary, social movement focus on
power shifting as a central goal of police reform, using the examples of com-
munity control of the police and the push to adopt a "People's Process" to write
new federal legislation. Part III presents a theoretical account of the power lens,
focusing on three justifications for it: a reparative view, an antisubordination
view, and a view of contestation as necessary for democracy. In Part IV, I ex-
plore some implications of the power lens for how reformers should think
about the governance and scope of policing. In particular, I examine how the
power lens unsettles traditional notions of expertise in policing. I conclude by
arguing that if scholars and reformers were to think about power shifting
alongside other goals of reform, we could open up the terrain of reform to ide-
as and communities that are too often excluded from the conversation. Indeed,
we could potentially open up our governance arrangements to contestation
over the very existence of our institutions of policing.
I. THE OBJECTIVES OF POLICE REFORM
What is the purpose of policing? The state's "police power" is not itself in-
herently about police officers walking the beat, or responding to 911 calls or
other emergencies, or arresting people, or any number of activities that the po-
hallmarks of "non-reformist reforms"); Marbre Stahly-Butts & Amna A. Akbar, Transforma-
tive Reforms, Abolitionist Demands, STAN. J. C.R.-C.L. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2-
3) (on file with author) (explaining how for abolitionist social movements, one of the five
requirements of a transformative reform-a reform that supports the goal of abolition-is
"whether the reform builds or shifts power").
792
130:778 2021
POLICE REFORM THROUGH A POWER LENS
lice regularly engage in today.42 Instead, as Markus Dubber has written, the po-
lice power is and has been "a body of state action enormous in scope as well as
in variety."43 When it comes to the purpose of the forms of state action that we
call policing, though, we have come to assume a rather uniform set of goals.
These goals are relatively consistent throughout the literature on law enforce-
ment, even if particular scholars do not embrace all of them: that policing prac-
tices should reduce crime, make people feel safe, and promote trust between
police officers and communities so that they can work together to coproduce
safety-all while limiting the harms of policing, such as police violence, as
much as possible. Legal scholarship has well articulated and supported each of
these goals. And these goals bring with them particular metrics of measuring
change. In this Part, I outline, in broad strokes, some predominant ways in
which legal scholars tend to think about and measure the objectives of police
reform outside of constitutional change.44 I then contrast these traditional met-
rics of success to the focus on power that emerges from an examination of so-
cial movement actors' proposals for change.
A. Traditional Ideas of Policing Success
In this Part, I describe a series of traditional ways of thinking about polic-
ing success, each of which scholars have studied in detail, and most of which do
not take shifting governance or policymaking power to policed populations as
one of their goals. Broadly speaking, these traditional approaches can be placed
into two camps: one that focuses on instrumental outcomes and one that cen-
ters on legitimacy. More recently, there has been a rhetorical shift in the litera-
ture toward an emphasis on the "democratization" of policing. My purpose is
42. Cf Friedman, supra note 19, at 5-6 (arguing that police have for centuries been asked to play
these various roles without sustained questioning of whether they are the appropriate ac-
tors).
43. MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERI-
CAN GOVERNMENT 94 (2005); cf Alice Ristroph, An Intellectual History of Mass Incarceration,
6o B.C. L. REV. 1949, 1967-69, 1972-80 (2019) (describing the formation and expansion of
local American police forces at the same time as legal scholars defended the necessity of po-
lice discretion).
44. The approaches below focus on the subset of legal scholarship that analyzes "police reform"
as an object of study separate from constitutional criminal procedure. Cf Harmon, supra
note 21, at 809-16 (laying out this field). Proposed changes in constitutional doctrine can
then be a part of potential reforms, and compliance with constitutional rules may be a goal
in itself, especially for those focused on legitimacy.
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not to provide a taxonomy of scholarly approaches to policing45 but rather to
highlight that power is largely absent from the dominant frameworks that fo-
cus on reform.
1. Instrumental Approaches
One central and ongoing way of thinking about the purpose of policing and
police reform focuses on instrumental outcomes that target the reduction of
crime. The primary goal of policing, in this approach, is to contribute to low
levels of violence and victimization and make people "safer,"46 with "safety" de-
fined as an absence of physical violence or property intrusion.4 7 Scholars and
practitioners alike then measure the success of various reforms by analyzing
whether those reforms lead to a reduction in "crime rates," or, relatedly, a re-
45. Indeed, others have done this much more thoroughly. See, e.g., DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DE-
MOCRACYAND THE POLICE 66-105 (2008); Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal
Justice, 111 Nw. U. L. REV. 1367, 1399 (2017) (separating scholars into "democratizers" and
"bureaucratizers"); Tracey L. Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing the Difference Between Lawful
or Effective Policing and Rightful Policing-and Why It Matters, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1865,
1866 (2013) (contrasting scholars who focus on "lawful" or "effective" policing with those
who focus on policing that is "rightful"); Bernard Harcourt, The Influence of Systems Analysis
on Criminal Law and Procedure: A Critique of a Style of Judicial Decision-Making 2-3 (Colum.
Law Sch. Pub. Law Research, Working Paper No. 14-562, 2013), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=3o62900 [https://perma.cc/RX8C-TZPS] (describing "internal" and "external"
approaches of legal scholars in studying the "criminal justice system"). Moreover, I join Seth
Stoughton in the belief that "[n]o single footnote, nor even an entire article, is sufficient to
list the range of scholars who have studied policing and offered suggestions for improve-
ment on everything from agency culture to the use of force." Seth W. Stoughton, The Blurred
Blue Line: Reform in an Era of Public & Private Policing, 44 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117, 146 n.217
(2017).
46. Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 9o N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 901
(2015) ("Most local policing seeks to facilitate criminal justice and prevent crime and disor-
der in order to make a community safer and happier.").
47. See Barry Friedman, What Is Public Safety? 1 (May 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author) ("When public safety is discussed in the public sphere, it is assumed we mean
freedom from injury, violence, and crime, certainly to one's person, and to one's property as
well.... Surely, though, being safe means much more than freedom from sudden physical
harm."). This traditional definition of public safety is contested, especially in movement
spaces. See NORRIS, supra note 38, at 9 ("There are two ways to think about safety. There is a
fear-based way and a care-based way. . . . The fear-based model defines safety only in terms
of being free from crime and criminals, which is limited, and limiting."); Lauren Johnson,
Cinnamon Pelly, Ebony Ruhland, Simone Bess, Jacinda K. Dariotis & Janet Moore, Reclaim-
ing Safety 9-28 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (describing participatory-
action research in which community members in Cincinnati are collectively redefining pub-
lic safety for themselves).
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duction in fear of crime or evidence of "disorder."4" Beginning in the 1990s, po-
lice departments themselves increasingly measured their own success this way.
For example, departments used CompStat- a managerial system developed by
Bill Bratton and the New York Police Department that includes frequent analy-
sis of reports of crimes and arrests by officers -with the stated, primary goal of
the reduction of crime.49 Using this and other evidence-based methods, re-
searchers have been able to analyze the effectiveness of various police policies,
including mandatory-arrest policies, hot-spot policing, broken-windows polic-
ing, and "community-oriented policing." 0 Most of these studies use the same
metrics: (1) police statistics on the occurrence of certain felony crimes as re-
ported by the police and (2) survey results in which people report whether they
have been victims of crimes or whether they feel safe and secure in their neigh-
borhoods.51 Such efforts aim to reduce "civilian" violence and promote safety,
but do not focus on how policed individuals and communities experience agen-
cy or power.
There is also a related recognition, especially among legal scholars, that the
goal of decreasing crime and disorder must be balanced against the potential
48. See WESLEY SKOGAN & KATHLEEN FRYDL, The Effectiveness of Police Activities in Reducing
Crime, Disorder, and Fear, in FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 217,
217-51 (2004) (summarizing this literature); see also Meares, supra note 45, at 1873 (summa-
rizing this literature and describing this view as, "The question is no longer whether police
can make a difference. We ask instead, 'How much of a difference in crime rates can police
make?"').
49. James J. Willis, Stephen D. Mastrofski & David Weisburd, Making Sense of COMPSTAT: A
Theory-Based Analysis of Organizational Change in Three Police Departments, 41 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 147, 148 (2007); see also William J. Bratton, Former Comm'r of Police of N.Y., Cutting
Crime and Restoring Order: What America Can Learn from New York's Finest, Address at
the Heritage Foundation (Oct. 15, 1996), in HERITAGE FOUND., THE HERITAGE LECTURES 12
(1997), https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/report/cutting-crime-and-restoring-
order-what-america-can-learn-new-yorks-finest [https://perma.cc/HCV5-5XU8] ("We be-
gan to run the [New York Police Department] as a private profit-oriented business. What
was the profit I wanted? Crime reduction."); Shaila K. Dewan, New York's Gospel of Policing
by Data Spreads Across U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/04
/28/nyregion/new-york-s-gospel-of-policing-by-data-spreads-across-us.html [https://
perma.cc/95NA-KF6P] (describing the implementation and effect of CompStat).
50. See, e.g., BRAGA & WEISBURD, supra note 29, at 99-149 (summarizing this literature); Cyn-
thia Lum, Christopher S. Koper & Cody W. Telep, The Evidence-Based Policing Matrix, 7 J.
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 3, 8-9 (2011) (describing the rise of "evidence-based policing"
and introducing a "matrix" through which to analyze police strategies along multiple di-
mensions).
51. See SKOGAN & FRYDL, supra note 48, at 227-51; David Weisburd & John E. Eck, What Can
Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 42, 50-
51 (2004).
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harms of policing, including the harm of police violence.5 2 The result is a call
for the police to abide by constitutional rules and other laws that govern police
violence and, relatedly, to focus on eliminating racial disparities or other harms
that may not trigger constitutional rules.53 Rachel Harmon has termed a ver-
sion of this idea "harm-efficient policing" -"policing that imposes harms only
when, all things considered, the benefits for law, order, fear reduction, and
officer safety outweigh the costs of those harms."54 This instrumental balancing
of harms and goods in policing has grown in prominence since 2015, when
leaders at all levels of government pushed for police reforms by, for example,
revisiting their use of force policies and strengthening disciplinary processes
for officers who use deadly force.55 It has also grown with the advent of federal
structural-reform litigation, under which consent decrees have allowed reform-
ers to pursue a host of different ways of measuring and incentivizing police
lawfulness.56 Under this approach, measurements of the success of policing
52. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 19, at 8-17 (discussing multiple levels of the harms of polic-
ing); Harmon, supra note 46, at 901-12 (discussing the need to balance the benefits and
harms of policing at the local level).
53. Cf Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a Modali-
ty of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REv. 2397, 2417-43 (2017) (describing the multiple layers of
communal harm that result from racial disparities in stop-and-frisk policing, and arguing
that current constitutional doctrines are ill-equipped to address them); Jason Mazzone &
Stephen Rushin, From Selma to Ferguson: The Voting Rights Act as a Blueprint for Police Re-
form, 105 CALIF. L. REv. 263, 295-310 (2017) (laying out a range of harms that can be meas-
ured, including unlawful stops and seizures, incidents of excessive force, and evidence of ra-
cial profiling).
54. Harmon, supra note 21, at 792; see also id. (critiquing the idea that "debates about [the costs
of policing practices] focus on whether the practices are constitutional or whether they are
effective, not whether they are harm efficient"). But see BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF
ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 185-242 (2001) (critiquing the
traditional versions of measuring "harm" that don't take into account how policing policies
affect civilians as subjects).
55. See generally Ram Subramanian & Leah Skrzypiec, To Protect and Serve: New Trends in State-
Level Policing Reform, 2015-2016, VERA INST. JUST. (Apr. 2017), https://www.vera.org
/downloads/publications/41417-PolicingTrendsReport-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5LJ-
X22V] (summarizing trends among seventy-nine police-reform bills passed by at least thir-
ty-four states and the District of Columbia between 2015 and 2016); The State of Justice Re-
form 2017: The State of Policing, VERA INST. JUST. (2017) [hereinafter The State of Justice Re-
form 2017], https://www.vera.org/state-of-justice-reform/2o17/the-state-of-policing
[https://perma.cc/VJR6-6JJQ] (describing reforms at state and local levels across the coun-
try). Federal reform efforts, however, have been all but eliminated under the Trump Admin-
istration. See The State of Justice Reform 2017, supra.
56. See Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 MINN. L.
REV. 1343, 1397-1421 (2015) (describing how structural-reform litigation operates, and ana-
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tend to analyze both crime rates and rates of harms such as, but not limited to,
unconstitutional policing. But here too, the purpose of minimizing harms to
individuals or racial groups is not to give them individual or collective power,
but rather to balance the harmful conduct of the police against the goals of
crime control.5 7
2. Legitimacy Approaches
There is a separate and often complementary view of the objective of police
reform: the objective of legitimacy, or to use Tracey Meares's term, "rightful
policing."5" The social science guiding the legitimacy approach demonstrates
that when people perceive police as legitimate, they are more likely to comply
with the law, cooperate with the police, and support their police departments.59
The legitimacy approach brings principles of procedural justice into the con-
versation of police reform, arguing that police departments should engage in
practices that people with whom they interact perceive to be fair and just.60 A
legitimacy-focused reform might also work to train police officers to prioritize
"police-community relations" as a long-term goal.61 Success of such approach-
lyzing its benefits and its limits); Walker, supra note 14, at 1791-99 (summarizing this trend
and scholarship about it).
57. But see Huq, supra note 53, at 2439 (describing political powerlessness at the neighborhood
level as one of the harms of stop-and-frisk policing).
58. See Meares, supra note 45, at 1873-76 (contrasting "rightful policing" with traditional police-
reform goals of "effectiveness" and "lawfulness").
59. See, e.g., Meares, supra note 12; Tom Tyler, What Are Legitimacy and Procedural Justice in Polic-
ing? And Why Are They Becoming Key Elements of Police Leadership?, in POLICE EXECUTIVE RE-
SEARCH FORUM, LEGITIMACY AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A NEW ELEMENT OF POLICE LEADER-
SHIP 6, 7-8 (2014); Tom R. Tyler, Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Street Stops and Police
Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men's Legal Socialization, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 751, 776 (2014).
6o. See Meares, supra note 12, at 1364-66; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler & Aziz Z. Huq,
American Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative,
101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 338 (2011); Tom R. Tyler, From Harm Reduction to Com-
munity Engagement: Redefining the Goals of American Policing in the Twenty-First Century, 111
Nw. U. L. REV. 1537, 1539 (2017).
61. See, e.g., Seth W. Stoughton, Principled Policing: Warrior Cops and Guardian Officers, 51 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 611, 614 (2016) ("For real change to occur the principles and values that un-
derlie policing must not only instruct officers to act lawfully but also encourage them to
build public trust and increase police legitimacy. . . . [L]ong-term goals [should focus on]
improving police-community relations.").
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es can then be measured through social-science instruments that measure trust,
including surveys of community members.6 2
Although the concept of legitimacy has been growing in strength for years,
it has emerged post-Ferguson as a leading way of thinking about the purpose
of police reform.63 In 2015, the Policing Project at New York University Law
School gathered a group of law-enforcement officials together to develop a
"Statement of Principles of Democratic Policing." The Statement concluded,
among other things, that "[f]or too long, policing success has been defined al-
most exclusively by crime and arrest rates. It is necessary to also develop a set
of metrics that capture the intangible aspects of policing, like equity and com-
munity trust."64 And a 2019 report by scholars who focus on legitimacy-
Phillip Atiba Goff, Elizabeth Hinton, Tracey Meares, Caroline Sarnoff, and
Tom Tyler -illustrates these goals in the context of a national framework for
police reform.65 These legitimacy leaders state unequivocally that "the central
goal of the criminal justice system must be to increase cooperation and trust
between individuals and the state."66 Flowing from this primary goal is a
framework that includes not just procedural justice in policing, but also the
need to recognize past communal harms and invest in community-level re-
62. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Alpert, Daniel Flynn & Alex R. Piquero, Effective Community Policing
Performance Measures, 3 JUST. RES. & POL'Y 79, 91-92 (2001); Phillip Atiba Goff, Elizabeth
Hinton, Tracey L. Meares, Caroline Nobo Sarnoff & Tom R. Tyler, Re-imagining Public Safe-
ty: Prevent Harm and Lead with the Truth: A Five-step Policy Plan for Policing in America, JUST.
COLLABORATORY & CTR. FOR POLICING EQUITY 5 (Oct. 2019), https://aw.yale.edu/sites
/default/files/area/center/justice/document/re-imagining public-safety inalii .26.19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D2DV-MJKF] ("[L]aw enforcement agencies must track the level of trust
in police by their communities just as they measure changes in crime."); see also Goff, Hin-
ton, Meares, Nobo Sarnoff & Tyler, supra, at 7 (describing how to measure pro-social
measures like fairness and trust).
63. It was the central goal articulated in President Obama's Task Force on 21st Century Policing,
among other high-profile efforts at articulating reform principles. See President's Task Force
on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing,
OFF. COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERV. 1, 56-57 (2015), https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC
/Publications/cops-p311-pub.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8EY-RFXV] (recommending building
trust between communities and the police as they "co-produce" safety); see also Megan
Quattlebaum, Tracey Meares & Tom Tyler, Principles of Procedurally Just Policing, JUST. COL-
LABORATORY (2018), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/justice/principles
_ofprocedurallyjustpolicingreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4VU-Q79G].




65. Goff, Hinton, Meares, Nobo Sarnoff & Tyler, supra note 62.
66. Id. at 5.
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sources outside of the criminal legal system.67 These scholars encourage police
departments to "measure what matters" by shifting away from the traditional
CompStat metrics of crime reduction and toward what they term "CompStat
for Justice," which combines reports of crime and violence with reports about
police use of force and results of community surveys and enables police de-
partments to measure "fairness" at the neighborhood level.68
The legitimacy approach to police reform comes closer than other instru-
mental approaches to getting at ideas of power. Legitimacy theory adds a dis-
tinctive way of thinking about the purpose of reform, one that turns the focus
of evaluating success toward people who are subject to policing. Its measure-
ments of success are about what groups of people think and say, because the
goal is for people to trust the police and to be motivated to obey the law and
proactively cooperate with the police. For this reason, Tracey Meares has ar-
gued that procedural justice can help transform people's understandings of
their own citizenship in productive ways that enhance democracy;69 and Tom
Tyler has emphasized that procedural justice can lead to "community identifica-
tion and engagement."70 Under even these conceptions of the citizenship-
enhancing benefits of legitimacy, though, the central goal is not to shift power;
rather, the goal is that people will perceive the police as fair and therefore live
more peacefully together, in part, perhaps, because they have been given some
power.
3. The Move to Power and Democracy
Some recent scholarship has begun to move away from the above ap-
proaches to police reform, focusing on goals outside of legitimacy, crime con-
67. Id. at 3 ("To build a legitimate system we need to invest in resources that prevent people
from becoming entangled in the criminal justice system, such as mental health assistance,
substance abuse treatment, and public health more generally.").
68. Id. at 7; see also What We Do: COMPSTAT for Justice, CTR. FOR POLICING EQUITY, https://
policingequity.org/what-we-do/compstat-for-justice [https://perma.cc/83ST-D5XN] ("In
addition to crime data, we will also track police stops, use of force data, and survey data. By
combining these data with census data and other geographic markers, we will be able to
pinpoint and differentiate the portion of racial disparities police cannot control (e.g., pov-
erty) and the portion they can (e.g., trainings, policies).").
69. See Tracey Meares, Policing and Procedural Justice: Shaping Citizens' Identities to Increase Demo-
cratic Participation, 11 Nw. U. L. REv. 1525, 1534-35 (2017) (describing "suggestive evidence
that what police do impacts how people think of themselves, especially how they think of
themselves as citizens ... [which in turn makes it more] possible to ensure that all will be
able to participate as equal valued members of society").
70. Tyler, supra note 60, at 1552.
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trol, or harm reduction. This trend in scholarship does not always explicitly
name power as a goal, but it is implied in the rejection of traditional means of
achieving reform.71 As legal scholars have increasingly recognized the structur-
al nature of police violence, they have begun to turn toward alternative, disrup-
tive frameworks72 : abolition," transformation,74 resistance.75 And there is a
burgeoning reckoning with the racialized history of policing and its potentially
inextricable connections to the social control of- and denial of political power
to -poor and Black Americans.76 For instance, Amna Akbar advances a concep-
tion of policing born within abolitionist social movements that rejects most
traditional police-reform efforts as "tinkering," in favor of reform efforts that
reduce the footprint of policing and find other methods of supporting people
in efforts to "reconceiv[e] modes of collective life.' 7 7 And Monica Bell has re-
cently advocated for an approach to policing that looks beyond instrumental
and legitimacy concerns to think also about what she calls the "mobilizing ca-
pacity of the justice system," which includes questions of the relative democrat-
ic power of communities more broadly. 78 In the work of these scholars, there is
71. Cf Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 MICH. L. REV. 259,
268-69, 272-73 (2018) (describing one scholarly approach to reform, the mass approach, that
concerns itself with systemic consequences of the carceral state and is concerned when "ag-
gressive or intrusive police tactics systematically inconvenience or marginalize certain mem-
bers of the community").
72. Akbar, supra note 20, at 1789-1802 (collecting citations of legal scholars increasingly taking a
structural approach to thinking about police violence).
73. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 34 (manuscript at 1, 50-54) (describing a "recent swell of prison
abolitionist scholarship"); McLeod, supra note 36, at 1617; Roberts, supra note 36, at 4-5
("Many individuals have therefore concluded that the answer to persistent injustice in crim-
inal law enforcement is not reform; it is prison abolition.").
74. See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 22, at 238-43.
75. See, e.g., Eric J. Miller, Encountering Resistance: Contesting Policing and Procedural Justice, 2016
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 342-43; Alice Ristroph, Regulation or Resistance? A Counter-Narrative of
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REv. 1555, 1558-60 (2015).
76. See, e.g., L Bennett Capers, Criminal Procedure and the Good Citizen, 118 COLUM. L. REv. 653,
654-57 (2018) ; Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The
Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REv. 125, 127-31 (2017); cf Khalil
Gibran Muhammad & Chenjerai Kumanyika, The Origins of Policing in America, WASH. POST
at 1:02 (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/history/perspective--the-
origins-of-policing-in-america/2o2o/o9/24/2c36eac-dao-4911-bb27-fdbfb7of24bovideo
.html [https://perma.cc/38YZ-RG2R] ("The idea of keeping track of the most valuable asset
in the United States, that is, enslaved Africans, animated much of what we'd recognize today
as law enforcement.").
77. Akbar, supra note 20, at 18oo-11, 1826 ("[A]bolitionist organizers are thinking about how to
contest the scale and power of police, and [how] to reconceive modes of collective life.").
78. Bell, supra note 32, at 211.
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a shift toward focusing on the ability of people to engage in self-governance, or
at least to reduce the subjugating effects of policing itself- both of which re-
quire subjects of policing to have some kind of collective power.
There is also an increasing number of scholars calling for the "democratiza-
tion" of the criminal legal system, including policing." The relationship of this
literature to the redistribution of political power is fraught and uneven.80 A call
for democracy in the criminal system is often a call for an increase in lay partic-
ipation at multiple points in that system" - a goal that might, in theory, shift
political power. But the actual proposals of many advocates of "democratic
criminal justice" do not reveal a desire for profound shifts in the balance of po-
litical power.8 2 Rather, they often track the goals and reform proposals of
scholars who focus on legitimacy and aim for democratic consensus: they ad-
vocate for procedural justice,83 for community policing,84 or for notice-and-
79. See supra note 21 and accompanying text; see also SKLANSKY, supra note 45 at 66-105 (arguing
that recent criminal-procedure scholarship has exhibited "an enthusiasm for community
participation"); Kleinfeld, supra note 45, at 1371, 1374-77 (describing series of symposium es-
says on "democratizing" criminal justice).
8o. Cf Akbar, supra note 20 (manuscript at 1802-05) (arguing that "democratic"-leaning schol-
ars can sometimes be on the side of repair).
81. See, e.g., LAURA L APPLEMAN, DEFENDING THE JURY: CRIME, COMMUNITY, AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION 3-4 (2015); STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at xxvi (2012)
(calling for "bottom-up populism" throughout the system); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COL-
LAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 244-81 (2011); Bierschbach, supra note 21, at 1452-53
("Pushing more criminal justice power-legislative, enforcement, adjudicative, and penal-
down to directly affected communities and neighborhoods could enhance representativeness
and sharpen lines of authority."); Kleinfeld, supra note 21, at 1483 ("[T]he administration
and enforcement of criminal law should be by and of the people - that is, solidaristic, public,
embedded in local communities, . . . primarily under lay rather than official control .... ").
82. See, e.g., SKILANSKY, supra note 45, at 68-105; Bell, supra note 18, at 741 n.447 (citing Joshua
Kleinfeld, Laura L Appleman, Richard A. Bierschbach, Kenworthey Bilz, Josh Bowers, John
Braithwaite, Robert P. Burns, R. A. Duff, Albert W. Dzur, Thomas F. Geraghty, Adriaan
Lanni, Marah Stith McLeod, Janice Nadler, Anthony O'Rourke, Paul H. Robinson, Jonathan
Simon, Jocelyn Simonson, Tom R. Tyler & Ekow N. Yankah, White Paper of Democratic
Criminal Justice, il1 Nw. L. REv. 1693, 1699-1700 (2017) [hereinafter White Paper]); Rap-
paport, supra note 28, at 716 (describing the focus of "democratizers" on, inter alia, proce-
dural justice and civilian review boards). Although I was one of the co-authors of the White
Paper, I do not subscribe to all of its recommendations. See White Paper, supra, at 1695
("[T]he policy proposals below do not reflect and should not be taken to reflect any indi-
vidual author's views in full.").
83. See White Paper, supra note 82, at 1699 (listing a series of proposed reforms under the head-
ing "[p]rocedural [j]ustice and [p]olicing").
84. See SKLANSKY, supra note 45, at 97-105 (critiquing the focus on community policing in argu-
ments for democracy in policing).
So1
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
comment rulemaking.85 As Stephen Schulhofer has noted, even Bill Stuntz, a
modern champion of "local criminal justice," tended to propose solutions such
as expert commissions that "leave decisionmaking power where it is now-
with police chiefs, district attorneys, and judges who are accountable to
citywide or countywide constituencies."86
The reform proposals from these "democratizer" scholars underscore David
Sldansky's seminal observation that, in the context of policing, different con-
ceptions of democracy will lead to different proposals for change.87 The con-
sensus-based proposals for reform from most democratizers do not come with
a stated aim of shifting political power; indeed, they may run the danger of
reinscribing, rather than shifting, power imbalances.88 There are certainly some
exceptions; for example, Rick Bierschbach has explicitly called for governance
arrangements and constitutional understandings that shift power "down to di-
rectly affected communities and neighborhoods,"89 and Sunita Patel has argued
for democratizing police consent decrees with the aim of "us [ing] . . . reform
tool[s] ... to shift power between the police and the communities they
serve."90 However, there is no guarantee that a "democratizing" approach to po-
lice reform will entail power shifting down to those directly affected by every-
day policing.'"
85. See, e.g., Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97
MINN. L. REV. 1 (2012); Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 21; Slobogin, supra note 21.
86. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and Constitutional Rights, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 1045, 1080-81 (2013) (reviewing STUNTZ, supra note 81). Schulhofer notes that one
important exception is Stuntz's recommendation that juries be drawn from local neighbor-
hoods. Id. at 1080.
87. See SKIANSKY, supra note 45, at 68-105 (contrasting the view of legal scholars who focus on a
consensus-based view of democracy with Sldansky's own view of a more pluralist concep-
tion of democracy with respect to policing); cf Kleinfeld, supra note 21 (describing different
conceptions of democracy in relation to the criminal system); Rappaport, supra note 28, at
719 (noting "the fragility of the democratizers' big-tent coalition").
88. See SKILANSKY, supra note 45, at 68-105; Rahman & Simonson, supra note 10, at 689-92 (con-
trasting consensus-based governance proposals with institutional designs that focus on con-
testation and shifting political power); Rappaport, supra note 28, at 720 ("[M]any of the
democratizers' own proposals are not only consistent with top-down, expert-driven reforms,
but also are more plausibly viewed as such."); Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 391, 401-08 (2016) (critiquing community policing and its consensus-based conception
of democracy in contrast to the conception of grassroots groups who seek to contest domi-
nant practices in policing); see also infra notes 112, 255-259 and accompanying text.
89. Bierschbach, supra note 21, at 1452-53.
90. Patel, supra note 21, at 798.
91. Cf Miller, supra note 75, at 298, 332-34 (suggesting that a republican view of democracy that
values contestation clashes with the reforms focused on procedural justice that encourage
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In Section III.C, I return to the concept of democratization and argue that
the power lens is part of a particular theoretical conception of democracy that
values contestation and agonistic participation over consensus-based forms of
lay participation. For now, the point is that in recent years, as legal scholars are
increasingly recognizing the structural and historical problems inherent in our
institutions of policing and questioning whether policing can ever be divorced
from its white-supremacist roots, they are seeking out new, different, and
sometimes more radical ways of envisioning police "reform," sometimes urging
more popular influence, and at times questioning whether the police can be re-
formed at all.
B. The Goal of Power Shifting
The rich conversations about police reform described above are exciting.
They are also necessary in our present moment. All told, though, there is one
objective largely missing from these discussions, even if it sometimes makes an
appearance in more recent pushes for transformation and emocracy: the goal
of shifting governance and policymaking power from the police to policed
populations. As I argue in Part II, this particular idea-what I call the power
lens-emerges from examining the ideas of a number of groups and social
movements crafting their own proposals for police policy and governance. The
power lens gets at a separate objective, broadly stated as shifting power away
from the police and toward the populations who are policed, people who are
often poor and Black, Latinx, or Indigenous. This goal stands separate and
apart from traditional goals oriented at instrumental outcomes or legitimacy.
While it is not necessarily in conflict with these traditional goals, it is in a
different register. Rather than aspiring toward an increase in trust of the police
or a reduction in violence by police and nonpolice alike, as a legitimacy-
oriented or instrumentalist approach might, the power lens takes a step back
and asks, as a preliminary matter, whether the governance or reform arrange-
ments at issue change the balance of actual power in decisions about whether
and how to police.
A focus on power in police reform asks whether directly impacted people
have real influence on the scope and policies of policing in their neighbor-
hoods, counties, cities, and states. The power lens does not merely ask whether
voices are heard. Instead, it is concerned with relatively direct political power:
cooperation); Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of "the People" in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM.
L. REV. 249, 288-90 (2019) (distinguishing a contestatory view of democracy from how
many criminal scholars think of democracy).
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the ability of a person, or a group of people,92 to influence policy outcomes
(e.g., use of force policies) and control the distribution of state resources (e.g.,
funding for the police). Power in this reading requires the ability to make deci-
sions with observable results,93 whether it is through the power to enact poli-
cy94 or the power to check state actors.95
To be clear, this does not mean that the power lens understands power,
more broadly, to be something that only flows through official channels of gov-
ernance. Indeed, the power lens is not necessarily wed to any one particular
definition of power as a general matter; one might adopt the power lens and
still recognize that power flows in multiple directions and sometimes counter-
intuitive ways-inside and outside the state and in the shadow of racism, het-
eropatriarchy, and precarity.96 As critical theorists emphasize, and as social
movement activists recognize,9" to shift governance arrangements alone does
not, on its face, address the power of ideology98 or the further dimension of
power in which knowledge itself is produced and made true.99 These facets of
power are especially salient in the criminal legal system, which is itself main-
92. Cf Michael Grinthal, Power with: Practice Models for Social Justice Lawyering, 15 U. PA. J.L. &
Soc. CHANGE 25, 36 (2011) ("We each have in our bodies the power to move stones, but if
we can coordinate our bodies with other bodies, we have the power to build cities. This,
crudely, is why power comes from organizing people.").
93. STEVEN LUKES, PowER: A RADICAL VIEW (2d ed. 2005) (distinguishing between deci-
sionmaking and non-decisionmaking power).
94. Daryl Levinson calls this "capacity." Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court 2015 Term-
Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 46-47 (2016).
95. Levinson calls this "control." Id.
96. Cf. LUKIES, supra note 93, at 13-15 (differentiating between different views of power); Grin-
tha, supra note 92, at 34 (describing how power can be generated through organizing out-
side of the state); Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Power with and Beyond Foucault, 9 CAR-
CERAL NOTEBOOKS 79, 81 (2013) (summarizing the Foucauldian idea that power is "always
and constantly at play, always in struggle, producing momentary, local victories and defeats
at a micro level").
97. See, e.g., Mariame Kaba & John Duda, Towards the Horizon of Abolition: A Conversation with
Mariame Kaba, NEXT SYS. PROJECT (Nov. 9, 2017), https://thenextsystem.org/learn/stories
/towards-horizon-abolition-conversation-mariame-kaba [https://perma.cc/N9LB-VRHZ]
(describing the layers of ideological struggle in abolitionist organizing).
98. See LUKIES, supra note 93, at 143-49 (describing his third dimension of power, in which there
is struggle over ideology).
99. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, CRITIQUE & PRAXIS: A CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF ILLUSIONS,
VALUES, AND ACTION 181-83 (2020) (describing Foucauldian ideas of knowledge-power and
the production of "regimes of truth").
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tained by longstanding understandings and ideologies of racialized penality.10 0
This is why social movements are not content to focus only on "police reform,"
but also engage in political education, in organizing, in mutual aid beyond po-
licing. But while the power lens doesn't address power in all its forms, by nam-
ing power it does implicate a goal of policing one can point to, name, and ana-
lyze; it allows someone looking at reform choices to articulate differences
between various governing and lawmaking arrangements that place deci-
sionmaking authority in distinct hands. 101
The power lens depends on an understanding that the mass criminalization
of the last century has had racialized, community-level effects in neighbor-
hoods that are most heavily targeted for policing and from which the most
people have been incarcerated. 102 The neighborhoods subject to these more
punitive forms of law enforcement are what political scientists call "race-class
subjugated communities" -neighborhoods in which the majority of residents
are poor Black, Latinx, or Indigenous people.10 3 Punitive law-enforcement
1oo. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE PUNITIVE SOCIETY: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE
FRANCE 1972-1973, at 233-39 (Bernard E. Harcourt ed., Graham Burchell trans., Palgrave
Macmillan 2015) (2013) (describing the methods of knowledge production leading to the
"punitive society"); KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS 277
(2010) (telling the history of the "invisible layers of racial ideology packed into the statistics,
sociological theories, and the everyday stories we continue to tell about crime in modern ur-
ban America").
101. Cf Rahman & Simonson, supra note 1o, at 733-38 (analyzing different ways in which gov-
ernance arrangements can facilitate power shifting in the local-government context).
102. See generally TRACI BURCH, TRADING DEMOCRACY FOR JUSTICE: CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS AND
THE DECLINE OF NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 75-104 (2013) (discussing the
neighborhood criminal-justice context and political participation); LERMAN & WEAVER, su-
pra note 24, at 199-230 (describing the alienation from political life experienced by custodial
citizens); STUNTZ, supra note 81, at 244-81 (charting structural causes and consequences of
the "punitive turn" in criminal justice in the late twentieth century); Bell, supra note 18, at
651-729 (providing an account of residential segregation and identifying six mechanisms
through which American policing perpetuates residential segregation); Jeffrey Fagan, Va-
lerie West & Jan Holland, Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in New York City Neigh-
borhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1551, 1554 (2003) (highlighting the reciprocal dynamics of
crime, incarceration, and aggressive enforcement); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral
Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1291-97
(2004) (explicating mass incarceration's role in controlling the social, economic, and politi-
cal engagement of Black communities).
103. Joe Soss & Vesla Weaver, Police Are Our Government: Politics, Political Science, and the Policing
of Race-Class Subjugated Communities, 20 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 565, 565 (2017) (defining
"race-class subjugated communities," and explaining "the ways 'race-class ubjugated com-
munities' are governed through coercion, containment, repression, surveillance, regulation,
predation, discipline, and violence"); see also id. at 567 ("The recognition that policed com-
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practices in these neighborhoods become self-reinforcing, independent of
"crime rates,"10 4 with a direct impact on political power."0 Policing causes
communal, democratic harms. This has led Janet Moore, Dorothy Roberts, and
others to argue that the criminal legal system is itself antidemocratic: by inflict-
ing punishment and mass enforcement and surveillance, the criminal legal sys-
tem takes away political power through a variety of simultaneous and comple-
mentary means.106 The antidemocratic work of the criminal legal system
happens on multiple levels,10 7 but in policing it is especially acute because of
the domination inherent in the everyday nature of modern policing.108 The
munities are coproduced by race and class may be obvious to some, but in most of the schol-
arship in our subfield, the tendency to treat race and class as distinct variables continues.").
104. See Fagan, West & Holland, supra note 102, at 1554 ("We ... show that neighborhoods with
high rates of incarceration invite closer and more punitive police enforcement and parole
surveillance ... even as crime rates fall.").
105. See HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 160-80 (describing the disempowering nature of broken-
windows policing); LERMAN & WEAVER, supra note 24, at 139-56 (describing how interacting
with the criminal process affects political engagement); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING
THROUGH CRIME 4-5 (2007) (arguing that an overemphasis on crime and fear of crime has
distorted American governance); STUNTZ, supra note 81, at 255 (noting that "voters with the
largest stake [in the process of building and filling prisons] - chiefly African American resi-
dents of high-crime city neighborhoods -had the smallest voice in the relevant decisions");
Bell, supra note 24, at 2067 ("[A]t both an interactional and structural evel, current regimes
can operate to effectively banish whole communities from the body politic."); Capers, supra
note 76, at 654-57 (describing how constitutional criminal-procedure doctrine constitutes
exclusionary meanings of who is a "good citizen"); Fagan, West & Holland, supra note 102,
at 1563 (describing these punitive practices as the "political economy of law enforcement");
Benjamin Justice & Tracey L. Meares, How the Criminal Justice System Educates Citizens, 651
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 159, 161-73 (2014) (describing how the criminal-justice
system educates individuals in "anticitizenry").
106. See Janet Moore, Democracy Enhancement in Criminal Law and Procedure, 2014 UTAH L. REV.
543; Dorothy E. Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist Project, 111 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1597 (2017) (arguing that American systems of law enforcement are by their nature an-
tidemocratic, so that democratizing criminal law requires looking beyond increasing public
participation in criminal justice in the conventional sense); see also Simonson, supra note 26,
at 1610-13 (describing three levels of the antidemocratic nature of the criminal-justice sys-
tem).
107. Cf Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 8o N.Y.U. L. REV.
1449, 1452 (2005) (describing the "expressive disempowerment of those disadvantaged
groups who tend to become defendants: racial minorities, the poor, the undereducated or il-
literate, juveniles, the unemployed, or people with criminal histories, mental health or sub-
stance abuse problems").
108. See infra notes 305-312 and accompanying text (arguing that policing is an acute form of
domination at the community level).
806
130:778 2021
POLICE REFORM THROUGH A POWER LENS
laws and everyday practices of policing preclude poor people of color from be-
ing full democratic subjects. 109
Reckoning with this aspect of the harms of policing requires reckoning
with the antidemocratic nature of contemporary police governance.110 Policing
priorities are rarely responsive to the marginalized populations who are most
likely to be arrested and prosecuted.1 11 Contributing to this antidemocratic na-
ture of policing is the fact that when marginalized populations do participate in
democratic processes meant to facilitate their input, their participation is often
muted by those very processes, reinscribing rather than dismantling existing
power imbalances.112 This layer of democratic exclusion reinforces the others,
reproducing and legitimizing an unequal and racialized system of justice.11 3
Approaching police reform through a power lens means paying attention to
each layer of antidemocratization. But the fact that reforms aiming to encour-
age participation have led to further political subordination and alienation in
the past does not mean that we should give up on political participation and
iog. See Bell, supra note 24, at 2065-67, 2100 (demonstrating the ways in which "collective sym-
bolic and structural exclusion" in how poor people of color experience contemporary meth-
ods of policing combine together to create "legal estrangement;' or a profound alienation
from the police).
no. Cf DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON 178 (2019) (arguing that reckoning with the harms
of police violence requires more than naming that harm; "[t]here will also have to be a shift
in power"); Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 21 (detailing the ways in which police
policies are crafted without popular input).
iii. Bell, supra note 18, at 750 ("For race- and/or class-marginalized neighborhoods and places,
external stakeholders, or stakeholders who are relatively powerful individual or organiza-
tional brokers between the community and political officials, determine the priorities of local
government agencies, including their police." (footnote omitted)).
112. See, e.g., SKLANSKY, supra note 45, at 68-105 (describing these dangers in the context of par-
ticipation and policing). For particular studies of this phenomenon playing out, see, for ex-
ample, LmS DANIEL GASC6N & AARON ROUSSELL, THE LIMITS OF COMMUNITY POLICING: CI-
VILIAN POWER AND POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY IN BLACK AND BROWN LOS ANGELES (2019),
which argues that community policing is not the solution it seems to be; STEVE HERBERT,
CITIZENS, COPS, AND POWER: RECOGNIZING THE LIMITS OF COMMUNITY (2006); Tony
Cheng, Input Without Influence: The Silence and Scripts of Police and Community Relations, 67
SOC. PROBS. 171, 172, 184 (2019), which describes how police use of silence and control over
speaker time during community-board meetings impacted residents' participation; and Jul-
ian Clark & Barry Friedman, Community Advisory Boards: What Works and What Doesn't
3 (Apr. 13, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), which states: "Too often,
Community Advisory Boards (CABs) represent a pro forma effort by policing agencies to
signal a commitment to working with the public, without really working with the public."
See also Simonson, supra note 88, at 401-08 (2016) (collecting citations and examples).
113. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, Inclusive Political Communication, in INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY
52, 57 (2000) (describing the process of "internal exclusion").
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turn toward technocratic solutions.1 1 4 Instead, there are other paths: paths that
do not reach full-blown enfranchisement but rather seek to build political pow-
er through intermediary tactics of collective resistance and changes in power
relations within smaller governance arrangements. This means that one axis of
change in the institutions of policing should be a shift in governance and poli-
cymaking power down to the populations who have been policed, surveilled,
and incarcerated, whose democratic standing has been taken from them. This
power, moreover, must take on actual, observable heft.
Power shifting might be difficult to measure, but it would not be impossi-
ble.115 Sociologists have measured power in police reform in other circum-
stances. For example, Steve Herbert has demonstrated how power can be
traced through a combination of sociological methods in the context of com-
munity policing in the city of Seattle;116 and in more recent work, Tony Cheng
uses transcripts of police-community meetings in Chicago to trace power rela-
tionships through the scripts and narratives of community complaints and po-
lice responses.1 7 Therefore, there might be ways to gather data that measure
and track whether there has been any power handed to the people who live in
the neighborhoods where street-level policing is concentrated. There is
CompStat (which provides the ability to measure instrumental outcomes like
reports of crime),118 and there is "CompStat for Justice" (which provides the
ability to add additional metrics such as use of force statistics and the results of
community surveys).1 9 Perhaps there may also be a way to build CompStat for
Power-or rather, to bring the measurement of power into the larger calculus
used to evaluate the success of reform efforts.
114. Cf HANNAH L. WALKER, MOBILIZED BY INJUSTICE: CRIMINAL JUSTICE CONTACT, PARTICIPA-
TION, AND RACE 5 (2020) ("While it is true that punitive policy communicates to those it tar-
gets that they are second-class citizens, it does not follow that individuals surrender a desire
to create change.").
115. Cf Patel, supra note 21, at 815-16 ("[B]ecause ... research is limited to community percep-
tion, it does not inform the larger debate about the formal shifting of power from police de-
partments to community members in the reform process.").
ii6. HERBERT, supra note 112, at 7-12 (describing police-community interactions in three Seattle
neighborhoods).
117. Cheng, supra note 112, at 176. According to Cheng, the participation of the public in com-
munity policing becomes "input without influence;' and community meetings become "a
mechanism of legitimating the input process, but only further reinforcing the social order."
Id.
118. Compstat: A Crime Reduction Management Tool, GOv'T INNOVATORS NETWORK, https://www
.innovations.harvard.edu/compstat-crime-reduction-management-tool [https://perma.cc
/JTE4-FJ4Y].
119. See CTR. FOR POLICING EQUITY, supra note 68.
808
130 :778 2021
POLICE REFORM THROUGH A POWER LENS
At the same time, the power lens calls into question traditional assumptions
about the need for technocratic experts to conduct precise measurements of the
success of various reform efforts. "0 Bernard Harcourt has argued that, in crim-
inal law and procedure, measuring costs and benefits within a perceived "crim-
inal justice system" results in troubling limits on what we can measure and
how we can conceive of success. " The scope of what social scientists and pub-
lic-policy professionals choose to study has "deep political implications that are
masked precisely by the purported scientific nature of the method."12 2 In other
words, deciding to measure the costs and benefits of certain policy choices is
itself a political choice -one that will be undemocratic unless and until we can
open it up to first-order questions about what it is we want the state to do
when we ask it to provide safety and security. Indeed, this decision requires de-
bate over the meaning of safety itself. The power lens implicates these political
questions as a preliminary matter, requiring an analyst to take a step back and
ask how and why we have decided to prioritize the provision of "safety"
through the police at all, let alone through traditional policing methods and
metrics. It demands that we pause our measuring for a moment, to ask bigger
questions first.
Power shifting in policing might therefore be destabilizing, in part because
it opens up institutional goals previously taken for granted to contestation and
replacement. More centrally, in the context of policing, power shifting opens
up the question of how and if we should continue to operate the police as we
know it. The idea of power shifting is not inherently abolitionist, or even left-
leaning; community control, for instance, could be an institution that people
who want more policing take up in the name of public safety. But a power-
shifting analysis does open up the terrain of police reform to contestation and
exploration of ideas that are excluded from other kinds of reform efforts. It
makes abolition possible, creating space for visions that would divest from po-
licing altogether through noncarceral methods of providing security-
120. See infra Part IV (exploring the notion of expertise in relation to the power lens); cf E.
Christi Cunningham, A Hopeless Case?: Escaping the Proof Pitfall in Power-Dependent Para-
digms, 20 CUNY L. REV. 481, 484 (2017) ("[T]he search for proper evidence, proof of op-
pression in power-dependent relationships, is a trap to ensnare the oppressed in their condi-
tion.").
121. See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Systems Fallacy: A Genealogy and Critique of Public Policy and
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 419, 432-33, 437 (2018).
122. Id. at 433.
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changing, perhaps, the meaning of "reform" itself. 123 And in this way, it pro-
motes a more inclusive vision of the possible ways that the state can promote
public safety, a view that takes into account voices and ideas that have tradi-
tionally been excluded from public discourse. 12
At the same time, the power lens can potentially exist alongside traditional
police-reform goals, such as reducing conduct that we label as criminal or as
excessive force. Proponents of the power lens may share some of the goals of
the legitimacy or instrumental approaches-for instance, they may share a de-
sire to reduce violence overall or to promote fairness in police interactions -
even if at the same time they approach reform with a different idea of how pro-
ductive change happens. And they may also recognize that to shift power in
governance will not necessarily lead to profound changes in political power ab-
sent other, more structural reforms.12' This is why the power lens is a lens
through which to look, rather than a complete theory of reform. One can place
additional lenses on top of or alongside the power lens, reflecting one's own al-
legiances to particular instrumental or legitimacy outcomes. To believe in the
power lens is simply, but crucially, to believe that we must account for power
and process in designing police reform.
In the next Part, I demonstrate how the power lens emerges from social
movement visions of police reform, in particular from Black-led abolitionist
movements. I flesh out two examples of social movement visions of reform-
locally, for community control of the police, and nationally, for a "People's Pro-
cess" for public-safety legislation. When these proposals are viewed collectively,
an underlying and coherent conception emerges, focusing on shifting power
through police reform itself.
123. Cf Stahly-Butts & Akbar, supra note 41 (manuscript at 2-3) (explaining how for abolitionist
social movements, one of the five requirements of a transformative reform -a reform that
supports the goal of abolition -is "whether the reform builds or shifts power").
124. See Simonson, supra note 91, at 299 (arguing for the importance of "opening up a closed and
alienating criminal justice system to a set of beliefs in the need for decarceration and even
abolition held by subsets of the public that have for too long been excluded from public dis-
course").
125. Cf BUTLER, supra note 22, at 238 ("Until we address the larger structural issues, racial sub-
ordination will just reproduce itself .... "); Bell, supra note 18, at 734 ("[M]eaningful power
building is extremely difficult to achieve and maintain in the context of socioeconomic isola-
tion and economic deprivation.").
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II. SOCIAL MOVEMENT VISIONS OF POWER OVER POLICING
At the center of the push for police accountability post-Ferguson are social
movement actors calling for the formation of new institutions that create bot-
tom-up power over policing policies and decisions. This push for police ac-
countability has gained incredible momentum as national attention to police
violence against people of color, especially African Americans, has sparked a
public debate about police policies such as the use of deadly force12 and police
surveillance of Black and brown people." Unlike most legal scholars, move-
ment actors are not just focused on changing policing policies, procedures, or
laws; they are equally focused on transforming the landscape of power in polic-
ing. Marbre Stahly-Butts and Amna Akbar, in laying out the vision of "trans-
formative reform" put forth by contemporary abolitionist social movements
today, explain it this way: "In a system plagued by profound power differen-
tials between those who control the system and those who are subject to its
power, transformative reforms cannot be top down: they must be bottom
up."128 Movement actors connect the history of policing and criminalization to
the subjugation of people who were formerly enslaved. They seek out reforms
that counteract that history and result in tangible shifts in power.
In this Part, I highlight this motif in social movement demands for institu-
tional change in recent years. Movement actors are calling for direct power
shifts over criminal legal institutions toward traditionally powerless popula-
tions. This demand comes in different forms, but it carries with it a series of
consistent ideas: that the history of policing has been one of subordination and
racialized violence; that prior police reforms have left the power in the hands of
elites who have always controlled policing; and that those who come from
neighborhoods that have been targets of policing in recent decades have devel-
oped their own expertise based on their experiences. For police reform to be
productive, movement actors want us to engage with this expertise: the exper-
tise developed from on-the-ground experience and collective action. To be sure,
these groups do not always seek the same outcomes; sometimes they disagree,
and their demands change over time. But when the idea of power shifting is
distilled out from movement reform proposals, what emerges is a distinctly
126. See, e.g., Phillip Atiba Goff, Tracey Lloyd, Amanda Geller, Steven Raphael & Jack Glaser, The
Science offustice: Race, Arrests, and Police Use of Force, CTR. FOR POLICING EQUITY (July 2016),
https://www.issuelab.org/resources/25200/25200.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QGK-XFSG].
127. See, e.g., Timothy Williams, Can 30,000 Cameras Help Solve Chicago's Crime Problem?, N.Y.
TIMES (May 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/26/us/chicago-police-
surveillance.html [https://perma.cc/875V-NZR6].
128. See Stahly-Butts & Akbar, supra note 41 (manuscript at 3).
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different way of thinking about police reform, one that centers power as much
as it does instrumental or legitimacy goals.
The power lens suggests that power in governance and policymaking
should be shifted away from the police and traditional experts, and toward
people and groups whose political standing have been eroded by institutions of
policing and criminal law. However, there is not one, consistent definition of
the specific population to whom power should be shifted. Often, organizers re-
fer to "directly impacted" people and communities, and they recognize in prac-
tice that people can be directly impacted in multiple ways: sometimes through
contact with the system, sometimes through other forms of systemic neglect,
and sometimes through familial or collective experiences of trauma or political
powerlessness. When social movement groups delineate methods for identify-
ing directly impacted people, their methods vary. Sometimes they focus on ge-
ographical boundaries,129 while sometimes they look at individual indicators of
past interactions with the criminal legal system, either personally or through a
family member."3 0 Often, movement actors refer in structural terms to popula-
tions who have been collectively harmed by policing and mass incarceration."'
This Article does not attempt to smooth out these differences into a coherent
definition of which people or "communities" should receive power. There is no
one perfect definition of "directly impacted people." Any definition would ex-
129. For example, activists in Nashville crafted a winning referendum for a Community Over-
sight Board with required representation from people in "economically distressed communi-
ties, a definition that was then carved out in geographic segments. See Charter Referendum
Petition, CMTY. OVERSIGHT NASHVILLE, https://communityoversightnashville.wordpress
.com/charter-referendum-petition-available-for-download [https://perma.cc/P43J-Q7MQ].
In political science, this mirrors the concept of "race-class subjugated communities." See Soss
& Weaver, supra note 103, at 567 (defining the term).
130. See Rahman & Simonson, supra note 1o, at 723-25 (describing how activists in Oaldand have
fought to specifically recruit individuals with criminal records to Oakland's new oversight
board).
131. For example, the People's Coalition for Safety and Freedom asks that decisionmaking power
be given to "[c] ommunities who are closest to the problem - currently incarcerated, former-
ly incarcerated people, communities who are surveilled and criminalized under these poli-
cies, and other directly impacted people." Our Values, PEOPLE'S COALITION FOR SAFETY &
FREEDOM, http://safetyandfreedom.org/our-values [https://perma.cc/JLG6-JDGU]. In
some ways, this mirrors the approach of political scientist Hannah Walker, who studies the
political participation of people with contact with the criminal legal system. Walker uses
survey and interview data that measures both "personal contact" (whether people have been
stopped, questioned, arrested, or convicted of a crime) and "proximal contact" (whether this
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clude some people -for example, people with disabilities or trauma,13 2 people
without stable housing (perhaps because of the criminal system), 3 or people
who are marginalized in other, intersectional ways. To use the power lens is to
ask which of these definitions should work best, and, iteratively, it is to ask this
question in collaboration with movement actors who are actively generating
these ideas and definitions.
Below I describe two examples of social movement actors using the power
lens-one of a local-governance structure, and one of a national legislation-
making structure.134 In each of these examples, social movements are putting
forth proposals for how people who are directly affected by mass incarceration
can in turn become the experts in charge of how the state aims to "fix" it- or,
because these are largely abolitionist social movements, challenging whether it
can be fixed at all. In the first example, local grassroots coalitions are demand-
ing "community control" of the police through direct-neighborhood or pre-
cinct-level institutions independent from police or mayoral leadership. In the
second example, a national coalition of groups organized against police vio-
lence have proposed a "People's Process" to develop national priorities for legis-
lation to promote public safety outside of policing. A theme runs through these
proposals: a push to shift power downward to the people most harmed by
mass criminalization. This theme is not always explicit within the proposals
themselves, but when these proposals are placed alongside each other, the
power lens emerges as a coherent and novel view of how to think about police
governance.
A. Local Governance: Community Control of the Police
Local activists focused on police violence have in recent years returned to
ideas of "community control of the police" as a way to approach large-scale re-
132. See infra notes 353-356 and accompanying text.
133. See Deborah N. Archer, Exile from Main Street, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 788, 819-23
(2020) (describing the collective housing precarity of people with criminal records and law-
enforcement contact, and their families).
134. This is not to say that all reforms fall neatly into categories of "local" or "national, but ra-
ther to demonstrate that the power lens spans this range of levels of reform. Cf Trevor
George Gardner, Right at Home: Modeling Sub-Federal Resistance as Criminal Justice Reform,
46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 527, 540-60 (2019) (describing the interaction between state and local
governance and federal criminal-justice reform).
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form of police departments.13 Unlike policies associated with traditional no-
tions of community policing-such as civilian review boards that recommend
discipline of individual officers or civilian advisory boards that make nonbind-
ing resolutions136 -the idea of community control as articulated by these activ-
ists requires "civilian" controlled bodies with the power to set binding policies
and priorities of police departments. 137 The central move is from popular input
to popular control. One activist in Oaldand explained their new civilian-police
commission this way: "The [new] commission will not recommend. It will im-
pose .... " 138 This idea has been taken up around the country. From D.C. to
Chicago to Atlanta to Los Angeles to Houston to Nashville, activists have
homed in on the potential of popular control of policing to shift power directly
to those who are policed rather than simply giving them advisory roles. 19
135. See generally Oldf6mi O. Tiw6, Power Over the Police, DISSENT (June 12, 2020),
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/onlinearticles/power-over-the-police [https://perma.cc
/4D3P-L6S4 ] (describing varieties of proposals for community control of the police).
136. On the history of civilian oversight of the police, see generally SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE AC-
COUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT (2001).
137. Cf M Adams & Max Rameau, Black Community Control over Police, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 515,
530-38 (laying out the idea of community control); Akbar, supra note 16, at 434 ("The de-
mand for community control is a rejection of the community policing frame.").
138. J.B. Wogan, The New, More Powerful Wave of Civilian Oversight of Police, GOVERNING (Feb.
27, 2017), https://www.goveming.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-police-civilian-
oversight-oakland-seattle.html [https://perma.cc/T87S-S68F].
139. For example, in Houston, a call for a civilian review board with subpoena power is part of
the new Right2Justice Coalition. See Brian Rogers, Houston Activists Call for Criminal Justice
Reform, HoUs. CHRON. (Aug. 16, 2016, 2:18 PM CDT), https://www.chron.com/news
/houston-texas/houston/article/Houston-activists-call-for-criminal-justice-reform-9145919
.php [https://perma.cc/MF6K-G29B] (describing how "more than a dozen activists called a
press conference to demand independent prosecutors to investigate police shootings over-
seen by civilian review boards with subpoena power"); see also Community Oversight Now
Launches Charter Referendum Petition for a Community Oversight Board So Years After the Death
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., CMTY. OVERSIGHT NASHVILLE (June 6, 2018), https://
communityoversightnashville.wordpress.com/2018/o6/o6/community-oversight-now-
launches-charter-referendum-petition-for-a-community-oversight-board-so-years-after-
the-death-of-dr-martin-luther-king-jr [https://perma.cc/8MMK-CTW9] (describing the
launch of a winning "petition drive for a charter referendum to create an independent
Community Oversight Board (COB) with compulsory and investigative powers" in Nash-
ville). In Atlanta, movement actors have consistently put forward a strong critique of a local
civilian review board that had been given subpoena power-a power seen by some as pro-
gressive. See Gloria Tatum, Atlanta Citizens Review Board Gets on Activists' Last Nerve, ATL.
PROGRESSIVE NEwS (May 15, 2015), http://atlantaprogressivenews.com/2015/o5/15/atlanta-
citizens-review-board-gets-on-activists-last-nerve [https://perma.cc/6DVV-8C8J]. In Los
Angeles, the local Black Lives Matter chapter has worked to call attention to the potential
problem that recent reforms re-entrench inequalities. See David Zahniser, After Election Loss,
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There are three central moves that social movement actors tend to make in
recent proposals to institutionalize community control of the police in Chicago,
Oaldand, Nashville, D.C., and elsewhere.140 First, these newer proposals for
community control often shift the nature of authority that civilians have over
policing, moving away from mere input into policy decisions and toward direct
power over those decisions. This means, for example, that decisions over polic-
ing policies or disciplinary decisions should be binding rather than advisory.
Second, these institutions are designed to give power to civilians who are inde-
pendent of police departments and contain at least some representation from
populations who have traditionally been the targets of policing.141 And third,
these institutions often have power over ex ante policing decisions and priori-
ties rather than simply ex post disciplinary or review decisions. By moving rela-
tively upstream in the decisionmaking process governing policing policy, insti-
tutions of community control have a greater ability to take up first-order
questions about the nature and value of policing itself. 142 If they wish, they can
contest and resist previous ways of defining and providing public safety. 143
A demand for community control is a demand for power. According to the
Vision for Black Lives, written by a coalition of organizations that make up the
Movement for Black Lives,144 the purpose of "community control" is not to re-
vise police policies, or to push for constitutional policing, but rather to ensure
Critics of CharterAmendment C Call for Sweeping Review of LAPD Discipline, L.A. TIMES (May
17, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-lapd-discipline-measure-
20170517-story.html [https://perma.cc/97CW-GYF9].
140. For a detailed explanation of these three dimensions of the institutional design of communi-
ty control and their implications, see Rahman & Simonson, supra note 1o, at 699-732.
141. See, e.g., Community Oversight Board, Potential Definitions of "Economically Distressed Com-
munities," NASHVILLE METRO PLANNING DEP'T (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.nashville.gov
/Portals/o/SiteContent/MetroClerk/docs/boards-commisions/CommunityOversight
/Economically%2oDistressed%20Communities%20Infographics.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8QXG-8K3P] (discussing how to define "economically distressed" for the purposes of re-
viewing nominations to the COB); Rahman & Simonson, supra note 1o, at 723-24 (describ-
ing the dispute in Oakland over whether there would be a criminal-record check for mem-
bers of the oversight commission).
142. On ex ante democratic decisionmaking in policing, see Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra
note 21, at 1893-1907; and Slobogin, supra note 21, at 91-98.
143. In this way, community control somewhat resembles what Heather Gerken calls "dissenting
by deciding," in which local groups such as juries resist mainstream politics through smaller,
local decisions that "stick." See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REv.
1745, 1746-49 (2005).
144. For a history of the formation of the Movement for Black Lives and the other organizations
that make up the Black Lives Matter Movement, see BARBARA RANSBY, MAKING ALL BLACK
LIVES MATTER: REIMAGINING FREEDOM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1-10 (2018).
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"[d]irect democratic community control" of law enforcement by "communities
most harmed by destructive policing."145 In Washington, D.C., the group Pan-
African Community Action, founded in 2015 following the murder of Alonzo
Smith by the city's Special Police, similarly advocates for community control.
They write: "The core issue is POWER, not racism. We cannot change our re-
ality by ending 'racism,' or the attitudes and opinions others hold of us. Our
conditions will only change when we shift power into our own hands and exer-
cise self-determination, thereby rendering the opinions of racists irrelevant."146
This call for power shifting via community control of the police is not new;
it was part of the call by the Black Panthers and other radical activists of color
in the 196os to reclaim control of their local governments. 147 The heart of this
historical push for Black community control was the idea that local police pre-
cincts should be independent of elites who are elected or appointed at the city
or county level, transferring power over policing to the people who interact
with police officers every day in the streets and on the roads.148 In the decades
145. Community Control, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://m4bl.org/policy-platforms
/community-control [https://perma.cc/U94Z-B2XR].
146. Max Rameau & Netfa Freeman, A Critical Analysis of the Demand to Defund the Police, PAN-
AFR. CMTY. ACTION (June 2020), https://pacapower.org/uploads/Documents/A%20Critical
%2oAnalysis%200f%2oDefunding%2othe%2oPolice.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RXP-57NX];
see PACA Tools of Analysis, PAN-AFR. CMTY. ACTION, https://www.pacapower.org/index
.php/tools-of-analysis [https://perma.cc/NNA6-JN4U].
147. See, e.g., Black Panther Party, Berkeley Petition for Community Control of Police, BERKELEY
MONITOR 12 (Aug. 8, 1970), http://www.itsabouttimebpp.com/CommunityControl/pdf/
CommunityControlPoliceNo1.pdf [https://perma.cc/NY6X-E8CF]; Bobby Seale,
Community Control of Police Was on the Berkeley Ballot in 1969, S.F. BAY VIEW (Aug. 13, 2015),
https ://sfbayview.com/2o15/o8/bobby-seale-community-control-of-police-was-on-the-
berkeley-ballot-in-1969 [https://perma.cc/DHH7-S45Y]. Like the Movement for Black
Lives, the idea of community control in the Black Panther philosophy was not just about
community control of the police, but also schools and other local-government services. See
Glen Ford, The Complexities of Black Community Control of Police, TRUTHOUT (Feb. 13, 2015),
http ://www.truth-out.org/news/item/291 oo-the-complexities-of-black-community-
control-of-police [https://perma.cc/K8AQ-XKMD] (connecting current demands for
community control of the police to the history of similar demands raised by social move-
ments in the 196os).
148. See generally Rita Mae Kelly, Sources of the Community Control Over Police Movement, J. VOL-
UNTARY ACTION RES. 25 (1978) (linking demand for community control to the value of
democratic self-governance); Elinor Ostrom & Gordon Whitaker, Does Local Community
Control of Police Make a Diference? Some Preliminary Findings, 17 AM. J. POL. SCI. 48 (1973)
(comparing police performance in community-controlled versus city-controlled police forces
in and near Indianapolis). Although few local jurisdictions in the 196os actually implement-
ed true community control, a weaker form of "civilian review" of police disciplinary deci-
sions did spread as a method of police reform. In Berkeley, California, for instance, voters in
1971 rejected a community-control referendum by a 2-1 margin, but two years later approved
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that followed this push, however, localities did not implement "community
control"; instead, they created institutions of "civilian review" or "community
advisory boards" that largely kept power in the hands of the police and city or
county officials.14 9 In recent years, though, many jurisdictions have placed re-
newed emphasis on reforming or designing new police-accountability institu-
tions with civilians at their helm, focusing on "control" over policing rather
than input into it.
This renewed conception of "community control" is not wed to any vision
of a coherent or monolithic "community." Indeed, the word "community" in
the context of local governance carries with it serious dangers of vagueness, co-
optation, and exclusion.150 But by using the word "community" in their de-
mands for power over policing, social movement actors are both nodding to
past struggles against racialized police violence and claiming inclusion in sys-
tems of local governance from which they feel excluded. With respect to polic-
ing in particular, movement actors make a deliberate attempt to reclaim the no-
tion of "community" as one of bottom-up power, in contrast to the dominant
concept of "community policing" in mainstream police reform. These groups
have diagnosed community policing as a dangerous "misnomer" that "pro-
vide[s] a facade of legitimacy that allows policing to continue as usual."151 In
a referendum for a "Police Review Commission" with independent authority to investigate
police complaints. See WALKER, supra note 136, at 32-33; see also Larry Redmond, Why We
Need Community Control of the Police, 21 PUB. INT. L. REP. 226, 229-31 (2015) (discussing this
Berkeley history); Seale, supra note 147 (describing the community-control referendum in
Berkeley).
149. See Udi Ofer, Getting It Right: Building Effective Civilian Review Boards to Oversee Police, 46
SETON HALL L. REv. 1033, 1041-42 (2016) (finding that, of the nation's fifty largest police de-
partments, only twenty-four have a form of civilian oversight of the police; and of those, all
but nine have a majority of the board nominated or controlled by the mayor or the police
chief); Samuel Walker, Governing the American Police: Wrestling with the Problems of Democ-
racy, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 615, 637 ("Other than the Berkeley effort,... community control
proved to be too radical an idea about the proper form of governing the police and gained no
traction in other communities."); Clark & Friedman, supra note 112 (manuscript at 3) (sur-
veying community advisory boards around the country and concluding that "[t]oo often,
CABs represent a pro forma effort by policing agencies to signal a commitment to working
with the public, without really working with the public").
150. See Weisberg, supra note 32, at 343-49 (critiquing the idea of community in the context of
the restorative justice and "community justice" movements); cf APPLEMAN, supra note 81, at
70-87 (discussing the difficulties with defining community in relation to criminal justice);
Ford, supra note 32, at 1870-74 (describing dangers of oppression and exclusion when using
local geography in legal analysis).
151. Counter-CAPS Report: The Community Engagement Arm of the Police State, WE CHARGE GEN-
OCIDE 3, 6 (Oct. 28, 2015) [hereinafter Counter-CAPS Report], http://wechargegenocide.org
/wp-content/uploads/2o15/1o/CAPSreport-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/FG39-QT55]
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contrast to the consensus-based model of community policing which they feel
has failed them, social movement actors demand a contestatory model of police
governance in which "communities most harmed by destructive policing" are
given power over policing, rather than denied input into it.i"2
Chicago activists' ongoing efforts to achieve community control of the po-
lice is illustrative of this push for local power shifting. In 2016, when the debate
in Chicago over police reform gained political salience, movement actors, along
with progressive allies in City Council, proposed an ordinance to create a Civil-
ian Police Accountability Council (CPAC) in which civilians had control over
police departments at the neighborhood level. Those activists explained: "We
believe democratic civilian control of the police means the community tells the
police what to do."153 The main grassroots group behind the push for CPAC is
the Chicago Alliance Against Racist and Political Repression (CAARPR), a
group founded in 1973 as part of the mass movement to free Angela Davis.154
Building on the group's longstanding presence organizing in largely Black
neighborhoods, CAARPR now works with Black Lives Matter-Chicago, the
Black Youth Project loo, and other local groups to advocate for community
control over the police. 155 Their 2016 proposed bill, then sponsored by only the
most progressive members of the city council,156 would have created a new po-
lice-accountability council with elected positions drawn from each district, for-
("These programs result in either democratic accountability of police agencies nor mean-
ingful changes in police practices. Instead, they . .. provide a fagade of legitimacy that allows
policing to continue as usual.").
152. Community Control, supra note 145.
153. The People's Guide to an Elected Civilian Police Accountability Council, supra note 2.
154. See CHI. ALLIANCE AGAINST RACIST & POL. REPRESSION, https://www.caarpr.org [https://
perma.cc/RC8G-9KBX]; see also Redmond, supra note 148, at 232-33 (detailing the history
of Chicago Alliance Against Racist and Political Repression and its current push for com-
munity control).
155. See, e.g., Press Release, We Charge Genocide, Chicago Alliance Against Racist and Political
Repression, Black Lives Matter-Chicago, Black Youth Project ioo & Showing Up for Racial
Justice-Chicago, Community Policing Is Not the Answer (Oct. 28, 2015),
http ://wechargegenocide.org/press-release-community-policing-is-not-the-answer-
countercaps-report [https://perma.cc/LWW9-GZA5] (listing organizations working to-
gether on the Counter-CAPS (Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy) report to expose the
limits of community policing in Chicago).
156. See D.D. Guttenplan, This Chicago Politician Is Showing How to Govern from the Left, NATION
(July 13, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/meet-chicagos-movement-politician
[https://perma.cc/54QC-MBBE] (describing progressive councilman Carlos Ramirez-
Rosa's support of the Civilian Police Accountability Council (CPAC) proposal).
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bidding individuals with personal or professional connections to police officers
from serving on the council. 157
The proposed CPAC ordinance has changed slightly over the intervening
years, but it remains in play in local Chicago politics.158 In 2020, for example,
with protesters around the city holding up signs that say "CPAC Now!" and
the City Council facing pressure to react,159 the revised ordinance once again
gained steam.160 The ordinance would create an elected board with the authori-
ty to select the person in charge of investigating officers, hire and fire the police
superintendent, and help create - and have veto power over - rules and policies
governing police conduct.16 1 Notably, there is also a competing proposal,
which would maintain the CPD's existing review agency but create a new
"Community Commission for Public Safety and Accountability" as well as local
district councils that would run community meetings in their police districts.162
157. The People's Guide to an Elected Civilian Police Accountability Council, supra note 2.
158. For example, in 2019, the movement-driven ordinance was once again before the Chicago
City Council, this time with twice the number of cosponsors as it had in 2016. Masterson,
supra note 2. This time, however, there was a competing community-driven proposal for ci-
vilian oversight from the Grassroots Alliance for Police Accountability (GAPA). See Aneel
Chablani, Community Police Oversight Is Long Past Due, CRAIN'S CHI. BUS. (June 10, 2019,
3:00 PM), https://www.chicagobusiness.com/lightfoot-loo/community-police-oversight-
long-past-due [https://perma.cc/3E9Z-7X5X] (describing some differences between GAPA
and CPAC) ; Annie Sweeney, First Public Hearing on Civilian Oversight Abruptly Breaks Up
Amid Protest, CHI. TRIB. (May 16, 2018, 5:30 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com
/news/local/breaking/ct-met-community-oversight-commission-hearing-2o18o516 -story
.html [https://perma.cc/U7R8-ZTBV] (describing how two movement-written proposals
for a police-review agency are now being debated in the Chicago City Council, along with a
different Emmanuel-backed plan).
159. See Black, supra note 4 (describing "thousands of Chicagoans in the streets in recent weeks
demanding community control of police in the form of an elected Civilian Police Accounta-
bility Council").
16o. Claudia Morrell & Patrick Smith, After Decades of Police Corruption, Can Chicago Finally Re-
form Its Force?, WBEZ (June 13, 2020, 6:oo AM CT), https://www.wbez.org/stories/after-
decades-of-police-corruption-can-chicago-finally-reform-its-force/c3cbe83f-3291-4be1-b977
-8c 7od431b921 [https://perma.cc/K8BA-856S] (describing how, in June 2020, CPAC was
"gaining serious legs" politically in the City Council).
161. Id.
162. See Craig B. Futterman & Sheila A. Bedi, Communities Need Control over Police if Justice Is to
Prevail, CHI. SUN TIMES (Mar. 9, 2020, 5:40 PM CDT), https://chicago.suntimes.com
/2020/3/9/21172211/communities-need-control-over-police-if-justice-is-to-prevail [https://
perma.cc/UH4W-BPEH] (arguing in favor of CPAC over GAPA and contrasting the two).
But see Fran Spielman, Lightfoot's Civilian Police Review Ordinance Hits Snag, CHI. SUN TIMES
(Mar. 10, 2020, 11:49 AM CDT), https://chicago.suntimes.com/city-hall/202o/3/10
/21173377/lightfoots-civilian-police-review-ordinance-hits-snag [https://perma.cc/26DF-
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This proposed ordinance came from the Grassroots Alliance for Police Ac-
countability (GAPA), a countergroup made up of a combination of police-
reform experts and community-based organizations163 -demonstrating that
different movement configurations can lead to different governance proposals.
GAPA's proposal does transfer some power to city residents: among other
things, the all-civilian Commission would, with enough City Council support,
have the ability to fire the police superintendent for cause and draft nonbinding
police department policies. 164 But because there are no binding, unreviewable
powers in the proposed GAPA commission, advocates for CPAC have described
the GAPA proposal as a "watered down" version of reform that elides commu-
nity control or "genuine community based accountability."165 The difference,
for these advocates, is centrally about both the amount and nature of the power
shift entailed in the structure of the new council.
The call in Chicago for "community control of the police" is echoed in other
parts of the country as well, from cities as small as Evanston, IL 166 and Roches-
ter, NY,1 67 to those as large as Minneapolis, MN, 168 Washington, D.C.,169 and
MCTL] (describing a rift between Lightfoot and the GAPA coalition over the power of the
new civilian council to impose binding policies).
163. See Our Coalition, GAPA (2021), http://chicagogapa.org/our-coalition [https://perma
.cc/9M2A-D9R5] ("The Grassroots Alliance for Police Accountability (GAPA) is a broad-
based coalition of community organizations committed to making our neighborhoods safer,
improving police practices and accountability, and transforming the relationship between
the Chicago Police Department and the communities it serves.").
164. See Chi., Ill., Ordinance to Amend Municipal Code ch. 2-82-125(b) (proposed Mar. 28,
2018) (unenacted), http://chicagogapa.org/wp-content/uploads/2o18/o9/02018-2389-
V2.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9HM-WPC6].
165. Futterman & Bedi, supra note 162.
166. See, e.g., Proposal for an Evanston Board of Police Oversight, Accountability, and Transparency,
CITIZENS' NETWORK PROT. (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.citizensnetworkofprotection
.com/wp-content/uploads/2o19/11/Citizens-Network-of-Protection-Proposal-updated-
April-2o18.pdf [https://perma.cc/EQS4-A3N4].
167. See POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD ALLIANCE, https://pabnow.github.io [https://
perma.cc/EM6W-5WQH]; see also Jennifer Lewke, City Voters to Be Asked About Police Ac-
countability Board, WHEC (Oct. 18, 2019, 5:21 PM), https://www.whec.com/news/city-
voters-to-be-asked-about-police-accountability-board/5528598 [https://perma.cc/TGV7-
W7 5L] (describing a police-accountability board referendum in the City of Rochester).
168. See Glen Ford, The Minneapolis Police Name-Change Con, LA PROGRESSIVE (Aug. 15, 2020),
https://www.laprogressive.com/minneapolis-police [https://perma.cc/85J7-JWFN] (de-
scribing the Twin Cities Coalition for Justice for Jamar, which advocates for community
control under the CPAC model in Minneapolis).
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New York City.170 And these campaigns have sometimes gained political trac-
tion, from the CPAC in Chicago, 1 1 to the winning movement-driven referenda
in Nashville in 2018172 and Oaldand in 2016173 to establish new institutions of
civilian oversight. 17' In many instances, social movement actors connect the
design of institutions of "community control" to concerns with larger structural
and historical inequities with respect to policing. In particular, activists who
have designed local proposals for community control claim that their proposals
themselves are a way to "deconstruct[] the historic relationship between the
police and the Black community, and re-imagin[e] a social force designed to
actually protect and serve its population."175
The demand for community control from local activists is far from univer-
sal. Some activists against police violence want to improve institutions of
community policing, involving communities in coproducing safety alongside
police officers.176 Meanwhile, for some abolitionist groups, there is a worry
170. See, e.g., Peoples' Justice for Community Control and Police Accountability, FACEBOOK, https://
www.facebook.com/peoplesjustice [https://perma.cc/EX2C-WZR6] (advocating for a New
York City community-control reform proposal).
171. See Stop Police Crimes-Enact CPAC for Community Control, CHI. ALLIANCE AGAINST RACIST &
POL. REPRESSION, https://www.caarpr.org/stop-police-crimes [https://perma.cc/NA48-
K3KU].
172. See Community Oversight Board, METROPOLITAN GOv'T NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON COUNTY,
TENN., https://www.nashville.gov/Government/Boards-and-Committees/Committee-
Information/ID/132/Community-Oversight-Board.aspx [https://perma.cc/79U8-GNX6];
see also Metropolitan Charter Amendment No. 1, METROPOLITAN GOv'T NASHVILLE & DA-
VIDSON COUNTY, TENN. (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nashville.gov/Portals/o/SiteContent
/MetroClerk/docs/boards-commissions/CommunityOversight/Community%200versight
%2oBoard%20-%2oAmendment%201.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BYE-HLA4] (providing the
text of the amendment to the Nashville and Davidson County Charter that would establish
the Community Oversight Board).
173. See Oakland, California, Civilian Police Commission, Measure LL (November 2016), BAL-
LOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Oaldand,_California,_Civilian_Police_Commission,
MeasureLL_(November_2016) [https://perma.cc/R7W2-N8KW].
174. Although neither Nashville nor Oaldand created institutions of community control, they did
successfully shift governance arrangements along other axes of power that are important to
the social movement push for power in governance. For an analysis of these governance ar-
rangements, see Rahman & Simonson, supra note 1o, at 709-10, 719-32.
175. Adams & Rameau, supra note 137, at 538; see also Rahman & Simonson, supra note 1o, at 723-
24 (discussing how to ensure the representation of systematically excluded groups on local
bodies).
176. See Leadership, Partnership, and Trust: A Community Plan for a Safer Chicago, GRASSROOTS
ALLIANCE FOR POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 4 (Mar. 2018), http://chicagogapa.org/wp-content
/uploads/2o18/o3/GAPA-Report-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/DE2Q-ZFGF] ("This pro-
posal seeks to increase public safety; foster and create trust and improve interactions be-
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that even strong civilian oversight institutions can be coopted by more power-
ful interests, or by reigning ideologies that infect the institution of policing it-
self. " To these groups, to fiddle with the strings of power within a current in-
stitution of policing is in some ways to legitimize that institution.178 And, to
the extent that a new policing institution concentrates resources in policing at
the expense of other social supports, it may also legitimate the use of the crimi-
nal legal system to solve social problems more broadly. 17 Indeed, although the
Vision for Black Lives, written in 2016 by the M4BL coalition, embraced com-
munity control of the police, more recent platforms from some of these same
organizations have not.180 Some of these platforms have not mentioned com-
munity control of the police at all,181 while others have stressed community
control more broadly. The Movement for Black Lives took this latter approach
tween and among police officers and Chicago residents; ensure that police policies and re-
form plans reflect community values and are informed by residents' experience; and estab-
lish an accountability system that operates independently and without bias.").
177. See, e.g., Kaba & Duda, supra note 97 (interviewing Mariame Kaba, who explains this am-
bivalence as follows: "[H]ere's where I'm stuck: what is different about community mem-
bers being elected to be on boards -we have elected officials in other places, right? We still
internalize particular ideologies about policing, we still have the police in our heads and our
hearts. Is it the oversight body itself that makes the difference? Why wouldn't those over-
sight bodies just adopt the existing ideology that is already in circulation?"); Richie,
Rodriguez, Kaba, Burch, Herzing & Agid, supra note 40, at 1 ("If we invest in an oversight
body that is meant to work toward the goal of ending 'bad' policing, we simultaneously in-
vest in the resources, rhetoric, and power of policing and the possibility of police reform.").
178. See Reformist Reforms vs. Abolitionist Steps in Policing, CRITICAL RESISTANCE (2020),
https ://static.squarespace.com/static/59ead8f9692ebee25b72f17f/t/b65cd58758d46d34254f
22c/1533398363539/CRNoCopsreformvs_abolitionCRside.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJZ7
-PEP7 ] (stating that pushing for community oversight boards "further entrenches policing
as a legitimate, reformable system, with a 'community' mandate. Some boards, tasked with
overseeing them, become structurally invested in their existence"); cf ALEx S. VITALE, THE
END OF POLICING 24 (2017) ("Policing will never be a just or effective tool for community
empowerment, much less racial justice.").
179. See Richie, Rodriguez, Kaba, Burch, Herzing & Agid, supra note 40, at 1 ("[B]uilding trust
in the institution of policing tends to legitimize . . . the role police play in our daily lives.").
180. See Vision for Black Lives, supra note 39, (highlighting the Movement for Black Lives'
(M4BL) 2016 platform on community control and explaining the revisions in the 2020 plat-
form).
181. The Dream Defenders' 2018 Freedom Papers, for example, hold out that "[p]olice and pris-
ons have no place in 'justice:" Freedom Papers, DREAM DEFENDERS 5 (2018),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JmqXaK9HUTfTouRB5rw6eAgxDPVFnk [https://
perma.cc/39U8-L8ML]; see also Agenda to Build Black Futures, BLACK YOUTH PROJECT 100
(2016), http://agendatobuildblackfutures.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/o1/BYP
_AgendaBlackFuturesbooldetweb.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SZS-YHB5] (making no men-
tion of community control and only passing mention of police reform).
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in its 2020 Week of Action to Defend Black Lives, which demanded community
control but placed policing last in a list of other forms of community control:
schools, budgets, and economies."12 And in their account of abolitionist trans-
formative reforms, movement leaders and scholars Marbre Stahly-Butts and
Amna Akbar describe power shifting as a form of change that for the most part
occurs outside of state processes, so as "to decrease reliance on harmful state
institutions." 18
At the same time, many larger coalitions of grassroots organizations fo-
cused on police violence do explicitly support community control184 and issues
of community control have become part of the national debate over reform fol-
lowing the 2020 uprisings.185 These groups sometimes combine calls for com-
munity control with larger demands of divesting from policing or abolishing it
altogether. 186 In Los Angeles, for example, Black Lives Matter-LA activists suc-
ceeded in gathering signatures for a winning 2020 referendum that will simul-
taneously bolster the powers of the Civilian Review Commission and require
"community reinvestment" by transferring resources from local jails to com-
munity services.187 This campaign combined demands for power shifting in
police accountability with demands for divesting from the criminal legal sys-
tem. Similarly, Black Lives Matter Chicago, one of the central supporters of
community control of the police in Chicago, has for years listed CPAC as just
182. See Atlanta, Defend Black Lives, DEFENDING BLACK LIVES,
https://www.defendingblacklives.org/atlanta-defend-black-lives [https://perma.cc/955M-
5LY6] ("The most impacted in our communities need to control the laws, institutions, and
policies that are meant to serve us -from our schools to our local budgets, economies, and
police departments.").
183. Stahly-Butts & Akbar, supra note 41, at 6.
184. See, e.g., Terrance Laney & Jana6 Bonsu, Agenda to Keep Us Safe, BLACK YOUTH PROJECT 100,
at 9 (2016) https://agendatobuildblackfutures.org/wp-content/uploads/2o16/o1/BYP1OO-
Agenda-to-Keep-Us-Safe-AKTUS.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVF4-2AFA] (listing the Chicago
CPAC as model legislation for democratic policing).
185. See, e.g., Morrell & Smith, supra note 160 (describing how in June 2020 CPAC is "gaining
serious legs" politically in the City Council); Rameau & Freeman, supra note 40 (describing
the differences between community control and defunding the police).
186. See generally Tiiw6, supra note 135 ("A community in control of how order is maintained
does not have to grin and bear the decisions of its police. It has the power to hire officers,
fire them, fund department initiatives, or abolish policing altogether.").
187. The referendum was on the ballot in 2020. See Jeffrey Cawood, Black Lives Matter Leader's
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one of its ten demands, with other demands including "defund the police" and
"invest in community resources."188
Whether it is because social movement actors want less policing, because
they want better policing, or both, overlying their demands for popular control
over policing is a broader -and separate-demand for power and democratic
rule. This call for power shifting in local police governance is of course a sepa-
rate question from whether new institutions of governance will be designed in
a way that is otherwise effective-with adequate resources, training, and insti-
tutional protections from capture from other interests.189 But drawing out the
specific focus on power shifting helps illuminate the different perspective that
calls for local community control bring to police reform. In an article focused
on Black community control of the police, two activist thinkers, M. Adams and
Max Rameau, put it this way: "Policies and specific laws conspire to make up
the details of social order and daily life. However, the truly important aspect is
the underlying power relationship among the individual and collective social
actors."19 0 For Adams and Rameau, because the underlying power relationships
are ones rooted in white supremacy, wealth extraction, and the marginalization
of women and trans people, "the only way to alter police behavior is to alter the
underlying power dynamic between the police and our communities."'9 As the
next Section will show, this call for a shift in the "power dynamic" is echoed in
national calls for police reform as well.
B. Federal Policy: A People's Process for Drafting Federal Legislation
At the federal level, the People's Coalition for Safety and Freedom (People's
Coalition) proposes new legislation that would shift investment in "public
safety" away from local policing by using a "People's Process" that emphasizes
the priorities of people living in communities most affected by mass incarcera-
i88. 10 Demands of BLMCHI, BLACK LIVEs MATTER CHI., https://www.blacklives
matterchicago.com/1o-demands-of-blmchi [https://perma.cc/D2W8-BXGA].
18q. See Clark & Friedman, supra note 112, at 13-14, 16-17 (describing how many community ad-
visory boards suffer from a lack of resources, adequate training, or structures to prevent
burnout); Rahman & Simonson, supra note 10, at 691-705; cf Joanna C. Schwartz, Who Can
Police the Police?, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437, 443-44 (using the public-defender system to il-
lustrate resource constraints on reformers).
190. Adams & Rameau, supra note 137, at 522-23
191. Id. at 529; see also Rameau & Freeman, supra note 40 ("[Washington, D.C. group Pan-
African Community Action] is intentional about he need to build campaigns rooted in the
objective of shifting power to the Black working class masses, with a particular emphasis on
empowering women and queer folk as a counterbalance to patriarchy.").
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tion and policing. The People's Coalition, made up of grassroots organizations
that include BYP loo, the Dream Defenders, the Center for Popular Democra-
cy, and the National Council of Incarcerated and Formerly Incarcerated Wom-
en, engaged in a year-long process of workshops and focus groups with for-
merly incarcerated and directly impacted people to generate a legislative
response to the 25th Anniversary of the 1994 Crime Bill. Like movement vi-
sions of community control, the People's Coalition demands a shift in which
groups and interests determine how the state provides safety and security. The
Coalition explains: "For far too long . . . federal legislation has been driven by
powerful interests and drafted in opaque ways. By bringing a transformative
approach to building consensus . . . for a transformative legislative outcome,
we seek to change the way- and for whom-policy and budgeting operates."192
The People's Coalition's analysis of the possibilities of transforming federal
spending on public safety begins with a critique of past reform initiatives. The
starting point of the analysis is a belief that the 1994 Crime Bill, while targeted
at reducing violence,193 has caused significantly more harm than good to "an
entire generation of families in the United States, with particularly destructive
impact on Black communities."194 This harm, in the view of the Coalition,
came from federal investment in local policing initiatives that increased surveil-
lance and everyday violence, and, in turn, discouraged the federal government
from investing in disadvantaged communities in other ways.195 In the context
of policing, the coalition focuses on the establishment of the Community Ori-
ented Policing Services (COPS) arm of the Department of Justice, which was
granted $8.8 billion in funding by the '94 Crime Bill. COPS has granted over
$14 billion to local law-enforcement agencies since that time.196
192. Reckoning with Mass Criminalization, supra note 8, at 5.
193. See id. at 1 ("While everyone supports violence reduction-the purported goal of the 94
Crime Bill - several of the provisions included in the 94 Crime Bill to achieve this goal have
been proven ineffective and harmful."). But see Bruce Shapiro, Nothing About the 1994 Crime
Bill Was Unintentional, NATION (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article
/archive/nothing-about-the-1994-crime-bill-was-unintentional [https://perma.cc/4TMH-
JX7 2].
194. Reckoning with Mass Criminalization, supra note 8, at 1.
195. For a detailed history of federal divestment from communities and investment in law en-
forcement instead, see ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON
CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 134-79 (2016).
196. See Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs., Grants, U.S. DEP'T JUST., https://cops.usdoj.gov/grants
[https://perma.cc/BKG9-BS34] ("As the leading community policing experts at the U.S.
Department of Justice, we've invested over $14 billion in community policing since Congress
established our office in 1994."); Naomi Murakawa, Police Reform Works-for the Police, LEV-
EL (Oct. 21, 2020), https://level.medium.com/why-police-reform-is-actually-a-bailout-for-
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In the view of the Coalition, this focus on federal investment in community
policing harmed communities in at least three ways: First, it legitimized the
expansion of local police departments and facilitated everyday police violence;
second, community-policing initiatives excluded the most marginalized from
their participatory mechanisms;197 and third, it used federal resources that
might have otherwise been designated for community supports outside of the
criminal legal system.198
The harm of the '94 Crime Bill, according to these activists, was about ide-
ology as much as it was about the distribution of federal resources: indeed,
they recognize that other federal legislation and policies can simultaneously be
blamed for the harms that they name.199 Three of their leaders wrote: "The '94
Crime Bill endorsed a false view that punitive and retributive systems of polic-
ing and incarceration can advance public safety. In reality, both perpetuate ra-
cial disparities, family separation, community destabilization, voter disenfran-
chisement, misdirected spending of limited public resources and systemic state
violence."200
In envisioning a replacement for the '94 Crime Bill, the Coalition's focus
groups and broader discussions tried to reimagine what it means for national
legislation to promote public safety. The resulting vision insists on the reduc-
tion of spending on the criminal legal system, instead advocating for direct
spending and investment in health, education, housing, and infrastructure.
The key policy insight here-the invest/divest framework-comes from dec-
ades of local organizing focused on advocating for divestment from prisons and
policing, paired with resource investment in other means of giving communi-
ties the ability to support each other and to thrive.201 The Coalition insists that
cops-ecf2dd7b8833 [https://perma.cc/PUD3-KYJ4] (describing federal investment in
Community Oriented Policing Services in 1994 and continually since then).
197. See Counter-CAPS Report, supra note 151, at 3 (expressing these critiques in the context of an
empirical study of community policing in Chicago); Simonson, supra note 26, at 1616 (de-
scribing this Counter-CAPS report and its analysis of community policing).
198. Reckoning with Mass Criminalization, supra note 8, at 1-2.
19q. The Coalition recognizes that the '94 Crime Bill was neither the exclusive cause of the ex-
pansion of policing, nor of the carceral state. See Hoskins, James & Rao, supra note 5; cf
John Pfaff, Bill Clinton Is Wrong About His Crime Bill. So Are the Protesters He Lectured, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/12/magazine/bill-clinton-
is-wrong-about-his-crime-bill-so-are-the-protesters-he-lectured.html [https://perma.cc
/SSGA-TGNN] (arguing that the impact of the 1994 Crime Bill is not as immense as Black
Lives Matter activists claim).
200. Hoskins, James & Rao, supra note 5.
201. See Kate Hamaji, Kumar Rao, Marbre Stahly-Butts, Janae Bonsu, Charlene Carruthers,
Roselyn Berry & Denzel McCampbell, Freedom to Thrive: Reimagining Safety & Security in
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the details of these new national policies be generated not by looking to experts
already in power, but rather by "join[ing] forces with the people most harmed
by policing, criminalization and incarceration."2O2
The Coalition demands that this grassroots reimagining of public safety be
an ongoing process. The Coalition calls for Congress to engage in a long-term
"People's Process": an iterative sequence of town halls, assemblies,203 and in-
district Congressional hearings that together connect the idea of public safety
to the need for federal investment in programs that prevent violence and inter-
personal harm. The legislation itself would then be drafted with input from or-
ganizations working at the local level. The "People's Process" relies on the idea
that wisdom can be generated when we allow communities and individuals to
use their experiences with the carceral state and policing as a way of generating
insight into pathways for reform. It is the same race- and class-subjugated
American communities that have been destabilized by policing and mass incar-
ceration that have also been ravaged by the lack of funding for forms of sup-
port-such as housing, education, and health-that are directly linked to the
prevention of violence. It is within these communities, often composed of poor
people of color, that movements have met the urgency of their situations by
collectively redefining the very ideas of "safety"2O4 and "freedom."2 os
In November 2019, in advance of the Coalition's release of its platform,
Representative Ayanna Pressley introduced a resolution in Congress, titled the
"People's Justice Guarantee."206 It is modelled after the Coalition's ideas and in-
Our Communities, CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY, L. FOR BLACK LIVES & BLACK YOUTH PRO-
JECT 100 (July 4, 2017), https://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Freedom%20To
%2oThrive%2C%2oHigher%2oRes%2oVersion.pdf [https://perma.cc/EDH9-FFAW]
(documenting how grassroots organizations across the United States have advocated for in-
vest/divest strategies locally).
202. See Hoskins, James & Rao, supra note 5.
203. See Makani Themba-Nixon, The City as Liberated Zone: The Promise of Jackson's People's As-
semblies, in JACKSON RISING: THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY AND BLACK SELF-
DETERMINATION IN JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI (Kali Akuno & Ajamu Nangwaya eds., 2017),
https ://jacksonrising.pressbooks.com/chapter/the-city-as-liberated-zone-the-promise-of-
jacksons-peoples-assemblies [https://perma.cc/RGN4-QRKH] (describing people's assem-
blies as "part of a long democratic tradition in progressive movements worldwide").
204. See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REv. 585, 615, 628 (2017) (de-
scribing how community bail funds contest larger ideas about the meaning of public safety);
Night Out for Safety and Liberation, ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUM. RTS., https://ellabakercenter
.org/night-out-for-safety-and-liberation [https://perma.cc/9GHX-ZZVU].
205. See, e.g., Freedom Papers, DREAM DEFENDERS, https://dreamdefenders.org/freedom-papers
[https://perma.cc/WY2T-CHYS].
206. H.R. Res. 702, 116th Cong. (2019); see Press Release, Ayanna Pressley, U.S. Congresswom-
an, Rep. Pressley Launches a Bold, Progressive Criminal Legal Reform Resolution: The
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fluenced by conversations with activists from the Coalition. Congresswoman
Pressley describes the resolution as "tak[ing the] lead" from on-the-ground
conversations by directly impacted people.207 She has repeatedly said: "There
are co-sponsors. It's the people."208 The People's Justice Guarantee sweeps
across policy areas, while centering its purpose on repairing the harms of mass
incarceration and mass criminalization. Recognizing a "moral obligation to
meet [the] foundational promise of guaranteed justice for all," the People's Jus-
tice Guarantee fits within the invest/divest framework, calling for Congress to
meet a crisis of mass incarceration by shifting federal resources "away from
criminalization and incarceration and toward policies and investments that
fairly and equitably ensure that all people can thrive."209 It demands legal
changes in the criminal system that reduce the reach of policing, criminaliza-
tion, and incarceration, along with federal investments in jobs, housing, health
care, transportation, infrastructure, and clean water that would allow people
who live in impacted communities to support each other and craft their own
remedies for disorder and violence.1
The People's Justice Guarantee also adopts the idea of the "People's Process"
from the People's Coalition for Safety and Freedom. Indeed, Congresswoman
Pressley has tressed in interviews that the resolution itself arose from the pre-
ceding, year-long process of the People's Coalition in which grassroots groups
met with directly impacted people to imagine what federal legislation that
guarantees safety and freedom could look like.2" The resolution sponsored by
Pressley states that Congress would "support and commit to a participatory
people's process that recognizes directly impacted people as experts on trans-
forming the justice system, who speak from experience about the devastation
of criminalization and incarceration and offer community-oriented solu-
tions."2 This "People's Process" would include "people's assemblies, town-
halls, listening sessions, and workshops" in which "directly impacted commu-
People's Justice Guarantee (Nov. 14, 2019), https://pressley.house.gov/media/press-releases
/rep-pressley-launches-bold-progressive-criminal-legal-reform-resolution-people [https://
perma.cc/GU3X-HG9R].
207. Kira Lerner, Ayanna Pressley Hopes the U.S. Can Reduce Its Prison Population by over 8o Percent,
APPEAL (Nov. 19, 2019), https://theappeal.org/ayanna-pressley-hopes-the-u-s-can-reduce-
its-prison-population-by-over-8o-percent [https://perma.cc/G2B8-9ERK].
208. Id.
209. See H.R. Res. 702.
210. Id.
211. See Lerner, supra note 207.
212. See H.R. Res. 702.
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nities" would help draft legislation to create a holistic federal agenda to pro-
mote public health and safety.213
Both the Coalition's platform and the People's Justice Guarantee lack speci-
ficity in their initial proposals for a "People's Process." Where, how, and when
these local forms of engagement such as townhalls and workshops could hap-
pen are left unstated. One possibility, suggested by the organizers, is that it
could resemble participatory budgeting, but on a national level. Despite this
imprecision, the Coalition's demand for a federal "People's Process" is centered
on a key idea: that directly impacted people are themselves the policy experts
on "public safety" to whom we should be listening for specific, grounded pro-
posals for change. The Coalition has tried to demonstrate the beginnings of
that process through the generation of their legislative proposal itself and in-
troduction of the People's Justice Guarantee in Congress. The result has been
the most far-reaching and transformative proposal in recent memory for feder-
al legislation that seeks to provide security and safety through means other
than policing, criminalization, and incarceration.214 Power shifting that would
result from the "People's Process" is not as direct as in a local-governance ar-
rangement like community control of the police, but its scope is bigger: it asks
directly impacted people to articulate visions of public safety that go beyond
policing and toward a transformative idea of how the state can keep people se-
cure.2 15 In doing so, it demands that we all reexamine the idea of "public safe-
ty" itself.216
Both the "People's Process" to craft national legislation and the local push
for community control over policing demand large-scale restructuring of insti-
tutional processes for generating policing policy. They share a focus on power,
although that vision of power looks very different: in community control, it is
about direct power over local policies, whereas in the national context, the input
they demand is more diffuse but covers more ground. Both forms of power
213. Id.
214. Cf Nik DeCosta-I lipa, Ayanna Pressley Releases a Sweeping Vision for Criminal Justice Reform,
BOSTON.COM (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.boston.com/news/politics/2019/11/14/ayanna-
pressley-criminal-justice-reform [https://perma.cc/42JE-HULV] ("Rep. Ayanna Pressley is
unveiling what she characterizes as the most progressive and comprehensive plan for over-
hauling the legal system.").
215. Cf Rahman & Simonson, supra note 1o, at 719-32 (arguing that the scope of power and the
nature of authority are two different dimensions along which to think about power shifting
in governance arrangements).
216. Cf Friedman, supra note 47, at 7 ("Wherever one ultimately comes out on what public safety
entails, what seems unacceptable is to not to ask the question, to fail to be clear in our own
mind about why some governmental functions are privileged over others that seem just as
vital.").
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shifting are also ripe for criticism along multiple axes: Will they be feasible?
Will they lead to change or will they just result in gridlock? Will they be co-
opted by more powerful interests? Will police resistance make any changes
unworkable?
How one goes about responding to these questions and criticisms, howev-
er, depends on a background understanding of the purpose of police reform.
Embedded in the larger social movement demand for power shifting is an un-
derlying demand that the purpose of police reform itself include the goal of
shifting power to people and populations who have historically been subject to
police violence. In the next Part, I explore and defend this idea.
III. A THEORETICAL DEFENSE OF THE POWER LENS
The power lens encourages reform efforts that shift power to populations
who have historically been subject, and are currently subject, to the violence
and control of everyday policing. Below I present three possible ways to think
about the power lens with respect to police reform: as reparation, as antisubor-
dination, and as necessary for contestatory democracy. Although I discuss these
three justifications separately, they are certainly related-in particular, repara-
tions theory and antisubordination theory have at times shared ideas and pro-
ponents.2 17 Nonetheless, I describe them separately because they arise from
distinct ways of thinking about why it is important to pay attention to power in
policing alongside other objectives of reform.
A. Reparation
The reparative argument for power shifting comes down to a simple idea:
we must take historical wrongs into account when thinking about reform in the
present. In the context of governance and policymaking, the implication is
something more specific, centering on the need to transfer ownership over pol-
itics and the workings of the law down to the people who are directly op-
pressed by the law. Within police reform, this means recognizing that the deni-
al of citizenship by everyday policing requires repair through deliberate efforts
to shift political power downward.2 1 The argument here is not that a new
form of governance that shifts power downward would itself constitute a com-
217. See Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for
the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1398-99 (1991) (describing reparations as a sub-
set of antisubordination theory).
218. On the antidemocratic nature of policing, see supra notes 102-109 and accompanying text.
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plete plan for reparations; it would certainly not be a form of payback, eco-
nomic or otherwise. Rather, the theories and narratives around reparations for
collective state harms support a stance on police reform that encourages power
shifting as a way to account for, and seek to remedy, past harms in political
power and democratic citizenship that have resulted from decades of policing
policies. Reform of governance arrangements can be a form of social and politi-
cal repair. As the debate over reparations for slavery reemerges in mainstream
discourse,219 so too might a way of thinking about policing going forward that
focuses on repairing the harms of policing on communities of color and other
disadvantaged groups.
Reparations theory is far-ranging and heterogeneous. One broad concept of
reparations from Alfred Brophy is that reparation is appropriate in "cases where
there is [a need for] repair for past crimes against groups,"2 such that repara-
tions "are justified because past harm is causing current inequality."2 Uniting
this and other theories of reparations, in the context of state obligations, is the
idea that the legitimacy of the state is bolstered when it recognizes that past
harms are causing current group harms and seeks to remedy those harms ex-
plicitly. 2 2 Charles Ogletree has identified four central ideas in the debate over
reparations: First, "a focus on the past to account for the present"; second, "a
focus on the present, to reveal the continuing existence of race-based discrimi-
nation"; third, "an accounting of past harms or injuries that have not been
compensated"; and fourth, "a challenge to society to devise ways to respond as
a whole to [those] uncompensated harms."2 This challenge means looking be-
yond individual acts that have caused harm to identify, name, and remedy larg-
er sets of state practices that have caused group harms.2 And, as Ogletree im-
219. See Edwin Rios, 150 Years Later, Slavery Reparations Are on the Agenda Again, MOTHER JONES
(Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2o19/o8/15o-years-later-slavery-
reparations-are-on-the-agenda-again [https://perma.cc/RD6P-9WZR].
220. Brophy, supra note 23, at 835.
221. Id. at 823.
222. See Lawrie Balfour, Reparations After Identity Politics, 33 POL. THEORY 786, 787 (2005) (de-
scribing "the tenor of an age in which victims of identity-based injustices around the world
were demanding and receiving both symbolic and material redress, in which states' claims to
democratic legitimacy in the present were increasingly connected to a willingness to con-
front the crimes of the past"). But see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for
Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 689, 693 (2003) (critiquing repa-
rations theorists for failing to ground their legal theories in cognizable legal claims).
223. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Current Reparations Debate, 36 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 1051, 1055
(2003).
224. See Eric J. Miller, On Juneteenth, Demanding that Reparations Be More than Lip Service, HILL
(June 19, 2019, 5:30 PM EDT), https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/449392-on-
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plies, it requires that we accept the challenge of imagining and creating new
state responses to inequality.
Legal scholars often focus on achieving reparation through litigation,2 2 but
many recognize that legislation and policymaking can be forms of repara-
tion.226 For example, the Voting Rights Act operates as a reparative piece of leg-
islation, aimed at righting the past and ongoing harms of Jim Crow by protect-
ing and promoting the ability of Black people to vote.227 So too is the
legislation in President Johnson's Great Society, aimed at using antipoverty
programs to improve the lives of poor people, and especially Black Americans
in urban areas.22 And in a recent piece of public reparative lawmaking, when
the City of Chicago admitted wrongdoing for its role in facilitating decades of
torture of police suspects by Detective Jon Burge and his deputies, the City not
only compensated the victims but also passed legislation to require that public
schools teach about the history of police torture.2 In the words of the Nation-
juneteenth-demanding-that-reparations-be-more-than-lip-service [https://perma.cc/QH7A
-E7AY] ("A full accounting of the institutional wrongs requires that state institutions devel-
op specific, social and institutional remedies to rebuild and restore the African American
people and communities singled out for these race-targeted ignity harms.").
225. See, e.g., BORIS L BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 68 (1973) (arguing that a
statute's potential reparative impact "would have to be clarified by protracted litigation").
But see id. at 128-37 (describing how under a legal theory of reparations in which the state is
liable, settlement money can be used for public projects).
226. See, e.g., ALFRED L. BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO & CON 173-74 (2006) (describing "communi-
ty-building legislation as reparations" (capitalization altered)); Jeffery M. Brown, Decon-
structing Babel: Toward a Theory of Structural Reparations, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 463, 473
(2004) ("Black Reconstruction remains the paradigm exemplar of so-called structural repa-
rations.") ; Lee A. Harris, Political Autonomy as a Form of Reparations to African-Americans, 29
S.U. L. REv. 25, 56 (2001) (arguing that reparations to African Americans can and should in-
clude political autonomy).
227. See BROPHY, supra note 226, at 172-73 (describing civil-rights legislation over American his-
tory as a form of reparations, including the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
228. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in Ameri-
ca, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 317 (2003) ("[President Johnson] explicitly recognized
that reparations required whites and blacks to face America's history of oppression and take
positive action in order to overcome that history.").
229. See G. Flint Taylor, The Long Path to Reparations for the Survivors of Chicago Police Torture, 11
Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 330, 338-52 (2016); Reparations Won: A Case Study in Police Torture,
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al Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America (N'COBRA), "reparations
means full repair"- repair that can include legislative or other policy actions.2 30
In recent decades, scholarly and public attention to the idea of Black repara-
tions has resurfaced.231 Most recently, the idea of financial reparations for Afri-
can Americans for the harms of slavery and its aftermath have reemerged in
mainstream American political discourse. Congressional Representative John
Conyers introduced H.R. 40, a bill to fund a federal study of reparations, for 30
consecutive years in Congress.23 2 It was not until 2019 that Congress for the
first time held public hearings on the legislation,2 33 and in the 2020 Democratic
primary it was an issue at debates and on the campaign trail.234 This political
shift comes after decades of organizing from longstanding groups like
N'COBRA,23 s writing and theorizing about the concept of reparations for Afri-
can Americans in America after slavery,236 as well as the influential 2014 essay,
"The Case for Reparations" by Ta-Nehisi Coates.23 ' The debate that has
230. Reparations Means Full Repair, NAT'L COALITION BLACKS FOR REPARATIONS AM. (Mar. 2019)
(capitalization altered), https://www.ncobraonine.org/wp-content/uploads/2o19/o3
/Reparations-Means-Full-Repair-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/SMC-HKGL].
231. See Ogletree, supra note 223, at 287 (noting the general lack of popular and academic discus-
sion of reparations from the late 1970s to the 199os).
232. Id. at 290 (describing the genesis and early history of H.R. 40).
233. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, At Historic Hearing, House Panel Explores Reparations, N.Y. TIMES
(June 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2o19/o6/19/us/politics/slavery-reparations-
hearing.html [https://perma.cc/NAE9-XSNR].
234. See Rios, supra note 219 ("The idea of reparations [is] on the national agenda in a way it has
not been since Reconstruction.").
235. See Terrance Laney, Pay for Generational Oppression: Reparations Revisited, in BLACK YOUTH
PROJECT 100, at 13, 13-15 (2016), http://agendatobuildblackfutures.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/o1/BYP_AgendaBlackFuturesbooldetweb.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8SZS-YHB5] (describing this history); see also Adam Simpson & Carla Skandier, For Repa-
rations: A Conversation with William A. Darity, Jr., NEXT SYS. PROJECT (Mar. 10, 2017),
https://thenextsystem.org/for-reparations [https://perma.cc/6ZSL-X4E9] (discussing the
history of reparations).
236. See, e.g., BITTKER, supra note 225, at 8-29. On this intellectual history, see BROPHY, supra note
226, at 62-74; Brown, supra note 226, at 478-81, which argues that Black Reconstruction in-
volved the original theorizing of reparations through structural transformation; Kaimipono
David Wenger, From Radical to Practical (and Back Again?): Reparations, Rhetoric, and Revolu-
tion, 25 J. Civ. RTs. & ECON. DEv. 697, 698-704 (2011); and Eric K. Yamamoto, Sandra Hye
Yun Kim & Abigail M. Holden, American Reparations Theory and Practice at the Crossroads, 44
CAL. W. L. REv. 1, 16-24 (2007).
237. Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC (June 2014), https://www.theatlantic
.com/magazine/archive/2014/o6/the-case-for-reparations/361631 [https://perma.cc/BX87-
FC4A]; see also Ta-Nehisi Coates Revisits the Case for Reparations, NEW YORxER (June 1o,
2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-new-yorker-interview/ta-nehisi-coates-
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emerged from recent congressional hearings and public conversations involves
not just reparations for slavery, but also reparations for broader patterns of
laws and policies that have systemically denied Black Americans equal footing
economically, socially, and politically.2 38
Reparative state policy can, and has, included pushing for shifts in political
power. The Voting Rights Act is perhaps the most direct example of this: pro-
moting the voting rights of one group (African Americans) because of histori-
cal and ongoing state participation in the suppression f those voting rights.239
Mari Matsuda, in her canonical article about reparations, describes an expan-
sive view of reparations for Native Hawaiians for the United States takeover of
Hawaiian land, including implementing a legal presumption of Hawaiian rule
over certain lands.240 In a similar vein, Katherine Franke's recent work on repa-
rations has shown the promise of Black self-governance during the early years
of Reconstruction and connected the goal of reparations today to that promise
of self-governance.241 In both of these cases, the group harm at issue included
the denial of citizenship in geographically or racially distinct areas.
One important idea in reparative theory is that the forms of reparations
should be determined by groups who have been harmed. For instance, Matsu-
da has included within her critical theory of reparations the requirement that
victims have full power to decide the form and substance of those repara-
tions.2 42 N'COBRA's most recent statement about reparations, in response to
the 2019 congressional hearings, states clearly: "The forms and to what extent
[reparations take place] will be determined by us."24 3 The Movement for Black
Lives echoes this idea in its Reparations Now Toolkit, stating that the "form and
manner" of reparations for slavery and other injustices-including racialized
revisits-the-case-for-reparations [https://perma.cc/ZQ6P-V8B6] ("It's not often that an ar-
ticle comes along that changes the world, but that's exactly what happened with Ta-Nehisi
Coates, five years ago, when he wrote 'The Case for Reparations' in The Atlantic.").
238. See Stolberg, supra note 233 (describing a range of possible means of reparations).
239. See BROPHY, supra note 226, at 172-73.
240. Matsuda, supra note 23, at 371-72.
241. See KATHERINE FRANKE, REPAIR: REDEEMING THE PROMISE OF ABOLITION 81-101 (2019).
242. See Matsuda, supra note 23, at 397 ("To avoid ... corruption, victims must define the reme-
dies, and the obligation of reparations must continue until all vestiges of past injustice are
dead and buried.").
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policing- should be determined by Black people.244 As a result, groups affiliat-
ed with M4BL have begun participating in townhall meetings throughout the
country to discuss their own reparations proposals.24
The recent ordinance in Chicago is itself an example of harmed groups
playing a part in designing the forms of relief: after years of collective protests,
litigation, and political discussions, a grassroots coalition put together the
package of reparations for decades of police torture.246 Movement actors delib-
erately framed their proposed legislation to compensate victims of police tor-
ture as "reparations," connecting racialized police violence in the twentieth cen-
tury to the histories of slavery, Jim Crow, residential segregation, and policing
targeted at Black neighborhoods.24 This led, in the end, to a settlement and
city ordinance in which the City of Chicago agreed to pay reparations to the
victims of police torture through free tuition and counseling. As part of that
deal, the City also agreed to issue an apology, erect a memorial, and include
study of police violence in Chicago as part of the public-school curriculum for
eighth and tenth graders.248 This ordinance was a form of reparations because
it meant more than individual reckoning - more than the criminal conviction of
the offending police detective, Burge, himself.249 Instead, it required a broader
public reckoning of the City's role in perpetuating police violence. 20
244. Reparations Now Toolkit, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES 17 (2019), https://m4bl.org/wp-
content/uploads/2o2o/os/Reparations-Now-Toolkit-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8S4-
8SYM].
245. See, e.g., Community Engagement-Evanston Reparations Dialogues 2020, CITY EVANSTON,
https://www.cityofevanston.org/home/showdocument?id=55 325 [https://perma.cc/3LMD-
5M3B].
246. For an extended history of the activism and the reparations legislation in Chicago, see
McLeod, supra note 36, at 1623-28, which describes the push for reparations for torture as a
kind of "abolition democracy;" and Taylor, supra note 229, at 338-40. For the text of the or-
dinance, see The Reparations Ordinance, CHI. TORTURE JUST. MEMORIALS PROJECT, https://
chicagotorture.org/reparations/ordinance [https://perma.cc/2UBS-ZEH6].
247. Sandhya Somashekhar, Why Chicago Used the Word 'Reparations,' WASH. POST (May 8, 2015,
2:29 PM EDT), https://wapo.st/1EijFwO [https://perma.cc/QJN2-7N76].
248. See Hal Dardick, John Byrne & Steve Mills, Mayor Backs $5.5 Million Reparations Deal for
Burge Police Torture Victims, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 14, 2015, 7:54 PM), https://www
.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-burge-reparations-emanuel-met-215o414-story.html
[https://perma.cc/U4X2-URNG].
249. Burge served four-and-a-half years in prison for obstruction of justice and perjury. See Tay-
lor, supra note 229, at 340.
250. See McLeod, supra note 36, at 1628 ("Instead of the typical calls for punitive responses to
harm, participants engaged in a broad and deep democratic process to contemplate how to
make amends. They then sought redress and repair in a form that would begin to make the
survivors whole, prevent future harm, and educate young people .... ").
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Similarly, power shifting in police reform can be a kind of reparation.2 1
The identifiable group is what political scientists call "race-class subjugated
communities." The groups have experienced everyday policing and surveillance
that deprive them of political participation and full democratic citizenship.252
Political scientists have documented how "race-class subjugated communities,"
the places where policing has increased in recent decades, are governed through
the coercion, control, and violence of policing.25 3 As a result, such communities
experience both a reduction in political power and pervasive alienation from
the state.25 4
It is not that police departments have not tried to increase everyday partici-
pation from these race-class subjugated groups; but when they have, that par-
ticipation has not led to actual shifts in governing power. Community policing
is a prime example of this. Community policing often includes the goal of gen-
erating nonbinding popular input through regular community meetings. Police
departments engaging in community policing may attempt to seek out com-
munity participation and cooperation, but they do so without giving residents
authority over policies or discipline, without including members of the com-
munity who are cynical about friendly cooperation (thus excluding large
swaths of people who interact regularly with the police) and without including
residents in big-picture policymaking or budget distribution.255
251. Although not necessary for a claim of reparations, some scholars have argued that police vio-
lence is a direct result - and has the "incidents and badges" - of slavery. See The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) ("[I]t is assumed that the power vested in Congress to enforce
the [Thirteenth Amendment] by appropriate legislation, clothes Congress with power to
pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the
United States."); see also Brandon Hasbrouck, Abolishing Racist Policing with the Thirteenth
Amendment, 68 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 200, 200 (2020) (arguing that policing is "a badge
and incident of slavery that Congress should abolish under the Thirteenth Amendment");
Cedric Merlin Powell, The Structural Dimensions of Race: Lock Ups, Systemic Chokeholds, and
Binary Disruptions, 57 U. LouisvLE L. REV. 7, 34 (2018) ("The modern carceral state has all
of the badges and incidents of slavery . . .. The chains are simply invisible now.").
252. See LERMAN & WEAVER, supra note 24, at 199-231.
253. See, e.g., Fagan, West & Holland, supra note 102, at 1554 (describing how through "social,
economic, legal, and political mechanisms ... spatial concentration transforms a spike in in-
carceration from an acute external shock into an enduring internal feature of the neighbor-
hood fabric"); Soss & Weaver, supra note 103, at 567 (describing "the term race-class subju-
gated (RCS) communities").
254. See BURCH, supra note 102, at 75-104; LERMAN & WEAVER, supra note 24, at 199-231; STUNTZ,
supra note 81, at 244-81; Roberts, supra note 102, at 1291-98; infra notes 280-282 and accom-
panying text.
255. See Simonson, supra note 88, at 398-407.
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Indeed, activists pushing for community control bring in sophisticated cri-
tiques of community policing when they advocate for power shifts in govern-
ance. In 2015, for example, the Chicago social movement group We Charge
Genocide conducted a study of community policing in its city by monitoring
community meetings over a period of six months. After studying the results,
the group issued a report concluding that "'community policing' is the superfi-
cial involvement of select community members in providing police with legiti-
macy."25 6 These on-the-ground findings echo a recent study of community po-
licing in Chicago during the same period by sociologist Tony Cheng, who
demonstrates that community policing meetings rarely incorporate community
views, even when they receive input from community members who genuinely
want to cooperate with the police.257 According to Cheng, the participation of
the public becomes "input but without influence," and community meetings
become "a mechanism legitimating the input process, but only further reinforc-
ing the existing social order."258 Community policing, then, often has the ten-
dency to exclude local residents (both cynics and noncynics) from meaningful
participation, while reinforcing existing power imbalances between the police
and policed populations.2`9
Social movement actors often argue the following: if current policing prac-
tices, even those that encourage participation, have had the effect of denying
people who live in race-class subjugated neighborhoods political power, then
political repair must follow. Recall that the People's Coalition's proposal for a
replacement o the '94 Crime Bill begins with a call for "a piece of 21st century
legislation that acknowledges and begins to repair the harmful, ineffective, and
wasteful aspects of policing, criminalization, and incarceration."26 0 Similarly,
the National African American Reparations Commission has stated that repara-
tions must include reckoning with "repairing the damages of the criminal in-
justice system."261 In political terms, this might mean directly re-enfranchising
people with criminal records and eliminating prison gerrymandering, which
256. Counter-CAPS Report, supra note 151, at 3.
257. Such community members are often referred to as "non-legal cynics." Cheng, supra note 112,
at 175.
258. Id. at 176, 184.
259. See generally SIcANSICY, supra note 45, at 66-105 (describing these dangers); Simonson, supra
note 88 (same).
260. Reckoning with Mass Criminalization, supra note 8, at 1.
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are group-based political harms.262 But it also might mean designing institu-
tions that give, or at least share, governing power with the people who are tar-
geted by the criminal system's institutions -the people who become arrestees,
who are designated victims, who live in buildings and housing developments
with a high police presence.263
B. Antisubordination
Shifting power in police reform is also consistent with an antisubordination
view of lawmaking and legal change. The legal theory of antisubordination was
generated amidst debates over the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
in the 1970s and 198os.26 4 In the words of Owen Fiss, the underlying norma-
tive thrust of antisubordination theory is that laws should not "perpetu-
ate[] ... the subordinate stature of a specially disadvantaged group."2 5 Anti-
subordination theory therefore rests on the conviction that "it is wrong for the
state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior social status of historically
oppressed groups."26 6 In the context of constitutional jurisprudence, this means
interpreting the Constitution to express an idea of equality that centers the
need to dismantle unequal status relations and especially to reduce and elimi-
262. Reparations Now Toolkit, supra note 244, at 13 ("The legal end of slavery was followed by 100
years of racial terror, disenfranchisement, abuse, and exclusion .... "); Pamela S. Karlan,
Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchise-
ment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1161 (2004) ("Criminal disenfranchisement laws ... operate as a
kind of collective sanction: They penalize not only actual wrongdoers, but also the commu-
nities from which incarcerated prisoners come and the communities to which ex-offenders
return .... ").
263. See Simonson, supra note 91, at 255 (arguing that these populations are currently shut out of
public participation in criminal legal institutions and in their governing ideology).
264. See generally Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassi-
fication or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003) (surveying the development and
application of the two principles).
265. See Fiss, supra note 25, at 108, 157. The antisubordination tradition was first described by
Owen Fiss but has been elaborated on and extended by many scholars including, but not
limited to, Reva Siegel, Jack Balkin, Catharine MacKinnon, Laurence Tribe, and Derrick
Bell. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 264, at 9.
266. Siegel, supra note 25, at 1472-73; see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT
OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 117 (1979) (proposing that courts de-
termining whether a practice discriminates on the basis of sex inquire "whether the policy or
practice in question integrally contributes to the maintenance of an underclass or a deprived
position because of gender status"); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race,
and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1986) ("Under the anti-subordination
perspective, it is inappropriate for certain groups in society to have subordinated status be-
cause of their lack of power in society as a whole.").
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nate racial subordination-whether that subordination is deliberate or not.26 7
Although antisubordination was born in the context of constitutional interpre-
tation, the legal theory is not limited to constitutional interpretation: it impli-
cates a broader state obligation to shift affirmatively the subordinate status of
certain groups. When applied to policing, antisubordination theory unearths
the need to structure policing in a way that takes account of, and minimizes,
the group harms that result from everyday policing practices.268 If policing it-
self drives and creates disparities of political economy and social life by relegat-
ing people who interact with police officers to less than full citizenship,2 9 then
shifting power to those subject to this subordination promotes equality and
democracy.
Antisubordination theory implicates a state obligation to promote equality
in a way that recognizes and pushes back against structural forms of subordina-
tion. Mari Matsuda has described antisubordination theory as inherently coun-
ter to dominant ideologies that sustain subordination.27 0 It simultaneously
makes legal and ideological claims. It is active, demanding that "law work
267. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 264, at 9 ("Antisubordination theorists contend that guaran-
tees of equal citizenship cannot be realized under conditions of pervasive social stratification
and argue that law should reform institutions and practices that enforce the secondary social
status of historically oppressed groups."); Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating
First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2139-40 (2018) (describing an antisubordinating
jurisprudence in the context of the First Amendment as "one that reduces, rather than rein-
forces, the inequalities in expressive opportunity that are a consequence of the highly, and
increasingly, unequal distribution of economic and political power in the United States");
R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 803, 925 (2004) (describing the purpose of antidiscrimination law as including the
elimination of "racially stigmatic harm -its subordinating effects, as well as the negative ex-
pressive message it carries"); Siegel, supra note 25, at 1500-47 (fleshing out a theory of anti-
subordination in detail).
268. See Bell, supra note 18, at 687-705 (describing the subordinating effects of policing practices
that create and perpetuate racial segregation).
269. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 32, at 199-203 (collecting sources and describing the subordination
of Black communities as a result of law-enforcement and criminal legal institutions, as well
as the related subordination of Latinx, Indigenous, Muslim, and Asian and Pacific Islander
communities); Butler, supra note 17, at 1425 ("The most far-reaching racial subordination
stems not from illegal police misconduct, but rather from legal police conduct."); Capers,
supra note 76, at 700-01; Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52
STAN. L. REV. 777, 797 (2000) ("[P]olice brutality is not random. It follows the vectors of
power established in the larger society in which white dominates nonwhite and rich domi-
nates poor."); Justice & Meares, supra note 105, at 161-66, 172-73 (describing how the crimi-
nal-justice system educates individuals in "anticitizenry"); Roberts, supra note 102, at 1291-
97
270. Matsuda, supra note 217, at 1398-1401.
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against subordination and not for it."" 1 For example, in Equal Protection ju-
risprudence, antisubordination theory requires attention not just to whether
groups are being treated similarly, but also to whether the groups being treated
less fairly are also groups with less power;2" and in First Amendment juris-
prudence, antisubordination theory might lead a court to consider social and
economic inequalities that structure and limit the ability of people to speak and
to be heard.273
The state's obligation to promote antisubordination extends beyond consti-
tutional interpretation to policymaking and governance more broadly.274 In the
realm of governance, for example, Christopher Tyson has recently argued that
"[a] ntisubordination theory can... be instrumental in redirecting considera-
tions of racial disparities away from individualized, intentional harm and to-
ward historically traceable and measurable group-based harms."2 75 Under this
strain of antisubordination theory, we might think not just formally about the
mechanisms of democratic participation for individuals - for example, by mak-
ing sure that every person is permitted to participate in elections equally-but
also structurally about the ways in which participation is muted for marginal-
ized groups. To remedy that set of structural harms, creating and expanding
different forms of political participation may be necessary.
The antisubordination tradition is linked and indebted to the visions of jus-
tice that emerged within the civil-rights movement in the mid-twentieth centu-
ry. In explaining the origins of antisubordination in the work of Owen Fiss,
Jack Balkin and Reva Siegel put it this way:
Equality, Fiss reminded us, is not just the Aristotelian insistence that
like cases be treated alike. It is about the struggle against subordination
in societies with entrenched social hierarchies. It is about the lived ex-
271. Id. at 1406.
272. Siegel, supra note 25, at 1472-78.
273. See Lakier, supra note 267, at 2127 (describing antisubordination in mid-twentieth-century
First Amendment jurisprudence as "free speech jurisprudence that was sensitive to economic
and political inequality - that assessed the constitutionality of state action by examining the
context in which it operated, and its effects, as well as its motivations and its form").
274. See Sergio J. Campos, Subordination and the Fortuity of Our Circumstances, 41 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 585, 589 (2008) ("[U]nder the antisubordination principle, the obligation of the
state is ... predicated ... on a commitment by society to eradicate all structures of subordi-
nation .... "); see also Balkin & Siegel, supra note 264, at 9 ("Antisubordination theorists
contend that . .. law should reform institutions and practices that enforce the secondary so-
cial status of historically oppressed groups.").
275. Christopher J. Tyson, From Ferguson to Flint: In Search of an Antisubordination Principle for
Local Government Law, 34 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1, 29 (2018).
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periences of people on the bottom who strive for dignity and self-
respect. And it is about the structures and strategies, institutions and
practices that continually deny them this prize all the while professing
to bestow it. 2 76
And when Mari Matsuda famously pleaded for critical legal scholars to
"look to the bottom" when thinking about state remedies for injustice, she ar-
gued that "adopting the perspective of those who have seen and felt the falsity
of the liberal promise . . . can assist critical scholars in the task of fathoming the
phenomenology of law and defining the elements of justice."2 7 7 The implica-
tion is that members of subordinated groups are themselves the ones we
should listen to when trying to understand ideas like "equality" and "democra-
cy.
American policing is, and has always been, a subordinating force to certain
populations, especially poor people of color, and particularly Black, Latinx, and
Indigenous people. This has not been because of illegal or unconstitutional
conduct-harms fashioned as legal claims - although such conduct has certain-
ly occurred. Rather, our constitutional rules and policing structures often set up
a system that facilitates policing practices that target certain neighborhoods
and populations, creating collective racialized harms in the process of everyday
policing. 271 Moreover, policing itself drives and creates disparities of social life
and political economy by relegating people who interact with police officers to
276. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 264, at 31.
277. Matsuda, supra note 23, at 324, 344; cf Gowri Ramachandran, Antisubordination, Rights, and
Radicalism, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1045, 1059-60 (2008) ("We should not forget that social cog-
nitionists, law professors, and public administrators do not exist outside the culture that has
produced unconscious prejudice, and that indeed, they have quite successfully adjusted
themselves to that culture.").
278. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 17, at 1425 ("The most far-reaching racial subordination stems not
from illegal police misconduct, but rather from legal police conduct."); Capers, supra note
76, at 700-01 (arguing that Supreme Court doctrine creates a landscape in which ordinary
citizens must cede their constitutional rights in order to be perceived as "good citizen[s]");
Carbado, supra note 76, at 128 ("Americans tend to think of police killings of African Ameri-
cans as aberrant and extraordinary, failing to see their connections to the routine, to the ve-
ryday, and to the ordinary."); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Policing the Boundaries of Whiteness:
The Tragedy of Being "Out of Place" from Emmett Till to Trayvon Martin, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1113,
1120 (2017) (describing the continuity in American policing of "racism (and thus the protec-
tion of whiteness as a privilege and benefit)"); Aya Gruber, Police and "Blue-Lining" 14-21
(Nov. 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (describing how, through geo-
graphic targeting of poor and Black neighborhoods, American policing is "essential to main-
taining White nonpoor citizens' dominion").
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less than full citizenship.279 Monica Bell's recent work illustrates these subordi-
nating effects in detail: everyday interactions with police officers, as well as
larger policies and practices of policing, lead to "collective symbolic and struc-
tural exclusion."280 These combine together to produce both "legal estrange-
ment," or a profound alienation from the police,28 1 as well as a larger collective
harm where police practices create and reinforce residential segregation and
unequal opportunity.28 2 To be clear, seemingly rational reasons exist for such
subordination-for example, the drive to use "hot spots" policing283 to reduce
violence in urban neighborhoods is connected to social science demonstrating
that the tactic may lead to a reduction in reports of violence.284 But such justifi-
cations do not negate the subordinating nature of practices like hot spots and
broken-windows policing. When the police target and surveil a neighborhood,
their practices strip the people who live there of some of their dignity and citi-
zenship.2 ss
If policing is subordinating in this way, then shifting power to those who
are subject to this subordination promotes equality and democracy, especially
when that power is over the very levers of policymaking that control those sub-
ordinating systems. Consequently, when the Movement for Black Lives de-
mands "a world where those most impacted in our communities control the
laws, institutions, and policies that are meant to serve us,"286 their call for more
279. See Justice & Meares, supra note 105, at 672-73 (discussing the socializing effects of the "cur-
riculum of policing"); cf Roberts, supra note 102, at 1291-97 (discussing the harms that mass
incarceration inflicts on communities).
280. Bell, supra note 24, at 2100.
281. Id. at 2066-67.
282. Cf Bell, supra note 18, at 687-728 (detailing the ways in which modern policing practices
operate to further segregation).
283. See, e.g., Nat'l Inst. of Justice, Practice Profile: Hot Spots Policing-Program Description, U.S.
DEP'T JUST. OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS, https://www.crimesolutions.gov/PracticeDetails
.aspx?ID=8 [https://perma.cc/7SZU-8YPE] ("Used by a majority of U.S. police depart-
ments, hot spots policing strategies focus on small geographic areas or places, usually in ur-
ban settings, where crime is concentrated.").
284. See generally BRAGA & WEISBURD, supra note 29, at 99-149 (documenting the "substantial
support for the crime prevention effectiveness of hot spots policing").
285. See, e.g., HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 162-80 (discussing the ways in which broken-windows
policing influences subject formation); LERMAN & WEAVER, supra note 24, at 199-230 (cata-
loguing how "punishment and surveillance themselves activate a process of political with-
drawal, alienation, and fear of government"); cf Harmon, supra note 46, at 892-939 (de-
scribing how federal policing programs do not take into account the harms of policing such
as injury, suffering, and fear and so exacerbate these problems).
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control over the criminal legal system is more than a naked power grab. It is a
demand that connects a shift in power to the everyday subordination of Black
people through the institution of policing itself. Similarly, when the People's
Coalition states that it is "seek[ing] to change the way- and for whom-policy
and budgeting operates,"28 7 its vision of transformative reform is one that
doesn't just shift budgeting priorities from the top down, but rather shifts
them from the bottom up in a way that simultaneously supports communities
and builds their collective power.28 8 The point is not more funding full stop,
but rather more power over the buckets of funding that the coalition has con-
nected to long-term communal subordination.28 9 In these ways, movement vi-
sions of power shifting reflect a goal of antisubordination theory: countering
subordination through the structure of state policymaking itself.
C. Contestatory Democracy
The power lens in police reform is also supported by a theory of democracy
that values contestation and resistance as necessary parts of a healthy state.
This concept of contestatory democracy means that a healthy state will recog-
nize that some forms of state power are subordinating and will set up institu-
tions or legal structures to facilitate resistance to those forms of power.290 Pow-
er shifts, in the frame of contestatory democracy, are not just desirable, but also
necessary, for a legitimate governance arrangement.29 1 This view of democratic
envision a remaking of the current U.S. political system in order to create a real democracy
where Black people and all marginalized people can effectively exercise full political pow-
er.").
287. Reckoning with Mass Criminalization, supra note 8, at 5.
288. Cf Stahly-Butts & Akbar, supra note 41, at 2-3 (noting that "[t]ransformative reforms seek to
transform the social, economic, and political sphere;" and that "[b]ottom-up change can be
transformative in part because it reflects attempts to build and redistribute power among
those historically excluded from access to social, economic, and political power").
289. Cf Hoskins, James & Rao, supra note 5 (charting a path for reform that centers around "ad-
dress[ing] the decades of harm" caused by the '94 Crime Bill by calling on legislators to
"join forces with the people most harmed by policing").
290. Cf CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 33-34 (2000) ("Instead of trying to erase
the traces of power and exclusion, democratic politics requires us to bring them to the fore,
to make them visible so that they can enter the terrain of contestation.").
291. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 75, at 332-43 (arguing for a contestatory, republican view of de-
mocracy with respect to policing); Patel, supra note 21, at 805, 807-16 (arguing for an ago-
nistic approach to integrating community members into consent decrees); Simonson, supra
note 91, at 288-90 (2019) (arguing for a view of democracy with respect to the criminal legal
system that values contestation and resistance over consensus); cf SKLANSKY, supra note 45,
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policing differs from consensus-based or legitimacy-based views, in which
seeking input and consensus is the clearest path to a healthy citizenry.292 In-
deed, police reform that centers the value of contestation requires opening up
the methods of public participation to processes that move beyond the consen-
sus-based nature of reforms like community policing and provide room to con-
test the dominant ideas in policing today.293 This, in turn, requires the creation
of new institutions of governance or forms of policymaking that facilitate coun-
tervailing power, allowing people to challenge the state's current approaches to
providing safety and security.294
Contestation is necessary for democracy. By contestation, I mean any form
of political action that involves direct opposition to reigning laws, policies, or
state practices. But I also mean to focus in on contestation from populations
and communities that have historically had a reduced voice in generating reign-
ing ideas about how to govern and provide security. This account of contesta-
tion comes close to what Chantal Mouffe terms "agonistic" politics in that it in-
volves political opposition to hegemonic ideas that uphold dominant and
oppressive political structures.295 Mouffe's account of agonism emphasizes that
political action happens in an adversarial manner but within the bounds of cur-
at 104 (calling for a "spirit of democratic oppositionalism" so that democracy is understood
to involve ongoing opposition to patterns of unjustifiable hierarchy).
292. See Simonson, supra note 88, at 429-38 (contrasting consensus- and contestation-based the-
ories of democracy with respect to policing).
293. Cf SKLANSKY, supra note 45, at 86-97 (describing the dangers of the preoccupation with
consensus-based reform); Miller, supra note 75, at 298 (arguing that theories of policing
must include the importance of contestation). In this way, it underscores David Sklansky's
argument that how we think of democracy in turn affects how we think of policing, even
when we do not articulate our theories of democracy out loud. See SKLANSKY, supra note 45,
at 66-105.
294. See HERBERT, supra note 112, at 138-40 (arguing that police accountability must be pursued
outside of existing forms of community policing); Eric J. Miller, Challenging Police Discre-
tion, 58 How. L.J. 521, 538 (2015) ("[O]ne goal of constructing political institutions for a giv-
en polity, for republicans, is to develop political processes that permit the public to partici-
pate in official decision-making by challenging it."); Roberts, supra note 106, at 1604-07
(arguing that American systems of law enforcement are by their nature antidemocratic, so
that democratizing criminal law requires looking beyond increasing public participation in
criminal justice in the conventional sense); cf K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST
DOMINATION 131-56 (2017) (describing the need to build institutions to facilitate counter-
vailing power).
295. CHANTAL MOUFFE, AGONISTICS: THINKING THE WORLD POLITICALLY 1-19 (2013); see also Pa-
tel, supra note 21, at 807-18 (using the concept of agonism to argue for the robust participa-
tion of community groups in the iterative process of Department of Justice consent decrees);
Simonson, supra note 88, at 435-38 (using the lens of agonism to argue for the importance of
respecting the practice of organized copwatching by marginalized populations).
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rent political structures. This respect for existing rules and structures is part of
what makes the participation agonistic rather than antagonistic.296 This view of
democracy requires, and embraces, collective resistance to dominant ideas and
policies within existing institutions.
For agonistic contestation to thrive, however, institutional and policymak-
ing processes must be structured to facilitate collective resistance.29" This view
of institution building is rooted in the necessity of counteracting the inequities
of modern-day democracy, in which some constituencies already possess a
greater capacity for power and influence. The task of democratizing reform,
then, is to better enable countervailing interests and community groups to as-
sert their views, hold governments and other actors to account, and claim a
share of governing power.298 In the parlance of neorepublican political theory,
the goal is to counter domination9 9 - a goal that K. Sabeel Rahman has recent-
ly brought to legal theory and analysis as well.300 Contestation becomes essen-
tial to the goal of countering domination because it enables dominated groups
to share governing power and hold government and elites accountable.301
An ideal of contestatory democracy should not be confused with a populist
vision of control of policy and governance. In particular, a populist view would
296. MOUFFE, supra note 290, at 99-105; see also Simonson, supra note 88, at 437 (describing how
agonistic contestation happens "through civic engagement with the processes in place").
Agonism takes an adversarial stance towards practices and ideologies of institutions in pow-
er, but it does so through engagement with those institutions rather than withdrawal, by ac-
knowledging intractable differences but respecting the adversary who disagrees. See
MOUFFE, supra note 290, at 1oo-05.
297. See HOLLIE RUSSON GILMAN & K. SABEEL RAHMAN, CIVIC POWER: REBUILDING AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY IN AN ERA OF CRISIS 169-202 (2020) (arguing that democratic contestation can
build durable power and redress power imbalances by establishing more effective civil-
society organizations and more participatory governance institutions).
298. See K. Sabeel Rahman, Policymaking as Power-Building, 27 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 315, 339-40
(2018) (describing a theory of institutional design in which "[t]he goal ... is not necessarily
to prioritize institutional designs for their epistemic, deliberative, or technocratic values
(though we may of course still hope to promote such values)" but rather to "focus on facili-
tating countervailing power and checks and balances").
299. See PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 21-27 (2002).
300. See, e.g., RAHMAN, supra note 294, at 116 ("The democratic response to domination can man-
ifest through the expansion of democratic capacities for political action and contesta-
tion .... ").
301. See, e.g., MOUFFE, supra note 295, at 1-19 (arguing that contestation is necessary to overcome
dominant, elite, and hegemonic ideas and social arrangements); PETTIT, supra note 299, at
63 (articulating a modern theory of republicanism where political legitimacy and freedom
are premised on the ability of citizens to contest the actions of the state).
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conceive of only one version of "the people"30 2 and only one group to whom
power should be shifted. Instead, this ideal is a pluralist conception of the de-
mos in which there is no one "people" or "community" to whom the state
should be beholden, but rather multiple publics with contrasting ideas about
justice (and policing) that cannot be easily reconciled.303 Indeed, it is precisely
because these ideas cannot easily be reconciled that contestation, rather than
consensus, is desirable. Unlike traditional pluralist theory, however, the power
lens does not encourage elites to represent pluralist, popular interests, but ra-
ther encourages more direct forms of participation and contestation.3 "4 The
idea of contestation as necessary for a legitimate democracy therefore requires
governance arrangements that facilitate collective contestation and, when ap-
propriate, subject reigning ideas to direct collective resistance.
Policing is as much a form of domination as any other realm of state action:
it involves the exercise of dominion and violence in the name of the state.30 In
the United States, the history of policing is one that can be traced back to slave
patrols and later to the formation of professional police patrols tasked with
surveilling and subordinating Black communities.306 The governance of polic-
ing is therefore a central place to interrogate power relationships and look for
guarantees that peaceful resistance to state practices is possible. Such contesta-
tion can happen in many ways. As Eric Miller and Alice Ristroph have separate-
ly argued, encouraging contestation might mean, at a minimum, that people
interacting with the police at an individual level should be able to resist the
302. See JAN-WERNER MOLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 3-4 (2016) (describing a core belief of popu-
lism that only some of the people are truly "the people").
303. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 134-45 (1956) (describing
American democracy as a political struggle among different groups); SKLANSKY, supra note
45, at 23-28 (summarizing the ways in which the pluralists saw group conflict as the essence
of politics).
304. Cf Simonson, supra note 91, at 287-90 (describing this vision of contestatory democracy).
305. See Bell, supra note 18, at 684-87 (describing policing practices that contribute to segregation
as a form of domination); Miller, supra note 294, at 540-45 (describing policing as a form of
dominion in republican terms); Alice Ristroph, The Constitution of Police Violence, 64 UCLA
L. REV. 1182, 1194-98 (2017) (describing the development of the "restraint of freedom"
standard that allows police officers to dominate civilians physically).
306. See Roberts, supra note 36, at 20-29 (describing the origins of policing in slave patrols and
how "[m]odem police forces are descendants of armed urban patrols ... which [were] es-
tablished ... to constantly monitor and inspect both enslaved and free black residents ... 'to
prevent the growth of an organized colored community"' (quoting ALEX S. VITALE, THE END
OF POLICING 47-48 (2017)).
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domination of the police by contesting the lawfulness of those encounters.307
Contestation can also happen collectively, including through bottom-up partic-
ipation in everyday adjudication,308 large-scale litigation,3 09 and communal
forms of organization and protest outside of formal state channels.310 In addi-
tion to these forms of contestation, the state has an obligation to ensure that its
broader democratic processes do not close off collective resistance to dominant
ideas about policing and the provision of public safety.
This commitment to protecting contestation means that, for police reform,
people must be able to engage in collective contestation over the scope and
methods of policing, rather than simply provide input into (or merely observe)
those methods.311 Ideally, this will give historically disempowered populations
power over the very levers of decisionmaking that control the distribution of
policing and police violence, even the decision whether or not to maintain the
institutions of policing as we know them. The contestation over ideas of how
307. See, e.g., Eric J. Miller, Police Encounters with Race and Gender, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 735, 744-
48 (2015) (applying the republican ideal of "contestatory citizenship" to the practices of po-
licing, and arguing that "[f]rom a republican perspective, robust, on-the-street challenges to
police authority and legitimacy are one way in which ... the public can engage in the politi-
cal process"); see also Miller, supra note 294, at 538 (" [R]epublicanism extends the right to
contest the exercise of public authority to any member of the public and relocates the chal-
lenging public officials from formal institutional settings, such as the legislative chamber or
the courtroom, into the street."); Ristroph, supra note 75, at 1558-60, 1599 (arguing for an
understanding of the value of constitutional criminal procedure based on resistance and
stating that a central purpose of criminal procedure should be to "enable and em-
brace . . . resistance" from those subject to police conduct).
308. See, e.g., Simonson, supra note 91, at 266-70, 287-97 (describing communal forms of contes-
tation in everyday criminal adjudication).
309. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOwA L. REV. 941, 945-48, 969-1011
(2011) (describing how losing litigation may be beneficial for social movements); Patel, su-
pra note 21, at 878 (suggesting that agonistic community participation in consent decrees
may help shift power when litigation outcomes fail to reform police-community relations).
310. See, e.g., Sheila R. Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 NOTIRE DAME L. REV.
57, 62-66 (2011) (describing forms of communal governance outside of the state); Lani
Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence ofLaw and So-
cial Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2762-77 (2014) (describing how Fannie Lou Hamer and
other activists with the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party engaged in collective contes-
tation over the meaning of political representation); Simonson, supra note 88, at 397, 435-38
(focusing on collective contestation from organized copwatching groups).
311. Cf Levinson, supra note 94, at 83-92 (arguing for the importance of tracing power shifting
through institutions).
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(and if) policing should happen will take place via the exercise of collective
governing power.31"
Police reform that invites agonistic participation and contestation welcomes
the participation of people who oppose the dominant ideas and policies of their
local police departments; indeed, their participation is celebrated. And because
their participation is celebrated, a governance arrangement inviting contesta-
tion must also be open to ceding ideological ground to visions of change com-
ing from people subject to domination. Recall the tweet from Black Lives Mat-
ter Chicago with which this Article opened, in which the group advocated for
community control with these words: "Defund, Disarm, Disrupt CPD and
business as usual. #FightBack #CPACNow."3 13 This short message exhibits a
belief in the possibility of collective contestation through police reform: it
combines a call for less policing or the abolition of policing ("defund" and "dis-
rupt") with an explicit focus on contestation ("disrupt" and "#FightBack") -
contestation that happens through the governance of the police itself
("#CPACNow"). People coming from communities who experience the vio-
lence of policing seek to play a new and powerful role: not just in small deci-
sions like on which blocks or streets to focus police patrols, but rather in first-
order questions about how the state should go about securing the safety of its
people. To contest reigning ideas through legitimate political means, these
groups are proposing new governance arrangements that shift power in a
manner that makes such collective contestation possible.
In this Part, I have argued that there are a variety of ways to theorize and
defend the idea that power shifting should be one of a series of goals for people
who are interested in changing how policing operates in the United States.
Taken together, these three conceptual approaches -power shifting as repara-
tions, as supporting antisubordination, or as facilitating contestatory democra-
cy-provide a theoretical framework to support the power lens. These ideas are
also reflected within social movement articulations of their own proposals for
police reform, as their proposals seek to shift power as much as they aspire to
particular instrumentalist or legitimacy-focused outcomes.
312. Cf Gerken, supra note 143, at 1777 (describing dissent of local decisionmaking bodies as
"both an act of affiliation and an act of contestation").
313. See BLM Chicago (@BLMChi), TWITTER (June 12, 2019, 2:25 PM), https://twitter
.com/BLMChi/status/113887 5o87 5 7 7387009 [https://perma.cc/E99S-WN9X].
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IV. POLICE REFORM REVISITED: ON EXPERTISE
If the power lens is an appropriate addition to discussions of police reform,
as I have argued in Part III, then adding it into the mix when discussing reform
possibilities shifts the discussion in important ways. In this Part, I focus on just
one of those ways: the construction of expertise. What I do not do in this final
Part is present a full account of how the power lens can be added to other pos-
sible goals - for example, goals of equality, legitimacy, constitutionalism, or vi-
olence reduction 4 - and how one might go about weighing and measuring
these different possible views on top of or beside one another with respect to
particular policy and governance proposals. This is a task too vast for these fi-
nal pages and deserving of a full article on its own. Instead, I explore one im-
portant implication of the power lens: the way that it expands and even inverts
traditional notions of expertise. This exploration underscores the impact of the
power lens, its potentially disruptive nature, and, ultimately, its necessity for
any larger effort at transformative change.
Legal scholars often debate the desirability of "expert" input into policies
governing criminal egal institutions such as the police and criminal courts. In
these debates, the concept of "expertise" usually takes on one of two distinct
meanings.315 Sometimes, scholars refer to the expertise of policing profession-
als: through years of on-the-ground service, training, and supervision, police
officers themselves understand the impact of rules and policies on everyday po-
licing in ways that others cannot.3 16 At other times, "experts" are meant to refer
to those who have attained advanced degrees and studied the "success" of polic-
ing over time -often "criminologists or social scientists who study these issues
314. See supra Part I (laying out these various goals of police reform).
315. Cf Benjamin Levin, Criminal Justice Expertise 15-33 (Nov. 11, 2020) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author) (describing two "traditional" models of "criminal justice exper-
tise" as based on either vocation or education).
316. See David Alan Sklansky, The Persistent Pull of Police Professionalism, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. 2
(Mar. 2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesi/nij/232676.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V4J-
Q9KU] (describing one form of police professionalism as acquiring knowledge and best
practices over time and applying those best practices to everyday policing); cf Anna
Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 2003-14 (2017)
(describing the rise of police professionalism in the mid-twentieth century and its contribu-
tion to the idea of police expertise in courtrooms). Harry Collins and Robert Evans call this
form of expertise "contributory expertise," which is expertise in a particular practice gained
through experience, resulting in "tacit-knowledge-laden" expertise that allows the expert to
contribute further to the practice itself. HARRY COLLINS & ROBERT EVANS, RETHINKING Ex-
PERTISE 14,17, 26-28, 69 n.38 (2007).
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on a regular basis."3" Recently, a number of legal scholars, including Rachel
Barkow, Maria Ponomarenko, and John Rappaport, have renewed a call for en-
gaging this second kind of "independent" expert more rigorously in police re-
form.3 18 These scholars do not eschew the need for democratic participation or
accountability. But they believe that everyday decisionmaking powers hould
be in the hands of social scientists or public-policy "experts," who may be better
suited to resist the pull toward "penal populism" - the tendency of the public to
rachet up criminal responses to harm-and may be better able to withstand
what Bill Stuntz has called the "pathological politics" of the criminal law.319
The power lens brings a different view of expertise and promotes a differ-
ent kind of expert.32o As the discussion in Part III demonstrated, social move-
ment visions of power shifting are not just about taking power away from elite
actors. They also come with very specific, even if sometimes contradictory, ide-
as about to whom power should be given: "directly impacted" people; people
who live in particular neighborhoods; people with criminal records; Black,
Latinx, and Indigenous People. These are populations who live in "race-class
subjugated communities" who not only tend not to have much political power,
but who are also consistently excluded from most forms of public participation
in the criminal legal system.321 Under the power lens, these people do not just
become important subjects of policing governance; they become experts them-
317. See BARKOW, supra note 28, at 166; see also id. at 168 ("[W]hen it comes to public safety and
maximizing limited resources, there is such a thing as expertise that can improve decision-
making."). In Collins's taxonomy, this is "interactional expertise." See COLLINS & Evans, su-
pra note 316, at 77-81.
318. See BARKOW, supra note 28, at 165-85 (describing the importance of engaging experts in re-
form efforts, describing how the public is guided by "emotions,' and calling for "expert bod-
ies that use empirical data and studies to guide their decisions about criminal justice poli-
cy"); Ponomarenko, supra note 21, at 38-42 (calling for administrative intermediaries to be in
charge of police rulemaking); Rappaport, supra note 28, at 810 (arguing for reform that
"emphasizes an evidence-based approach to criminal justice problem-solving focused on
achieving outcomes consistent with democratic values").
319. See BARKOW, supra note 28, at 5 ("We have these ill-considered policies because we have a
pathological political process that caters to the public's fears and emotions without any insti-
tutional safeguards or checks for rationality to make sure these policies work or are the best
approach to combating crime." (citing William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal
Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 506-11 (2001)).
320. Cf Schwartz, supra note 189 (providing a taxonomy of different questions to ask about the
"who" of police reform).
321. See Simonson, supra note 91, at 270-86.
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selves.322 This inversion of expertise demonstrates the expansive potential of
taking the power lens seriously.
The rising movement claim over expertise, and therefore over the creation
of knowledge, of "what works," is profoundly destabilizing to the status quo of
the criminal legal system. This destabilization comes as much from decon-
structing the traditional myth of expertise in policing as it does from the gener-
ation of a new, collective idea of who should make decisions about how to de-
fine and measure concepts like safety and security.323 Indeed, claims of
expertise within systems can raise existential questions about he systems
themselves, as Patricia Hill Collins explores in her theory of Black feminist
epistemology: "If the epistemology used to validate knowledge comes into
question, then all prior knowledge claims validated under the dominant model
become suspect."3" Contemporary movement claims over expertise parallel the
destabilizing nature of the moves in Critical Race Theory, feminist legal theory,
and other forms of "outsider jurisprudence" to center the experiences of the
oppressed in generating our understandings about the law.32
Today's radical claims over expertise are not coming from scholars, but ra-
ther from movement leaders. They write their claims of expertise into the insti-
tutional designs of new agencies to control policing and security, as in the ex-
ample of community control of the police.326 They are explicitly naming who
322. Cf HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 163 (describing how policing policies such as "broken-
windows" turn entire classes of people into "subjects that need to be controlled," with impli-
cations not just for those people but for social meaning more broadly).
323. Cf Levin, supra note 315, at 54-71 (describing both the deconstruction of traditional ideas of
expertise and the reconstruction of expertise through concepts like the power lens).
324. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, Black Feminist Epistemology, in BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT:
KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 271 (2000).
325. Cf Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2320, 2322 (1989) ("[O]utsider jurisprudence -jurisprudence derived from consid-
ering stories from the bottom -will help resolve the seemingly irresolvable conflicts of value
and doctrine that characterize liberal thought."); Francisco Valdes, Identity Maneuvers in Law
and Society: Vignettes of a Euro-American Heteropatriarchy, 71 UMKC L. REV. 377, 382 (2002)
(describing the "continuing evolution of outsider jurisprudence"). For more on the im-
portance of this tradition for scholarship today, see Akbar, Ashar & Simonson, supra note 30,
at 11-22.
326. See supra Section ILA. Movements search out inversions of expertise in other parts of the
carceral state too, including in courtrooms, where movement-driven efforts like participa-
tory-defense campaigns have helped young people with criminal records learn how to act as
court-sanctioned "experts" on gangs and testify at criminal trials. See Cynthia Godsoe, Par-
ticipatory Defense: Humanizing the Accused and Ceding Control to the Client, 69 MERCER L.
REv. 715, 722-25 (2018); Janet Moore, Marla Sandys & Raj Jayadev, Make Them Hear You:
Participatory Defense and the Struggle for Criminal Justice Reform, 78 ALB. L. REv. 1281, 1281
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should be in charge: people with criminal records,327 directly impacted people,
and people who live in "economically distressed communities."328 They prefig-
ure their own expertise with detailed people's budgets329 and the national push
for a "People's Process."330 This is explicit, for example, in the congressional
resolution inspired by the People's Coalition, which states that Congress would
"support and commit to a participatory people's process that recognizes directly
impacted people as experts on transforming the justice system, who speak from
experience about the devastation of criminalization and incarceration."331 In
laying out these governance demands, movements are claiming their own pow-
er to make informed decisions about what "works" and what doesn't; they de-
mand that we pay attention to the realities they lay before us.
This conception of expertise reverses the claim of many scholars that we
should be seeking out independent experts with traditional credentials like ad-
vanced degrees or professional experience.332 Rather than looking for expertise
from social scientists or veterans on the police force, the people with expertise
on what democratic policing should look like may instead be those who are
subject to the domination of the police on a regular basis. Paul Butler, in his
explanation of how policing cannot be reformed in a traditional sense,333 re-
minds us334 of this quotation from James Baldwin: "If one really wishes to
(2015) ("Participatory defense empowers these key stakeholders to transform themselves
from recipients of services provided by lawyers and other professionals into change agents
who force greater transparency, accountability, and fairness from criminal justice systems.").
327. See Rahman & Simonson, supra note 1o, at 709-10 (describing a dispute in Oaldand over
whether there would be a criminal-record check for members of the institutionalized Civil-
ian Police Commission).
328. See Planning Dep't, Community Oversight Board: Potential Definitions of "Economically Dis-
tressed Communities," METROPOLITAN GOVT NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON COUNTY (Nov. 19,
2018), https://www.nashville.gov/Portals/o/SiteContent/MetroClerk/docs/boards-
commissons/CommunityOversight/Economically%2oDistressed%2oCommunities
%2olnfographics.pdf [https://perma.cc/GXE3-XJEC]; see also CMTY. OVERSIGHT NASH-
VILLE, https ://communityoversightnashville.wordpress.com [https://perma.cc/2UJ9-
RJTR] (initially proposing Nashville's Community Oversight Board before its approval by
ballot in 2018).
329. See, e.g., PEOPLE'S BUDGET LA, https://peoplesbudgetla.com [https://perma.cc/6V7X-
GF84] (describing the importance of centering those communities that have been "under-
served and marginalized").
330. See supra Section IIB.
331. H.R. Res. 702, ii6th Cong. (2019).
332. See supra note 318.
333. See BUTLER, supra note 22, at 172 ("The idea that the [criminal-justice] system can be re-
formed is shortsighted. If black lives are to matter, we must dream bigger.").
334. And Shirin Sinnar, in turn, reminded me to turn to Butler's use of this Baldwin quotation.
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know how justice is administered in a country, one does not question the po-
licemen, the lawyers, the judges, or the protected members of the middle class.
One goes to the unprotected .... Ask any Mexican, any Puerto Rican, any
black man, any poor person.. . .""' Baldwin and Butler remind us that those
who are harmed or neglected by the system, especially if members of racially or
economically subordinated groups, can bring us knowledge that is missing,
knowledge that is based on wisdom and experience. If brought into governance
and policymaking, these experts might use information from social scientists
and police officers to inform their work, and they might also seek data and in-
formation from less traditional sources, but they would bring their own experi-
ences to bear on their decisions. Indeed, we might want to let these experts de-
cide for themselves the subjects and methods through which they can be
adequately informed and trained.336 Contestation and agonistic participation
would be possible, expected, and encouraged.
Shifting the definition of an expert to include those who are directly im-
pacted by the system also implicates the related definition of what counts as
"evidence" or "data" to input into decisionmaking processes.3" Erin Collins's
recent work explores how the push for "evidence-based" practices in the crimi-
nal system reinforces epistemological hierarchies by categorizing as "evidence"
forms of knowledge that invalidate the individual and collective lived experi-
ences of those directly impacted by the system, as both so-called victims and
defendants.338 In arguing for democratizing the production of algorithms in
the pretrial process, Ngozi Okidegbe has similarly highlighted the expertise of
people who are directly impacted by the system, underscoring notions of ex-
pertise from both "members from low-income, racially marginalized communi-
ties" and those regarded as traditional experts.3" Although the concept of "evi-
335. BUTLER, supra note 22, at 171 (citing JAMES BALDWIN, NO NAME IN THE STREET 149 (1972)).
336. Cf Clark & Friedman, supra note 112, at 11-12 (describing the limitations of police-led train-
ings of members of civilian advisory boards).
337. Cf BARKOW, supra note 28, at 167 ("The second premise behind this recommendation for
expert oversight is that empirically valuable information on criminal law can lead to better
decisions."); Garrett, supra note 29, at 1493 ("Evidence-informed practices refer to a family
of approaches that have brought greater use of data and science into the criminal justice sys-
tem.").
338. See Erin R. Collins, Against the Evidence-Based Paradigm (July 2020) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author).
339. Ngozi Okidegbe, The Democratizing Potential of Algorithms, 53 CONN. L. REv. (forthcoming
2021); see also Ngozi Okidegbe, Discrediting Communal Knowledge Within an Algorithm
Epistemology 5 (May 22, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (highlight-
ing the importance of recognizing "alternative ways of knowing, particularly those located
within and produced and validated by low income racially marginalized communities").
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dence" is separate from that of "expertise," the issues are related: to shift exper-
tise implies shifting the genesis of data and evidence. As Okidegbe tells us, this,
too, would be destabilizing.
The justification for this rethinking of the notion of expertise, and relatedly,
of evidence or data, takes on at least two related ideas. First, people who have
"experience about the devastation of criminalization and incarceration," to
quote the People's Justice Guarantee, are able to contribute something im-
portant, indeed something critically central, to a much-needed rethinking of
how we have constructed and maintained the carceral state.340 Second, this
perspective would be different, and push us toward possibilities of contestation
and change in our potentially transformative moment.3 41 Undergirding these
ideas -that directly impacted people have something important and different
to contribute to how we think about policing-is a concept that goes to the
heart of the power lens: that to invert expertise is to begin to reverse the pro-
found power imbalances caused and maintained by policing and the carceral
state. As discussed in Part III, the subordinating nature of policing in Ameri-
ca - both historically and in the present moment - means that power shifting is
morally necessary and is politically required under a certain view of democracy
that values contestation. It is why the shift in expertise is an integral implica-
tion of the power lens. And it is part of why power shifting, if it is accompanied
by a true opportunity for contestation, opens up new and different possibilities
for configuring the state's provision of protection and safety, something we
have traditionally reserved for police departments.
Opening the idea of expertise in this way allows "expert opinions" to en-
gage deeper critiques of policing than are ordinarily found in academic or pro-
fessional conversations. The power lens would encourage us not to think of
someone who believes we should reduce the footprint of policing as providing
a knee-jerk or unproductive idea. Instead, that person might provide a perspec-
tive that gets at something important, new, and even hopeful. Anna Roberts, in
writing about the importance of having people with criminal records on juries,
has explained why "embitterment toward the system" can be a feature, rather
340. See H.R. Res. 702, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Susan Sturm & Haran Tae, Leading with Con-
viction: The Transformative Role of Formerly Incarcerated Leaders in Reducing Mass Incarceration
15-27 (Colum. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 14-547, 2017), https://scholarship
.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3o34&context=facultyscholarship [https://
perma.cc/BV7Y-Z6AE] (describing the experiences of formerly incarcerated people that al-
low them to bring unique and missing perspectives to the world of criminal-justice policy).
341. That the perspective would be different does not mean that it would be monolithic or its
results preordained. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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than a bug, of participation in the criminal system.342 She writes, "Automatic,
cost-free exclusions on the basis of assumed embitterment permit the state to
avoid the consequences of something potentially very wrong with the state."343
In other words, "embitterment" has a source, and that source is worth examin-
ing-why does it exist and what does it say about how or if we should po-
lice?344 Turning the answers to that question into new ideas for how to provide
public safety is one of the goals of the movement push to shift expertise.
An alternate approach, such as procedural justice, would try to encourage
policing practices and priorities that reduce embitterment. But he power lens
implies something different: someone who is embittered should perhaps be
given power over the state institutions about which they have knowledge and
experience. In this view, the embittered are neither the objects of study and
measurement nor participants in a larger consensus-driven effort at legitimacy,
but instead the experts deciding what to measure and how to proceed. This
idea also undergirds recent efforts by academic researchers to engage in partici-
patory-action research - to recognize the wisdom of lived experience and incor-
porate it into knowledge creation, with an aim both to shift power and to create
better scholarship.34 Movements are, in a sense, asking us to make a similar
move: when we shift power to the people who have been harmed by policing,
we are asking them to help us understand it and decide if and how it can be
fixed.
Consider how these ideas play out in the debate over whether people with
criminal records should be a central part of decisionmaking about policing. In
Oaldand, for instance, the coalition of activists behind the establishment of the
new civilian police commission has fought to ensure that individuals with
342. Anna Roberts, Casual Ostracism: Jury Exclusion on the Basis of Criminal Convictions, 98 MINN.
L. REv. 592, 629, 631-34 (2013).
343. Id. at 632.
344. Susan Sturm and Haran Tae describe this source as a "reservoir of ground truth" that is born
from the experience of being directly impacted by the criminal legal system. See Sturm &
Tae, supra note 340, at 16.
345. Emily M.S. Houh & Kristin Kalsem, It's Critical: Legal Participatory Action Research, 19 MICH.
J. RACE & L. 287, 294 (2014) ("'[L]egal participatory action research' ... makes its most sig-
nificant and original contribution to legal scholarship not only by 'looking to the bottom' in
a theoretical sense, but also by treating those 'at the bottom' as equal research partners who
are presumptively best situated to identify, analyze, and solve the problems that directly
affect them."); Johnson, Pelly, Ruhland, Bess, Dariotis & Moore, supra note 47, at 9-12 (de-
scribing participatory-action research in which community members in Cincinnati are col-
lectively redefining public safety alongside academic researchers, using a method that "prior-
itizes shifting research capacities from academic researchers to the communities themselves
by focusing on their needs, strategies, and expertise").
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criminal records can serve on the new oversight board.346 These activists suc-
ceeded in removing a provision of the new law that would have required crimi-
nal background checks of all potential commissioners.34 The presumption, in
fact, became reversed: initial flyers recruiting applicants to apply for the com-
mission encouraged formerly incarcerated people to apply.348 The reaction of the
president of the Oaldand Police Officer's Association (OPOA) underscored the
destabilizing nature of this move, when he titled an op-ed: "Are you serious,
recruiting felons for Oaldand Police Commission?"4 What to the OPOA Pres-
ident seemed obvious - that "felons" cannot be trusted with such a task; that it
is police who best know how policing works350-became a contested idea, an
idea that ultimately lost out with respect to the new Oaldand commission. The
rising concept of expertise, instead, was that someone with a criminal record is
likely to have useful firsthand knowledge of both interacting with the police
and experiencing the harms of everyday police work. This experience, in turn,
gives that person a leg up, rather than a leg down, in becoming an expert on
how to reform the Oaldand Police Department. At the same time, the very pur-
pose of the new commission: to "impose,"351 rather than recommend, policy
and discipline on the police department, gets at a more central idea that people
with criminal records, having been harmed by everyday policing practices, de-
serve power as a collective remedy for that harm.
346. See Rahman & Simonson, supra note 1o, at 709-11 (describing the dispute in Oaldand over
whether there would be a criminal-record check for members of the oversight commission).
347. See Amendments to Enabling Legislation for Police Commission, COALITION FOR POLICE AC-
COUNTABILITY, https://coalitionforpoliceaccountability.files.wordpress.com/2017/06
/proposed-amendments-6-8-rg.doc [https://perma.cc/LLM2-6Z42] (proposing amend-
ments to the ordinance).
348. Id.; see also Application for Commission: Fact Sheet (2019), CITY OF OAKLAND POLICE COMMIS-
SION, https://cao-94612.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/Police-Commission-2o19-
Application-With-Translations-Due-6.17.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GWA-GS9W] (de-
scribing the requirements for the application for position of commissioner); David Debolt,
More than 100 Apply for Powerful Oakland Police Commission, EAST BAY TIMES (July 21, 2017),
http ://www.eastbaytimes.com/2o17/o7/21/hundreds-apply-for-powerful-oaldand-police-
commission [https://perma.cc/K56H-96T8] ("[A] flier promoting the process encouraged
formerly incarcerated individuals to apply.").
349. Barry Donelan, Opinion, Are You Serious, Recruiting Felons for Oakland Police Commission?, E.
BAY TIMES (June 25, 2017), http://www.eastbaytimes.com/2017/o6/25/opinion-convicted-
felons-on-new-police-commission-really [https://perma.cc/JAST-N9M2].
350. Cf Lvovsky, supra note 316, at 1997 (describing the history of the "judicial presumption of
police expertise: the notion that trained, experienced officers develop insight into crime
sufficiently rarefied and reliable to justify deference from courts").
351. Wogan, supra note 138 (emphasis added) (quoting a leading activist as saying, "The [new]
commission will not recommend. It will impose.").
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I do not mean to imply that shifting expertise is simple and devoid of risks,
or that the ways to get there are clear. As I explain in Part II, defining the group
of people to whom power should be shifted is a complicated task, one to which
there is no one right answer. Moreover, a governance arrangement hat shifts
power on its face could recreate existing power imbalances in new ways, for in-
stance by replicating the existing pathologies of white supremacy, heteropatri-
archy, or ableism.35 2 Take the example of people with disabilities, who repre-
sent an enormous percentage of people who are subject to the control of the
carceral state, and especially to the violence of policing.353 The state erects
many barriers to full participatory citizenship for people with disabilities,354 in-
cluding barriers set up by the carceral state. But like so many of our exclusion-
ary pathologies, ableism is not limited to state actions and state structures. So-
cial movements can unwittingly exclude people with disabilities;... so too
could new governance structures that explicitly aim to bring those subject to
the carceral state into the polity. These possibilities do not mean that power
shifting would leave policing policy to be automatically guided by "emotion"
rather than "data," or that it would automatically revert to the "penal populism"
that has characterized so much popular policymaking with respect to the crim-
inal legal system.356 Indeed, the hypothesis of the movement actors who have
352. See FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY
SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL 7 (1977) (arguing that demands for participation from poor peo-
ple too often lead to elite-designed institutions that mute oppositional politics); see also
sources cited supra note 112 (collecting sources describing ways in which policing initiatives
meant to be participatory can end up excluding some parts of the population).
353. See Camille A. Nelson, Frontlines: Policing at the Nexus of Race and Mental Health, 43 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 615 (2016); Camille A. Nelson, Racializing Disability, Disabling Race: Policing
Race and Mental Status, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 16 (2010); Jamelia N. Morgan, Policing
Under Disability Law 3 (Aug. 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
("[D]isabled people experience at disproportionate rates more ordinary forms of policing
that can lead to deadly police violence.").
354. See Rabia Belt, Contemporary Voting Rights Controversies Through the Lens of Disability, 68
STAN. L. REV. 1491, 1493, 1496-98 (2016) (describing the structural difficulties leading to a
participation gap for voters with disabilities).
355. See Jamelia N. Morgan, Disability's Fourth Amendment 9-12 (Aug. 2020) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (describing "[t]he erasure of disability in movements"
against police violence) ; see also Disability Solidarity: Completing the "Vision for Black Lives,"
HARRIET TUBMAN COLLECTIVE, https://harriettubmancollective.tumblr.com
/post/15007231903o/htcvision4blacdives [https://perma.cc/352A-U4FZ] (criticizing the
Movement for Black Lives' Vision for Black Lives for "not once mention[ing] disability,
ableism, audism or the unspeakable violence and Black death found at the intersection of
ableism, audism, and anti-Black racism").
356. Benjamin Levin, De-Democratizing Criminal Law, 39 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 74, 84 (2020) (re-
viewing BARxOW, supra note 28) ("Deciding who gets to claim expertise and who is an ex-
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proposed changes such as community control and the "People's Process" is that
the opposite would be true. But nor would it be easy.
Overall, the debate over the role of experts and data in policing cannot be
solved with the power lens alone. State officials cannot simply shift all power
into the hands of a specific category of people - for example, people with crim-
inal records-walk away, and hope for the best. This would preordain confu-
sion and bacldash. Instead, the state can help those it newly recognizes as ex-
perts to understand and parse through complicated realities together. Or
reformers could engage in tradeoffs, balancing the now-recognized benefits of
shifting power alongside other goals and lenses of reform,357 goals that might
sometimes clash with the goal of power shifting. Once one accepts the power
lens as legitimate and important, the next task emerges: sorting through the
various lenses, determining their relative strengths, and bringing that complete
analysis to bear on specific reform proposals. This is an analysis for another
day.
For now, I conclude by connecting the inversion of our understanding of
expertise that comes from the power lens to broader social movement visions
of the relationship between the state and marginalized communities. I use the
example of the Dream Defenders, a member-based, statewide Florida group
focused on abolitionist organizing and mobilizing young people for racial and
economic justice. In 2018, the Dream Defenders published the Freedom Papers.
The Freedom Papers is a kind of constitutional document, expressing hopes for a
government that respects the freedom of all. 358 It begins with the importance
of collective self-rule and freedom from oppression. At the end of each page,
the refrain "[b]y virtue of being born" is followed with a series of state obliga-
tions and positive rights, including rights to voting, healthcare, food, water,
shelter, and education, as well as state obligations to foster freedom from state
and private violence alike.359 The Freedom Papers then stresses the larger belief
that if the state facilitates the ability of the most marginalized among us to
thrive, we will all thrive. 360
A poem at the end of the Freedom Papers brings together its themes, and it
includes this stanza:
pert necessarily would affect policy outcomes, and rejecting some claims of expertise as too
political, too personal, or too divorced from a more easily quantifiable expert model neces-
sarily has a political valence.").
357. See Part I for a discussion of various goals of police reform.
358. See DREAM DEFENDERS, supra note 181.
359. See, e.g., id. at 3, 5, 7, 9.
360. Id. at 15.
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This is the year four time felons,
Found guilty of falling in traps,
are found running in Miami,
and running in Pahokee,
and running in Duval,
For Senate, and Mayor, and Governor.361
This stanza goes far beyond a demand for the enfranchisement of people
with criminal records, or even a requirement to "listen" to those most affected
through institutions of community justice. It is not just that people with crimi-
nal records should vote, but that they should lead, with a faith in the democrat-
ic justice that would flow from that leadership by virtue of their marginality. Its
underlying idea-that people with criminal records should lead us and should
lead us toward a world in which we do not use criminal law to solve our prob-
lems -is destabilizing, transformative, and possible all at once.362 The Freedom
Papers's vision of elected officials taking on this new vision of expertise and rep-
resentation goes a step beyond the power lens in this Article, involving the
larger democratic process of electing our leaders. The power lens tells us that in
order to get there, we must first alter our power arrangements at a different
scale, within the institutions and methods that set our "expert" policies and de-
cide our priorities for providing safety and helping people thrive. The Freedom
Papers represents the widest potential of the power lens: to transform our ideas
of who should craft our visions of public safety and then design institutions to
allow them to do so in the most productive ways possible.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the social movement focus on shifting power in
police reform creates a lens on policing, the power lens, that adds critical layers
to dominant ways of thinking about the objectives of police reform. For those
interested in democratic justice, the power lens provides a tool to dig into the
levers of control embedded in various police-reform arrangements and to move
beyond traditional notions of consensus-based reform. And for those interested
in broader transformation, and even abolition, shifting power is a necessary
361. Id. at 16.
362. Cf Sturm & Tae, supra note 340, at 77 (describing how leaders with criminal records can
possess an "alchemy of experience, education, and employment, fueled by deep commit-
ment, [that] equips them to play a crucial role in shifting the public narrative and empower-
ing community leadership").
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beginning, a nonreformist reform363 : without opening up the ability of gener-
ally disempowered people, and especially poor Black, Latinx, and Indigenous
Americans, to contest big ideas about how and if the state polices its citizens,
transformation will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. For shifting polit-
ical power can open up policing to contestation over broader ideas about the
existence and form of policing. It can open up governance and policymaking to
the possibility of disinvesting from the police and investing in other forms of
safety. It can even open it up to discussions of defunding or abolishing the po-
lice entirely. This does not mean that contestation will immediately lead to this
transformative change; transformation happens slowly. But the view from so-
cial movements suggests that it might help us push toward a different way of
approaching the state provision of justice and safety.
If we seek the transformation of policing, we should not cling to traditional
means of conceptualizing or measuring success in efforts at change. Nor should
we look to the usual experts to create roadmaps for transformational change.
Today's abolitionist social movement actors do not represent he citizenry, but
they do give us new, collective understandings of how we can relate to each
other and engage in self-governance. And they help us reinterpret the idea of
"reform" itself. We need not limit our horizon of police reform to tinkering
with policing as we know it. As today's social movement actors teach us, reform
can also mean shifting power arrangements in ways that allow us to question
the existence of our institutions of policing themselves.
363. See supra note 41 and accompanying text; see also Akbar, supra note 41, at 102 ("The non-
reformist reform does not aim to create policy solutions to discrete problems; rather it aims
to unleash people power against the prevailing political, economic, and social arrangements
and toward new possibilities.").
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